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Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term 
Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the 
Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit* 
Arlen W. Langvardt** and Kyle T. Langvardt*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Assume that in 2004, a person wishes to borrow and make 
use of the expression contained in a work that was created and 
published in 1922.  Copyright protection on the work took effect 
in 1922, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1909.1  Now 
consider these questions: 
1. Must the prospective user obtain a license—i.e., a grant 
of permission—from the copyright owner in order to avoid 
being liable for infringement when the use occurs? 
2. What if the facts are the same, except that 1923 was the 
year of creation, publication, and copyright commencement? 
The answers to the above questions relate directly to the 
public policy and constitutional issues on which this article will 
focus.  We begin the identification of those issues by offering 
the following answers to the article’s opening quiz: 
1. No, a license is not necessary.  Some law students would 
be quick to argue that this is a trick question because there is 
no copyright owner.  This is because there is no longer a valid 
copyright on the 1922 work.  Even assuming that the copyright 
owner properly renewed the copyright in 1950, the copyright 
expired at the end of 1997.2  The 1922 work is therefore in the 
 
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. 
*** First-year student, University of Chicago Law School (Fall 2004). 
 1. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9-10, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909) 
(amended by the Copyright Act of 1976 and currently codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101-1101 (2000)) [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1909]. 
 2. The 1909 Act called for a basic copyright duration of 28 years from 
publication of the work, with a 28-year renewal term available if the renewal 
procedure was properly completed.  Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, §§ 23-
24.  The 1909 Act was extensively overhauled by the Copyright Act of 1976.  
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (amended in various respects 
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public domain and any person may freely use it regardless of 
the use’s nature or purpose.3 
2. Yes, a license is necessary (assuming that the copyright 
owner renewed the copyright in 1951 and that copyright law’s 
fair use doctrine4 would not protect the use at issue).  The 
copyright on the 1923 work continues to exist and will run 
through 2018.  Copyright protection of the 1922 work and the 
1923 work both arose pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1909, 
but the 1922 copyright has expired and the 1923 is still in 
force.5 
What accounts for the drastically different durations of the 
copyrights on the works described in the above hypotheticals? 
The Copyright Act of 1909 established a maximum 
copyright term of 56 years from the time of publication of the 
copyrighted work.6  Therefore, when copyright protection was 
secured on the 1922 and 1923 works, the copyright owners 
would have expected that their copyrights would run until 1978 
and 1979, respectively.  The duration rules changed, however, 
more than five decades after the two works acquired copyright 
protection.  The 1922 work received only the benefit of the 1976 
 
since enactment; current version codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2000)) 
[hereinafter Copyright Act of 1976].  The Copyright Act of 1976 provided that 
if a work remained under copyright as of January 1, 1978, the 28-year renewal 
term called for by the 1909 Act would instead be a 47-year renewal term—
meaning that the total copyright duration would be 75 years rather than 56 
years.  17 U.S.C. § 304 (1976) (amended 1998).  For further explanation of why 
the copyright on the hypothetical 1922 work ran through the end of 1997, see 
infra note 7 and infra text accompanying note 58. 
 3. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23, 29-30 (2003) (noting that once a copyright expires and the work enters the 
public domain, any party may make unrestricted use of the work). 
 4. Under the fair use doctrine, use of a copyrighted work for such 
purposes as criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or 
research may not amount to copyright infringement, even though the user did 
not obtain permission from the copyright owner.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 5. The explanation of why the copyright on the 1923 work continues to 
exist begins with the statutes cited supra note 2.  Unlike the 1922 work, the 
1923 work received the benefit of the 20-year duration extension provided by 
the Copyright Term Extension Act.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 
(1976)) [hereinafter CTEA].  For further explanation of why the copyright on 
the hypothetical 1923 work has not expired, see infra note 9 and infra text 
accompanying notes 8-9, 59. 
 6. The 1909 Act established a basic copyright duration of 28 years from 
publication of the work, and allowed the option of a 28-year renewal term.  
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 24. 
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enactment that extended the maximum copyright duration for 
pre-1978 works to 75 years.7  Twice blessed, the 1923 work 
qualified not only for the 1976 statute’s 19-year term extension 
but also for the 20-year bonus tacked on by the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA).8  The 1923 work came within 
the CTEA’s coverage by still being under copyright when the 
CTEA took effect in 1998.  The 1997 expiration of the copyright 
on the 1922 work caused that work to miss qualifying for the 
CTEA jackpot by one year.9  Thanks to the CTEA, the 1923 
work carries a 95-year copyright duration.  This is 39 years 
more than the term contemplated by the law in effect at the 
time copyright protection on the work was secured. 
A blunt two-part answer may be offered in response to the 
“What accounts for the drastically different durations?” 
question posed earlier.  First, an accommodating Congress was 
too inclined to please institutional copyright owners and their 
lobbyists, so it granted a huge extension in copyright duration 
in 1998 without paying adequate attention to the public policy 
and constitutional implications of doing so.10  Second, the 
Supreme Court was overly concerned about the practical effects 
of holding the CTEA unconstitutional, so it opted in its Eldred 
v. Ashcroft11 decision for an exceedingly deferential posture 
toward Congress’ enactments pursuant to the Copyright 
Clause.12  In case the reader has not already guessed, the 
 
 7. See supra note 2.  As of January 1, 1978, the 1922 work was still 
under copyright, in what would have been the last year of its renewal term.  
By still being “alive,” in a copyright law sense, as of January 1, 1978, the 1922 
work obtained the benefit of the 1976 Act’s 19-year duration extension.  
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2.  The renewal term that would have been 
28 years therefore became a 47-year renewal term.  As a result, the copyright 
on the 1922 work ran through the end of 1997.  See id. § 305 (copyrights run 
through end of calendar year in which they otherwise would expire). 
 8. CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 102, 112 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304). 
 9. CTEA, supra note 5, § 102(d).  By still being under copyright as of 
January 1, 1978, the 1923 work qualified for the 1976 Act’s 19-year duration 
extension.  See supra note 7.  What would have been a renewal term of 28 
years from 1951 thus became a renewal term of 47 years from 1951.  
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302.  The 47-year renewal term meant 
that the 1923 work was under copyright as of October 1998.  The CTEA took 
effect in October 1998, granting a 20-year duration extension to all existing 
copyrights that remained valid as of the statute’s effective date.  CTEA, supra 
note 5, § 102(d), at 112 Stat. 2827-28.  The 1923 work therefore met the 
necessary condition for obtaining the CTEA bonus. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53, 60-62, 277-295. 
 11. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 97-111, 131-135, 162-163, 340-411. 
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authors sympathize with the blunt objections raised in this 
paragraph. 
This article offers critical analysis of the CTEA, a law that 
increased copyright duration by 20 years for works created 
after the CTEA’s 1998 effective date and for preexisting works 
still under copyright as of 1998.13  The CTEA amounts to a 
massive giveaway to corporate copyright owners and heirs of 
creators of copyrighted works at a steep cost to society.  Among 
the CTEA’s undesirable effects is the freezing of the public 
domain.  We are in the initial stages of a two-decade period in 
which no copyrights will expire and no works will enter the 
public domain.  This throws off the balance contemplated by 
the framers in the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and serves 
as one of the reasons why the CTEA should have been regarded 
by courts as not merely unwise but unconstitutional.14 
In addition, this article examines the Eldred decision in 
which the Supreme Court held that the CTEA passed 
constitutional muster despite its questionable public policy.15  
The Eldred assessment set forth here reveals serious 
deficiencies in the Court’s analysis and demonstrates why 
Justice Breyer had the better of the argument.  In his dissent, 
Justice Breyer asserted that the CTEA reflected “failings of 
constitutional kind.”16  Recognizing that Eldred, even if 
wrongly decided, has resolved nearly all questions concerning 
the CTEA’s constitutionality, this article will explore that 
decision’s implications for the future of copyright law and 
policy.  In doing so, we offer recommendations for future 
copyright-related courses of action on the part of Congress, 
courts, copyright owners, and users of copyrighted works.17 
II.  COPYRIGHT DURATION: THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
A. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE 1790, 1831, AND 1909 ACTS 
Placing the CTEA in proper perspective requires 
consideration of the history of congressional enactments 
 
 13. CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 302, 304(b). 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 166-173, 210-222, 246-252, 266-
267, 274-276, 290-295, 395-399. 
 15. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.  For extensive examination of Eldred, see 
Part III of this article. 
 16. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  We explore Justice Breyer’s dissent 
in a later subsection.  See infra Part III.C. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
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dealing with copyright duration.  The U.S. Constitution grants 
Congress the power to legislate with regard to copyrights and 
patents in Article I, § 8: “Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18  The 
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” portion of 
the clause has been characterized as a limitation on the grant 
of power to Congress because it states the objective that 
congressional exercises of the power must fulfill.19  This portion 
of the clause and its proper role will receive further attention 
later in the article.20  Congress is also cabined by the Copyright 
Clause’s “limited Times” language: Congress cannot 
constitutionally make copyright protection perpetual.21  Thus, 
the matter of copyright duration has a constitutional 
dimension. 
Congress enacted the first federal copyright law in 1790.  It 
granted rights to creators of new works as well as creators of 
preexisting works.22  The 1790 Act established a copyright 
duration of 14 years from the date of the work’s publication, 
with a 14-year renewal term being available if the creator 
survived the basic term.23  In 1831, Congress amended the 
copyright duration rule to provide for a basic term of 28 years 
but made no change in the length of the possible renewal 
term.24  The duration rule established by the 1831 Act applied 
to works created after the statute’s effective date and to 
preexisting works that were still in their initial copyright term 
at the time the statute took effect.25 
After the 1831 Act, 78 years elapsed before Congress again 
lengthened copyright duration.  In the Copyright Act of 1909, 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 19. See e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. 212; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
5 (1966). 
 20. See infra Part IV.B. 
 21. See e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-209 (suggesting that when the Court 
affirmed past copyright term extensions as being constitutionally valid in 
accordance with “limited Times,” it did not imply that the Constitution 
authorized perpetually unlimited times). 
 22. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed by Act of Apr. 29, 
1802, ch. 36, Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, and by Act 
of June 30, 1834, ch. 157). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37. 
 25. Id. §§ 1, 16. 
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Congress added 14 years to the previous maximum duration of 
42 years.26  The 1909 Act established a maximum copyright 
duration of 56 years from publication—28 years for the basic 
term plus another 28 for the renewal term provided that the 
renewal right was properly exercised.27 
B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 
The Copyright Act of 1976 took effect January 1, 1978.  
With it, Congress effected a major overhaul of copyright law.28  
Congress concluded that for future works, copyright duration 
should be determined on some basis other than the basic-term-
plus-renewal approach of previous copyright law.29  Two key 
factors led to this conclusion.  First, the potentially harsh 
nature of the renewal requirement meant that a copyright 
owner’s slip-up in filing renewal paperwork could result in the 
receipt of only 28 years of copyright protection.  Second, the 
basic-term-plus-renewal approach was incompatible with the 
duration provision called for by the Berne Convention, an 
important international agreement that the United States 
seemed likely to join in the near future.30  Congress therefore 
 
 26. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1. 
 27. See id.  Failure to take appropriate steps to renew the copyright 
during the final year of the basic term meant that the work passed into the 
public domain at the end of the basic term.  See id. 
 28. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 264 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to 1976 Act as having 
“thoroughly revised copyright law”).  Details concerning the many changes 
made by the 1976 Act, other than those dealing with copyright duration, are 
largely beyond the scope of this article.  However, we occasionally address a 
rules-change made by the 1976 Act if it bears at least a general relationship to 
the matter of duration.  See, e.g., infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 29. See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134-35 (1976) (listing rationales for 
changing to duration based on the life of the author). 
 30. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 9.02 (1995) (noting the “clumsy renewal structure” of the 1909 Act); Patrick 
H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 658 (2002) (the 1909 renewal 
system resulted in a “substantial burden and expense to the author;” further, 
the United States needed to join the Berne Convention); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
194-95 (the 1976 Act aligned the United States with the Berne Convention) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 259, 264-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (the 1976 Act 
allowed the United States to conform to “an important international treaty”); 
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135-36 (the extended copyright term was required 
by the Berne Convention); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 118 (1975) (without the 
proposed “life-plus 50” term, the United States would not be able to adhere to 
the Berne Convention).  The Berne Convention required subscribing nations to 
provide, in their respective copyright laws, that copyright protection would 
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established a different set of duration rules for works created in 
1978 or thereafter.31  The basic rule for the duration of works 
created on or after January 1, 1978 became the life of the 
creator plus 50 years.32  Joint-creator works produced in 1978 
or later were to receive copyright protection for the life of the 
last surviving creator plus 50 years.33  In choosing a “life plus 
50” framework for the basic rule and the joint-creator rule, 
Congress borrowed from the Berne Convention’s duration 
provision.34 
The 1976 Act’s revised duration rules included a separate 
provision dealing with works-for-hire.35  Works-for-hire created 
on or after January 1, 1978 would be protected for 75 years 
from first publication of the work or 100 years from the work’s 
creation, whichever came first.36  Anonymous or pseudonymous 
works created on or after January 1, 1978 have the same 
duration.37 
 
last for a minimum of 50 years beyond the creator’s life.  Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris, 
July 24, 1971, art. 7, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention].  The United States did not formally join the Berne Convention 
until 1989, after Congress made other necessary changes in U.S. copyright 
law.  See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  Nevertheless, the 
duration changes made in the 1976 Act proved critical to that effort. Eldred, 
537 U.S. at 195; id. at 259, 264-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting); H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476, at 135-36; S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 118. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.  The 1976 Act also departed 
from prior law by making creation of the work, rather than the publication 
thereof, the key event triggering the commencement of copyright protection.  
Compare Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 102 with Copyright Act of 
1909, supra note 1, §§ 9-10.  As will be seen, the longstanding duration rule 
that called for a basic term of 28 years from publication plus a possible 
renewal term continues to govern copyrighted pre-1978 works, though the 
1976 Act lengthened the renewal term for qualifying pre-1978 works.  
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304; see also infra text accompanying 
notes 38-41.  Works created prior to 1978 but not published until 1978 or later 
were made subject to the newly developed rules for works created on or after 
January 1, 1978.  Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 303. 
 32. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302(a). 
 33. Id. § 302(b). 
 34. Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 7. 
 35. The requirements for a work to constitute a work-for-hire to exist are 
currently set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  When a work-for-hire, exists, the 
copyright owner is the employer or the party for whom (or for which) the 
employee or the independent contractor prepared the work 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) 
(2000). 
 36. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302(c). 
 37. Id. 
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Congress also revisited the duration rule for pre-1978 
works (the 28-plus-28 rule set forth in the 1909 Act).38  The 
maximum 56-year duration established in the 1909 Act seemed 
likely to be a shorter period of copyright protection than the 
average term of protection under the life-plus-50 rule for works 
created in 1978 or thereafter.39  Therefore, as part of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress modified the 1909 Act’s 
duration rule by providing that if a pre-1978 work was under 
either its basic term or renewal term as of January 1, 1978, the 
renewal term would be 47 years rather than 28.40  The 
maximum duration for qualifying pre-1978 works thus became 
75 years from publication.41 
The duration change just described accounts for the 75-
year duration of the copyright on the work referred to in the 
first of the two hypotheticals with which this article opened.  
Let us return briefly to that first hypothetical.  In view of the 
28-plus-28 rule of the 1909 Act, the work created and published 
in 1922 would have received 56 years of copyright protection 
and would then have passed into the public domain if not for 
the extension provided for by the 1976 Act.  Because the 1922 
work’s copyright remained valid as of January 1, 1978, the 
renewal term that would have been 28 years under the 1909 
Act became 47 years under the 1976 Act.  This meant that the 
copyright on the 1922 work ran for 75 years, through the end of 
1997.42 
 
 38. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 23. 
 39. Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How 
Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 698-99 (2000) 
(comments of Jane C. Ginsburg). 
 40. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304. 
 41. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304.  The foregoing explanation 
simplifies a somewhat more complex historical reality.  The major copyright 
overhaul that finally took place in the 1976 Act required more than a decade of 
legislative preparation to accomplish.  Confident that the overhaul almost 
certainly would include duration modifications but not knowing exactly when 
the full statute would be ready for enactment, Congress, beginning in 1962, 
passed a series of annual extensions of durations on copyrights that were in 
their renewal terms.  RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT DENICOLA, CASES ON 
COPYRIGHT 481 (7th ed. 1998).  These annual extensions kept the copyrights 
on many works alive long enough to enable them to receive the 75-year 
duration established in the 1976 Act for qualifying pre-1978 works.  Id.; 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (2003). 
 42. See citations and explanation in supra note 7. 
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C. THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT OF 1998 
The 1976 Act granted an additional 19 years of copyright 
protection to qualifying pre-1978 works and substituted new 
rules that lengthened the average copyright term for works 
created in 1978 or thereafter.  In doing so, the 1976 Act 
increased copyright duration to a greater degree than had the 
earlier extensions enacted by Congress.43  The jump in 
copyright term from 56 years to 75 or more years was not 
enough, however, as far as some copyright owners were 
concerned.  The 1990s witnessed a significant behind-the-
scenes lobbying effort, mounted largely by corporate copyright 
owners, for another statutory extension of copyright duration.44  
Among the leading proponents of a term extension was The 
Walt Disney Company.45  Its copyright on the “Steamboat 
Willie” cartoon, which featured the first depiction of the Mickey 
Mouse character, was set to expire in the very early years of 
the 21st Century unless a term extension became law.46  In 
addition, other Disney copyrights were destined for the same 
fate in steady succession if the duration rule remained as it 
was.47 
The lobbyists and the sponsors of the relevant legislation 
stressed the supposed benefits that both corporate and 
individual copyright owners would receive from a duration 
extension.48  They relied on the support of organizations such 
 
 43. The extensions established in the 1909 and 1831 statutes had each 
been 14 years in length.  Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 24; Act of Feb. 
3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439. 
 44. For accounts of the lobbying effort, see Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: 
Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
199, 203-04, 229, 232-33, 235 (2002); Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, 
BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Aug. 29, 1999; Bill McAllister, A Capital Way to 
Stop a Headache, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A21; Brigid McMenamin, 
Mickey’s Mine!, FORBES MAGAZINE, Aug. 23, 1999, at 43; Dinitia Smith, 
Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties?  Even Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1998, at B7, B9; John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2. 
 45. See generally, supra note 44. 
 46. See generally, supra note 44. 
 47. See generally, supra note 44. 
 48. See 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch, co-sponsor of the CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390-92 (daily ed. Feb. 
22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch when extension bill was first considered in 
1995); 141 CONG. REC. S3393 (statement of Sen. Feinstein, co-sponsor of 
CTEA, when extension bill was first considered in 1995); Fonda, supra note 
44; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21; Smith, supra note 44, at A1. 
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as the Motion Picture Association of America, the estates of 
well-known composers such as George and Ira Gershwin, and 
the estates of less famous creators.49  The CTEA’s proponents 
also paraded before congressional committees an assortment of 
musical artists who urged enactment of the duration 
extension.50  The well-financed backers of the legislation had 
little difficulty drowning out the objections of those who 
questioned the wisdom and constitutionality of extending 
copyright duration yet again.51  As a result, the CTEA became 
 
 49. See supra note 48. 
 50. Quincy Jones provided testimony to a House subcommittee.  Hearing 
on H.R. 989 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 233-39 (1995) [hereinafter 
Hearing on H.R. 989] (statement of Quincy Jones in regard to CTEA 
forerunner when bill was under consideration in 1995).  Bob Dylan, Don 
Henley, and Carlos Santana expressed their views to a Senate committee.  
Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
55-56 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Senate Hearings] (statement of Bob Dylan in 
regard to CTEA forerunner when bill was under consideration in 1995); id. at 
56-57 (statement of Don Henley regarding same bill); id. at 57 (statement of 
Carlos Santana regarding same bill).  The hearings dealing with what later 
became the CTEA occurred in 1995, when congressional committees first 
considered extending existing and future copyrights by 20 years.  See S. 483, 
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong. (1995).  The extension bill became 
stalled over another copyright issue, namely, whether restaurants, bars, and 
other small businesses should have to pay performance fees to song copyright 
owners when they played the radio or television at their establishments.  
Karjala, supra note 44, at 204 n.21; Fonda, supra note 44.  That issue was not 
resolved until 1998, when Congress settled on the terms of the Fairness in 
Music Licensing Act (FMLA).  Congress then revived the CTEA proposal and, 
in short order, enacted it along with the FMLA.  CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 102(b) 
& 102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-28; Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
298, §§ 201-07, 112 Stat. 2830 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 110).  In doing so, 
Congress did not conduct further hearings of an extensive nature on the 
duration-extension issues.  Fonda, supra note 44.  See McMenamin, supra note 
44, at 43; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2. 
 51. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-27; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21; 
Smith, supra note 44, at B7; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.  When it enacted 
the CTEA, Congress “acceded to the demands of noncreative heirs and 
assignees.”  Karjala, supra note 44, at 199.  Professor Dennis Karjala worked 
tirelessly in seeking to inform Congress of the problems with the CTEA when 
it was first proposed in 1995 and when it resurfaced in 1998.  See, e.g., 
Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors In Opposition 
to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act, 
Submitted to the Committees on the Judiciary, Senate and House of 
Representatives, 105th Cong. (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Statement of 
Copyright Law Professors] (statement of Dennis S. Karjala, representing group 
of approximately 60 copyright and intellectual property law professors); 
Written Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, on H.R. 989, A 
Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, With Respect to the Duration of 
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law with almost no opposition in Congress and with minimal 
public fanfare.52  One assumes, however, that there was plenty 
of fanfare in certain corporate boardrooms and offices.53 
Congress officially named the CTEA the “Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act,” in memory of the late 
entertainer-turned-Congressman, who had favored the 
legislation.54 Bettering the previous length-of-extension record 
by one year, the CTEA tacked on 20 years to the copyright 
terms of both pre-1978 works and works created in 1978 or 
thereafter.55  The CTEA thus applied both retrospectively (to 
certain works that existed prior to its enactment) and 
prospectively (to works created after it took effect in 1998). 
For a pre-1978 work to qualify for the 20-year extension 
established in the CTEA, the work’s copyright must still have 
been valid in either the basic term or the renewal term as of 
 
Copyright, 104th Cong. (July 13, 1995) (written testimony of Dennis S. 
Karjala, representing group of approximately 45 copyright and intellectual 
property law professors); see link to Opposing Copyright Extension, at 
http:www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala (site maintained by Dennis S. 
Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University) (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).  
In the constitutional challenge that made its way to the Supreme Court, 
Professor Lawrence Lessig took the lead.  See infra notes 398, 415; infra text 
accompanying notes 416-417, 422. 
 52. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-26; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.  
For discussion of the circumstances surrounding the CTEA’s 1998 enactment 
after bills proposing the same duration extension had been put on legislative 
hold in 1995, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-28; McMenamin, supra note 44, at 43; 
Solomon, supra note 44, at E2. 
 54. CETA, supra note 5.  Originally, Bono had favored making copyright 
protection perpetual, though one assumes he must have backed off from that 
position upon being informed that the Constitution prohibited Congress from 
taking such action.  See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film 
Preservation: Hearing on H.R. 989 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Courts 
and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 94 
(1995) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono, raising question about whether 
copyrights should ever expire).  See also 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 
7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono, who succeeded her late husband in the 
House, noting that Sonny Bono had favored perpetual copyright protection but 
that she had been “informed by staff” of the unconstitutionality of such a move 
by Congress). 
 55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000).  Professor Karjala has observed that no 
pro-CTEA speakers—whether witnesses at hearings or members of 
Congress—attempted to make a special case for the statute’s prospective 
application.  Instead, witnesses and members of Congress focused in their 
statements on the supposed need to extend the duration of existing copyrights.  
See Karjala, supra note 44, at 204, 216.  This fact seems to demonstrate the 
real object of congressional attention on the question of duration extension.  
See id. 
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October 1998.56  Many of the pre-1978 works that had received 
the 1976 Act’s 19-year term extension also qualified for the 
CTEA’s 20-year extension.  Under the CTEA, the renewal term 
for qualifying pre-1978 works has become 67 years, with the 
total copyright duration for such works now being 95 years.57 
We return, for illustrative purposes, to the hypotheticals 
with which this article began.  As explained in the earlier 
discussion of the first hypothetical, the 1922 work qualified for 
the lengthened renewal term of 47 years established by the 
1976 Act’s extension of the 28-year renewal term called for by 
the statute under which the work’s copyright arose.  The 47-
year renewal term ran through the end of 1997.  Accordingly, 
the copyright on the 1922 work expired just prior to the CTEA’s 
1998 enactment, meaning that the work did not qualify for the 
20 additional years of protection contemplated by the CTEA.58 
The story is significantly different, however, for the work 
described in the second hypothetical.  That work’s year of 
creation, publication, and copyright acquisition was 1923.  The 
1951 renewal of the copyright on the work meant that the work 
clearly remained under copyright as of January 1, 1978.  The 
renewal term therefore would have lasted for 47 years from 
1951, if not for the CTEA’s further sweetening of the pot.  
Measuring 47 years from the time of copyright renewal in 1951 
would yield a date in 1998.  Because copyrights run until the 
end of the relevant year, the copyright on the 1923 work would 
have expired at the end of 1998 if the CTEA had not been 
enacted.  But because the 1923 work was still under copyright 
as of the October 1998 effective date of the CTEA, the 1923 
work qualified for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus.  The copyright on 
that work therefore will not expire until the end of 2018.59 
Consider, too, the similar good fortune of The Walt Disney 
Company, whose copyright on the “Steamboat Willie” cartoon 
would have entered the public domain on January 1, 2004 if the 
CTEA had not been enacted.60  Instead, that copyright will 
remain valid through 2023.  Also put off for 20 years each are 
the other copyright expirations that, if not for the CTEA, 
Disney would regularly have experienced after the expiration of 
 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), (b). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See supra note 7. 
 59. See supra note 9. 
 60. Fonda, supra note 44, at 25; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21; 
Solomon, supra note 44, at E2. 
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the Steamboat Willie copyright.  The same is true of many 
other owners—whether corporate persons or natural persons—
of pre-1978 work copyrights that would have expired beginning 
January 1, 1999 had the CTEA not come to the rescue. 
The CTEA’s application to qualifying pre-1978 works, as 
detailed in the preceding paragraphs, has produced a 
noteworthy effect: a frozen public domain.  Since the CTEA’s 
enactment, no works have entered the public domain.  None 
will do so until the thaw begins on January 1, 2019.61  This 
CTEA effect will receive further attention later in the article.62 
We now turn to the CTEA’s application to works created on 
or after January 1, 1978.  Here, the CTEA did not cause the 
immediately visible and dramatic effect it produced regarding 
certain pre-1978 works: significantly delaying the entry into 
the public domain of works that were on the verge of entering 
it.63  In view of the life-plus-50 rule established in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 for most works created in 1978 or 
thereafter, January 1, 2029 was the earliest time any work in 
that category could have entered the public domain.64  For the 
vast majority of works in that category, the time of copyright 
expiration would have been much later.  The CTEA’s addition 
of 20 years to the duration of copyrights on works created on or 
after January 1, 197865 thus put off an inevitability that 
 
 61. Copyrights run until the end of the relevant calendar year.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 305 (2000).  Therefore, any work whose copyright survived into 1998 
qualified for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus, which applied not only to future 
copyrights but also to existing copyrights that were still in effect as of the 
statute’s 1998 effective date.  Id. §§ 302 & 304.  Any copyright that would have 
expired at the end of 1998 will, thanks to the CTEA, run through 2018.  Id. § 
304(b).  Hence, no works have entered the public domain since January 1, 
1998 (the date of entry of works whose copyrights expired at the end of 1997).  
The public domain will receive no additions until January 1, 2019.  See id. 
 62. See infra text accompanying notes 173, 210-222, 274-276, 290-295, 
395-396, 411-415. 
 63. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).  For illustrative purposes, consider the 
case of a person who created a copyrighted work in 1978 and then died that 
same year.  The life-plus-50 rule, operating in conjunction with the rule that 
copyrights exist until the end of the relevant year, would have dictated a 
copyright duration running through 2028.  Id. § 305.  Hence, January 1, 2029 
would have been the underlying work’s date of entry into the public domain—
the earliest possible public domain entry date under the pre-CTEA rule 
governing the duration of works created in 1978 or thereafter.  Post-CTEA, 
such works cannot enter the public domain until January 1, 2049 at the 
earliest.  17 U.S.C. § 302. 
 65. In regard to works created in 1978 or thereafter, the CTEA’s 
application was both retrospective (to works created between January 1, 1978 
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already seemed rather distant.  Even so, the long-term 
significance of this aspect of the CTEA will be considerable, as 
will be discussed extensively in this article. 
With the enactment of the CTEA, the duration rule for 
most copyrighted works created on or after January 1, 1978 has 
become life of the creator plus 70 years.66  The CTEA similarly 
adjusted the rule for joint-creator works.67  That duration rule 
now speaks in terms of the life of the last surviving creator plus 
70 years (increased from 50).68  Finally, the CTEA added 20 to 
the relevant numbers of years set forth in the rules governing 
the duration of copyrights on works-for-hire and anonymous 
and pseudonymous works.69  Those rules now call for a 
duration of 95 years from first publication (increased from 75) 
or 120 years from creation (increased from 100), whichever 
comes first.70 
Congress may have acted unwisely when it enacted the 
CTEA, but did it act unconstitutionally?  Eldred v. Ashcroft71 
presented that fundamental question.  In the following section, 
we offer an in-depth examination of Eldred. 
III.  THE ELDRED V. ASHCROFT DECISION 
The plaintiffs in Eldred were providers of products or 
services that involved the use of public domain works.72  They 
filed suit against the United States Attorney General in an 
effort to have the CTEA declared unconstitutional.73  The 
 
and the CTEA’s 1998 enactment) and prospective (to works created after the 
CTEA’s enactment).  17 U.S.C. § 302.  Pre-CTEA works created from 1978 on 
were made subject to the same qualifying condition applied to pre-1978 works: 
that they still were under copyright at the time the CTEA came on the scene.  
Id.  See id. § 304(a), (b).  Unlike the pre-1978 works, some of which qualified 
for the CTEA jackpot and some of which did not, all pre-CTEA works created 
on or after January 1, 1978 would have satisfied the qualifying condition.  
Under the life-plus-50 rule that existed prior to the CTEA, no copyright on a 
work created in 1978 or thereafter could have expired any earlier than the end 
of 2028.  See supra note 64. 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 67. Id. § 302(b). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 302(c). 
 70. Id. 
 71. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 72. Id. at 193. 
 73. Id.  The lead plaintiff, Eric Eldred, operates a website on which he 
provided free access to copies of a wide range of public domain works.  See 
http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).  For a profile of 
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above-described 20-year freeze on the public domain caused the 
plaintiffs immediate concern because they very soon would 
have had unrestricted ability to use many works that were on 
the verge of entering the public domain at the time the CTEA 
was enacted.  As previously explained, however, the CTEA 
delayed those works’ entry date into the public domain by two 
decades.  In addition, the CTEA’s long-term consequences for 
the public domain troubled the plaintiffs.74 
Recognizing that merely demonstrating why the CTEA was 
bad policy would not enable them to win the case, the plaintiffs 
stressed, as grounds for judicial intervention, what they 
regarded as constitutional infirmities in the CTEA.  The U.S. 
District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the CTEA 
violated the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and First 
Amendment, and granted the Attorney General judgment on 
the pleadings.75  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed and later denied both rehearing and 
rehearing en banc.76 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two 
questions: “whether the CTEA’s extension of existing 
copyrights exceeds Congress’ power under the Copyright 
Clause; and whether the CTEA’s extension of existing and 
future copyrights violates the First Amendment.”77  With Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and Thomas joining an opinion authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and held that the CTEA violated neither the Copyright 
Clause nor the First Amendment.78  The following subsections 
summarize Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and the 
separate dissents of Justices Stevens and Breyer.  After those 
subsections, we subject the decision to careful analysis. 
 
Eldred, see Fonda, supra note 44. 
 74. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Eldred v. Reno, 
239 F.3d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 
255 F.3d 849 (2001), aff’d sub nom.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  
See also Fonda, supra note 44 (discussing Eldred’s concerns about CTEA). 
 75. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 76. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375-76, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing and 
rehearing en banc denied, 255 F.3d 847 (2001). 
 77. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.  The first of these questions reflected Eldred’s 
decision to focus (in the Supreme Court proceedings) on the CTEA’s 
retrospective application.  Id. at 193. 
 78. Id. at 187-91 (syllabus); see also id. at 194,198, 204-05, 208-09, 221-22.  
Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.  Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. 
at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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A. THE GINSBURG MAJORITY OPINION 
Early in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the 
petitioners (referred to here collectively as “Eldred”) did not 
contest the validity of the CTEA insofar as it applied to 
copyrights arising after the statute’s effective date.79  Eldred’s 
position was that the CTEA’s unconstitutionality resided in its 
application to existing copyrights.80  The court was 
unsympathetic to Eldred’s primary contention: that the 
Copyright Clause bars Congress from extending the terms of 
existing copyrights.81 
With the Court not previously having had occasion to 
decide whether Congress could constitutionally lengthen the 
duration of existing copyrights,82 Justice Ginsburg began by 
observing that the CTEA was merely the latest in a long series, 
stretching back nearly as far as the Constitution itself, of 
retroactive extensions of term length.83  The first in the series, 
she asserted, was the Copyright Act of 1790.  The 1790 Act, 
which set a basic copyright term and provided for the 
possibility of a renewal term, applied not only to new works but 
also to already existing works that had been subject to state 
copyright.84  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg noted, the duration 
extensions of the 1831 Act, the 1909 Act, and the 1976 Act 
applied to existing as well as future works.85 
Justice Ginsburg characterized Eldred’s argument as one 
that “essentially reads into the text of the Copyright Clause the 
command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever 
‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable.’”86  Rejecting such a view, the Court 
reasoned that a congressional decision to extend the term of 
existing copyrights did not in and of itself create tension with 
 
 79. Id. at 193. 
 80. Id. at 193, 198.  See id. at 221-22.  In the lower courts, Eldred had 
made a broader challenge, arguing that the CTEA was unconstitutional in its 
retrospective and prospective applications.  See Eldred 239 F.3d at 373-74. 
 81. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204; see also id. at 208, 219. 
 82. Id. at 202. 
 83. Id. at 194-96. 
 84. Id. at 194, 200.  Justice Stevens disputed Justice Ginsburg’s 
characterization of the 1790 Act as the first in a series of duration extensions 
for existing copyrights.  Instead of being a duration extension, he said, the 
1790 Act created the federal copyright regime.  Id. at 230-32 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  See infra text accompanying notes 181-182. 
 85. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194, 200-01, 204. 
 86. Id. at 199-200. 
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the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” provision.87  Justice 
Ginsburg then added an observation to which she would return 
later: “there [was] no cause to suspect that a purpose to evade 
the ‘limited Times’ prescription prompted Congress to adopt the 
CTEA.”88 
As a possible further indication that Congress may 
constitutionally apply a term extension to existing copyrights, 
the Court noted that during the first part of the 19th Century, 
Congress had extended the duration of individual patents on 
various occasions.89  Congress, moreover, had done so with 
judicial approval in cases in which Chief Justice Marshall and 
Justice Story sat as circuit justices.90  Because the patent 
authority of Congress stems from the same constitutional 
source as its copyright authority, the Court concluded that the 
early judicial decisions on patent term extensions were relevant 
to the proper resolution of the current CTEA-related issues.91  
Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that in an 1843 decision, the 
Supreme Court had approved the retrospective application of a 
change in requirements for patentability.92  If changes in 
patent law could be applied in that fashion, Justice Ginsburg 
reasoned, the same should be true of a new provision on 
copyright duration.93 
According to the Eldred majority, the congressional 
rationale for applying copyright duration adjustments to 
existing works has traditionally been founded in a principle of 
equity: that it would be unfair to grant more favorable terms of 
 
 87. Id.  The Court stated that if a time period would be considered limited 
as applied to future copyrights, it still would be limited as to existing 
copyrights even though it extended the expiration point established in prior 
law.  Id.  This assumes, of course, that the extension did not go so far as to 
eliminate any expiration point and thereby make copyrights perpetual in 
duration.  See id. 
 88. Id. at 199-200; see id. 209-10 & n.16.  For consideration of the 
meaning and potential implications of the Court’s statements in this regard, 
see infra text accompanying notes 340-349, 459-464; see also infra note 411. 
 89. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201-202. 
 90. Id. at 202.  The well-aged cases cited by the Court were Evans v. 
Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 874 (C.C. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (Marshall, Circuit 
Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 
648, 650 (C.C. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518) (Story, Circuit Justice); and Evan v. 
Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 888 (C.C. Md. 1813) (No. 4,571).  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
202. 
 91. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201. 
 92. Id. at 202-03.  McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (1843), was the 160-
year-old decision cited by the Court.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202-03. 
 93. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203-04. 
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protection to authors whose works acquired copyright 
protection the day those terms took effect than to authors 
whose works came under copyright a short time earlier.94  
Since the 19th Century, Congress had frequently acted on this 
principle.95  The Court regarded the CTEA’s retroactive 
application as being in line with the “consistent historical 
practice” of Congress.96  Taking into account “text, history, and 
precedent,” Justice Ginsburg stated, “we cannot agree with 
[Eldred’s] submission that extending the duration of existing 
copyrights is categorically beyond Congress’ authority under 
the Copyright Clause.”97 
Having satisfied itself that the CTEA complied with the 
“limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause, the Court 
turned its attention to whether the CTEA’s retroactive 
component was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause 
authority.98  As Justice Ginsburg recounted, Congress had 
concerns regarding U.S. copyright law’s duration provisions in 
relation to the copyright term provided for in the European 
Union.99  A 1993 EU directive had instructed all member states 
to adopt a term of life of the creator plus 70 years.100  The EU 
operates under the rule of the shorter term, which means that 
if a work is under copyright outside the EU, the EU regards the 
copyright as expired once either the EU term or the foreign 
term has passed.101  In other words, even though an EU-
copyrighted work would pass into the EU’s public domain only 
after the work’s author had been dead 70 years, a U.S.-
copyrighted work would pass into the EU’s public domain a 
mere 50 years after the author’s death—so long as life-plus-50 
 
 94. Id. at 204. 
 95. Id.  The Court stressed that the copyright duration extensions set 
forth in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts had involved attempts on the part of 
the Congress to “place[] existing and future copyrights in parity.”  Id. at 194, 
208. 
 96. See id. at 204. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  Justice Ginsburg wasted little time in pointing out that the 
Court’s review in this regard would involve paying considerable deference to 
Congress and that she disapproved of Justice Breyer’s proposal for a form of 
heightened review.  Id. at 205 & n.10.  She asserted that her colleague’s 
“stringent version of rationality is unknown to our literary property 
jurisprudence.”  Id.  Justice Breyer’s proposal receives discussion at infra 
notes 206-209, 409 and accompanying text. 
 99. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-206. 
 100. Id. at 205. 
 101. Id. 
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remained the duration set by U.S. law.  Congress presumably 
concluded that extending the term of copyright by 20 years 
would afford U.S. authors the same protections in Europe as 
those provided to EU authors, and would make the U.S. a more 
attractive location for the creation and dissemination of 
copyrightable works.102 
Justice Ginsburg also observed that Congress had certain 
“demographic, economic, and technological” trends in mind 
when it considered the CTEA.103  For one, an extended term 
would give copyright owners added incentive to put out new 
editions of copyrighted works, to restore them, and to bring 
about their greater public distribution.104  In light of new 
technologies, media, and means of distribution, this aim 
appeared especially important.105  Some members of Congress, 
moreover, expressed concern that in view of increases in life 
expectancies and the tendencies of people to have children later 
in life, the life-plus-50 term could be insufficient to ensure that 
royalties from an author’s work would not be cut off before all 
of his or her children and grandchildren die.106  Accordingly, 
Congress concluded that life-plus-70 would be a more enticing 
term to family-minded potential authors.107  In reaching this 
conclusion, Congress evidently took into account the committee 
hearing testimony of “prominent artists” such as Quincy Jones, 
Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana, who “expressed 
the belief that the copyright system’s assurance of fair 
compensation for themselves and their heirs was an incentive 
 
 102. See id. at 205-06 (majority opinion).  In his dissent, Justice Breyer 
stressed that contrary to the impression the Court may have left, the CTEA’s 
supposed harmonization of U.S. law with EU law was woefully incomplete.  Id. 
at 257-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See infra text accompanying notes 243-245, 
319-320. 
 103. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206. 
 104. Id. at 207. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 207 n.14. 
 107. Id.  Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that for would-be creators, the 
lengthened term would not furnish any meaningful work-creation incentive 
beyond what the already substantial copyright duration would have provided.  
Id. at 255-56 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  He also stressed that the lengthened 
term could not possibly furnish an incentive for the creation of an already 
created work.  Id.  Discussion of Justice Breyer’s dissent appears at in Part 
III.C.  For critical analysis of the Eldred majority’s treatment of the Copyright 
Clause’s incentive requirement and the incentive issues presented by the 
CTEA, see infra text accompanying notes 325-339. 
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to create.”108  The Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, also 
offered committee hearing testimony that extending the 
duration of existing copyrights could furnish additional income 
that would help finance the creation of new works.109 
The Eldred majority made no attempt to determine 
whether the conclusions reached by Congress were 
unassailable or whether the supporting testimony and 
considerations taken into account by Congress reflected 
soundness in all respects.  After noting that the inquiry into 
whether the CTEA was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause 
authority required the Court to “defer substantially” to the 
judgments of Congress, Justice Ginsburg stressed that the 
CTEA “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, 
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside [its] domain.”110 
Justice Ginsburg appeared to acknowledge that there was 
room for doubt about whether the 20-year duration extension 
called for by the CTEA was good public policy.  She 
emphasized, however, that the Court was “not at liberty to 
second-guess congressional determinations and policy 
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise 
they may be.”111  Holding that the CTEA passed the lenient 
rationality test, the Court issued a less-than-ringing 
endorsement: “[W]e cannot conclude that the CTEA . . . is an 
impermissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright 
Clause.”112 
The Court then turned to other Copyright Clause 
arguments raised by Eldred—arguments that Justice Ginsburg 
regarded as resting on “several novel readings” of the clause.113  
Addressing Eldred’s concern that retroactive extensions of 
copyrights could be strung together in a way that would make 
 
 108. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08 n.15.  This quartet’s comments and 
apparent influence on Congress will receive further attention later in the 
article.  See infra text accompanying notes 277-285. 
 109. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08 n.15.  The comment attributed to Peters is 
a curious one.  A general system of copyright protection may, of course, lead to 
income from a particular work—income that could help support a creator at 
the time he or she is creating another work.  Any income from the extra 20 
years of copyright protection on an earlier work, however, could not possibly 
help a long-deceased creator produce another work by writing from the grave.  
See id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 205. 
 111. Id. at 208. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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for an effectively perpetual term, Justice Ginsburg wrote that 
there was no reason to suspect Congress of attempting to make 
an end-run around the “limited Times” constraint.114  Earlier 
retroactive extensions, the Court emphasized, did not create 
perpetual terms, and the CTEA was no different.115 
Justice Ginsburg dismissed Justice Breyer’s calculation 
that a CTEA-regime copyright is already “virtually perpetual” 
because the economic incentive provided by a term of 95 years 
is equal to 99.8% of a perpetual term’s value.116  The 1976 Act, 
however, created an incentive that was 99.4% of the value of a 
perpetual term; the 1909 Act, 97.7%; the 1831 Act, 94.1%.117  
Justice Ginsburg suggested that if a figure near the 100% mark 
could make a duration extension unconstitutional because it 
supposedly would not be a limited time for purposes of the 
Copyright Clause, then not only the Sonny Bono Act but also 
the 1976 Act’s term extension would be invalidated.118  Even 
the earlier statutory extensions of duration would be suspect.119  
The Court did not believe that such an approach would square 
with the intent of the Constitution’s framers.120  “It is doubtful,” 
quipped Justice Ginsburg, “that those architects of our Nation, 
in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in terms of 
the calculator rather than the calendar.”121 
Up next for consideration and rejection were three Eldred 
 
 114. Id. at 208-09; see id. at 209-10 n.16.  Later discussion in the article 
will focus on whether this statement by Justice Ginsburg leaves an opening for 
a constitutional attack on a later term extension, if Congress enacts another 
one.  We will also consider whether the presence of congressional intent to 
evade the limited times requirement should be seen as a necessary element of 
a Copyright Clause-based challenge.  See infra text accompanying notes 340-
349, 442-454, 459-470. 
 115. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209.  Justice Ginsburg noted the government’s 
observation that the CTEA’s life-plus-70 term could be expected to yield a 95-
year copyright term on average.  Id. n.17.  She also mentioned the 
government’s assertion that a 95-year term resembles accepted durations in 
other areas of the law, such as 99-year leases of real estate and bequests 
satisfying the rule against perpetuities.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg pointed out, 
however, that “[w]hether such referents mark the outer boundary of ‘limited 
Times’ is not before us today.”  Id. 
 116. Id. at 255-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 209-10 n.16. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  As we will explain later, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer 
missed a key point in the economic analysis.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 325-347; infra note 326. 
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arguments centering, in the Court’s view, around the 
contention that Congress “may not extend an existing copyright 
absent new consideration from the author.”122  The first of 
these arguments relied on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.,123 a decision concerning the 
copyrightability of the white pages of a telephone directory.  
There, the Court wrote that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is 
originality,”124 and that copyright was unavailable only to “a 
narrow category of works in which the creative spark of 
originality is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent.”125  Works already in existence, Eldred asserted, 
are no longer original; therefore, they should not qualify for 
copyright protection of additional duration beyond what they 
were given at the time of copyright acquisition.126  Justice 
Ginsburg responded by observing that Feist was concerned 
with copyrightability per se rather than with the duration of 
copyright.127  Because the initial copyright-worthiness of the 
works receiving an extended copyright duration was not 
being—and could not credibly be—contested, Justice Ginsburg 
considered the originality argument irrelevant to the issues in 
Eldred.128 
In the second of the three arguments grouped together by 
the Court for discussion purposes, Eldred focused on the 
“promot[ion] [of] the Progress of Science” language of the 
Copyright Clause.129  Eldred contended that the CTEA did not 
comply with this constitutional provision because, in extending 
 
 122. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210. 
 123. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 124. Id. at 345. 
 125. Id. at 359. 
 126. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  Justice Ginsburg’s answer to Eldred’s originality argument would 
seem to mean that once a work meets the originality requirement and 
qualifies for copyright protection, Congress is free in succeeding years to 
bestow on the copyright owner almost any added legal benefits it wishes to 
bestow, without expecting the copyright owner to create or provide anything 
new in return.  See id.  Although Congress of course could not enact a statute 
that would expressly make copyright perpetual, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8, the Court’s disposition of the originality argument might be read as 
permitting Congress to string together enough duration extensions that 
copyright protection could become effectively perpetual.  Perhaps, however, 
the Court’s comments about intent to evade the limited times requirement—
an intent the Eldred majority believed that Congress did not have with regard 
to the CTEA—might then come into play.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. 
 129. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211-12. 
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the duration of existing copyrights, Congress did not stimulate 
authors to create new works.130  Instead, the CTEA merely 
added greater value to existing works.131  The Court 
acknowledged that in earlier decisions, it had referred to the 
Copyright Clause as “‘both a grant of power and a 
limitation,’”132 and had stated that copyright’s “‘primary 
objective’” is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”133  
However, Justice Ginsburg stressed, it is Congress and not the 
courts that should decide how best to accomplish this 
objective.134  What mattered, for Copyright Clause purposes, 
was whether Congress had enacted a copyright “system” that 
would “promote the Progress of Science.”135 
Noting again the supposed justifications that Congress had 
taken into account in enacting the CTEA, the Eldred majority 
considered it reasonable to conclude that the CTEA complied 
with the objective of the Copyright Clause.136  Justice Ginsburg 
pointed once more to Congress’ long history of retroactive term 
extensions and emphasized that the previous lack of disputes 
regarding the rights created by the various extensions provided 
strong support for the constitutionality of lengthening the 
durations of existing copyrights.137  Continuing to stress the 
importance of history to a proper determination of whether 
legislative action complies with a constitutional provision, 
Justice Ginsburg quoted a 1926 decision: 
[T]his Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a 
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the 
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were 
actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of 
years, fixes the construction to be given [the Constitution’s] 
provisions.138 
In the Court’s view, “Congress’s unbroken practice since 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
 133. Id. at 212 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991)). 
 134. Id. at 212-13. 
 135. Id. (quoting Graham, 382 U.S. at 6).  For criticism of the Court’s focus 
on the overall copyright “system” as opposed to individual enactments within 
that system, see infra text accompanying notes 400-404. 
 136. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213. 
 137. Id.  The significance of the lack of previous disputes is open to 
question.  See infra text accompanying notes 186, 387-389. 
 138. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
175 (1926)). 
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the founding generation thus overwhelms [Eldred’s] argument 
that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights fails per se to 
‘promote the Progress of Science.’”139 
Turning to the third of what it regarded as Eldred’s three 
related arguments, the Court examined the contention that the 
Copyright Clause contemplates a quid pro quo arrangement 
under which the author of an original work is granted 
copyright protection for a limited time, in exchange for a 
dedication of that work to the public following the expiration of 
the copyright term.140  The retroactive component of the CTEA, 
Eldred asserted, violates the terms of that arrangement by 
“bestow[ing] an unpaid-for benefit on copyright holders and 
their heirs.”141  Justice Ginsburg answered that a review of the 
long history of copyright term extensions reveals the benefit’s 
paid-for nature.142  Because there have been retroactive term 
extensions in the past, Justice Ginsburg maintained, the 
author of a work would reasonably expect that she was being 
offered legal rights whose duration would be measured not 
merely by the rules in effect at the time copyright was acquired 
but also by any later-enacted term extensions.143  For the 
Court, therefore, the possibility of term extension is part of the 
quid that authors receive in exchange for the quo of dedicating 
the work to the public upon the copyright’s expiration.144  
According to this view, the CTEA is not an unpaid-for benefit at 
all.  Indeed, it was part of the deal when, for example, 
Gershwin’s “Rhapsody in Blue” became eligible for copyright in 
1924.145 
 
 139. Id. at 213-14.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed with the 
majority’s assertion that Congress had displayed an “unbroken practice” since 
a time shortly after the ratification of the Constitution.  See id. at 230-34 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 174-184.  Later in the 
article, we take the position that instead of applying the Myers principle to the 
question whether Congress could retroactively extend copyright duration, the 
Eldred majority should have applied it in an effort to determine what the 
Framers would have regarded as a “limited [t]ime[]” for purposes of the 
Copyright Clause.  See infra text accompanying notes 410-415. 
 140. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  Justice Ginsburg found evidence for this expectation in copyright 
assignment agreements, a standard form that provides for the possibility of 
term extension.  Id. at 214 n.21. 
 144. See id. at 214-15.  For a criticism of this line of reasoning, see infra 
text accompanying notes 340-349. 
 145. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215 (stating that “the author of a work created 
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Justice Ginsburg also observed that any quid pro quo 
requirement in the copyright realm differs from the patent quid 
pro quo in two respects.  First, a patent entitles a qualifying 
inventor to monopoly rights that are more sweeping than those 
received by the creator of a copyrighted work.  Second, 
disclosure of the details of the patented invention is the “price” 
paid by the inventor for those sweeping rights, whereas 
disclosure of a work is the “desired objective” of copyright 
law.146  These differences caused the Eldred majority to 
conclude that a patent’s quid pro quo may be “more exacting” 
than that of a copyright’s.147  If so, the Court reasoned, the 19th 
Century congressional practice of “[repeatedly extending] 
existing patents without constitutional objection suggests even 
more strongly that similar legislation with respect to copyrights 
is constitutionally permissible.”148 
Having discovered no Copyright Clause barrier to the 
CTEA’s extension of the duration of existing copyrights, the 
Court proceeded to make short work of Eldred’s argument that 
the CTEA violated the First Amendment rights of members of 
the public.149  Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the close 
temporal proximity in which the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment were adopted indicates that the Framers 
regarded “copyright’s limited monopolies [as] compatible with 
free speech principles.”150  She went on to quote Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises151 for the proposition that 
“[t]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression.  By establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas.”152 
The Court’s rejection of Eldred’s First Amendment 
argument depended heavily on the customary judicial view that 
copyright law contains built-in First Amendment 
 
in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend, as the ‘this’ offered her, a 
copyright not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for 
any renewal or extension legislated during that time”). 
 146. Id. at 216-17. 
 147. Id. at 217 n.22. 
 148. Id.  For critical examination of the Court’s quid pro quo analysis, see 
infra text accompanying notes 340-372. 
 149. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19. 
 150. Id. at 219. 
 151. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 152. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539). 
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accommodations.153  One such accommodation noted by the 
Court, again with a nod to Harper & Row, was the familiar 
idea-expression dichotomy.154  This distinction makes clear that 
the copyright on a work protects only the work’s expression, not 
the ideas, facts, themes, and general concepts addressed 
therein.  All users are free to make whatever use they desire of 
the ideas, facts, and other unprotected matter contained in the 
work.155  The second of the built-in First Amendment 
accommodations mentioned by the Eldred Court was copyright 
law’s fair use doctrine.  Under this doctrine, users of the 
protected expression in a copyrighted work may have a defense 
against infringement liability.156  In the Court’s view, the fair 
use doctrine furthers the interests of users of copyrighted 
works in much the same way that the First Amendment would, 
thus making it unnecessary to subject copyright law generally, 
and the CTEA specifically, to further First Amendment-based 
scrutiny.157 
In the closing paragraphs of the majority opinion, Justice 
Ginsburg commented again on the Copyright Clause issues.158  
Though brief, the comments revealed what may have been a 
major concern that prompted the Court to rule as it did.  
Justice Ginsburg observed that if Eldred’s “vision of the 
Copyright Clause held sway, it would do more than render the 
CTEA’s duration extensions unconstitutional as to existing 
works.”159  Eldred’s assertion that the CTEA provisions were 
not severable “would make the CTEA’s enlarged terms invalid 
even as to tomorrow’s work.”160  Then came what the majority 
may have seen as the clincher: “The 1976 Act’s time extensions, 
which set the pattern that the CTEA followed, would be 
vulnerable as well.”161  The Court was unwilling to issue a 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”); 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556; Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
 155. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
 156. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 221-22. 
 159. Id. at 221. 
 160. Id. at 221-22. 
 161. Id. at 222. 
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decision that could produce such a domino effect.162 
Further underscoring the deferential approach it had 
chosen to take, the Court observed that “the Copyright Clause 
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property 
regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the 
ends of the Clause.”163  Justice Ginsburg acknowledged Eldred’s 
having “forcefully urge[d] that Congress pursued very bad 
policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms,” but emphasized 
that “[t]he wisdom of Congress’s action . . . is not within our 
province to second guess.”164 
B. THE STEVENS DISSENT 
Justice Stevens was not convinced by the majority’s 
characterization of the CTEA as a statute that may have been 
unwise but was not unconstitutional.165  Instead, Justice 
Stevens emphasized that the Copyright Clause contemplates 
not only the furnishing of incentives for the creation of new 
works but also the existence of a rich public domain to which 
all persons have ready access.166  He maintained that the 
 
 162. See id.  For the view that the Eldred majority was too concerned about 
the possible implications for the 1976 Act, see infra text accompanying notes 
373-383. 
 163. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.  With this statement, the Court again 
indicated that the focus of its Copyright Clause analysis would be on the 
general scheme of copyright, rather than on the individual enactment—here, 
the CTEA—within that scheme.  See id. at 213.  We examine the shortcomings 
of that focus at infra text accompanying notes 400-404. 
 164. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. 
 165. See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id.  In asserting that the Copyright Clause promotes a vibrant public 
domain by encouraging the production of works whose copyrights expire as 
soon as reasonably possible, Justice Stevens relied on Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with patent law.  He cited Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 1 (1829), in which the Court held that an inventor who had been 
commercially exploiting his invention could not unreasonably postpone the 
filing of his patent application in an effort to delay commencement of his 
exclusive rights until he needed them to ward off competition, because 
allowing the inventor to do that would push back the time of the invention’s 
entry into the public domain.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stevens also cited Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), in which the Court wrote that “the ultimate 
goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the 
public domain through disclosure.”  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Because the same clause in the Constitution provides Congress 
its copyright authority and its patent authority, Justice Stevens regarded the 
patent decisions’ emphasis on nourishing the public domain as equally 
applicable to the realm of copyright.  Id. at 227. 
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CTEA’s extension of the duration of existing copyrights 
promoted neither the production of new works nor the 
enhancement of the public domain.167  Justice Stevens 
concluded, therefore, that the retroactive aspect of the CTEA 
found no support in the Copyright Clause.168  Instead, it 
amounted to “a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to 
authors, publishers, and their successors in interest.”169 
Continuing along the same analytical lines, Justice 
Stevens took the position that the bargain envisioned in the 
Copyright Clause involved creators, the public, and the 
government.170  It would be impermissible for the government, 
before the expiration of a given’s creator’s copyright, to take 
away a particular right already guaranteed under that 
copyright.171  Likewise, Justice Stevens asserted, it should be 
impermissible for the government to alter the terms of the 
bargain by increasing the duration of existing copyrights and 
thus delaying the public’s ability to exercise its right to make 
unrestricted use of the underlying works of authorship.172  
That, according to Justice Stevens, was what Congress did, 
unconstitutionally, in the CTEA.173 
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of the history of congressional extensions of 
patent and copyright duration.  He noted that patent duration 
extensions had not always been applied retroactively.174  
 
 167. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 227. 
 170. See id. at 226-27. 
 171. Justice Stevens stated the following regarding patent law: 
It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the Government as a 
representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by shortening the 
term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention.  The 
fairness considerations . . . would presumably disable Congress from making 
such a retroactive change in the public’s bargain with an inventor without 
providing compensation for the taking.  Those same considerations should 
protect members of the public who make plans to exploit an invention as soon 
as it enters the public domain from a retroactive modification of the bargain 
that extends the term of the patent monopoly. 
Id. at 226.  These arguments apply to copyright laws as well since, the 
“authority to issue copyrights stems from the same Clause in the Constitution 
that created the patent power.”  Id. at 223.  Thus, “[i]f Congress may not 
expand the scope of a patent monopoly, it also may not extend the life of a 
copyright beyond its expiration date.”  Id. at 222-23. 
 172. See id. at 226-27. 
 173. See id. at 234-38. 
 174. Justice Stevens used as an example an 1861 statute that provided for 
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Moreover, Justice Stevens asserted, many of the 19th Century’s 
retroactive extensions of the durations of individual patents 
had been applied to public domain items and thus were clearly 
unconstitutional.175  Justice Stevens contended that the Eldred 
majority should not have relied on the supposed history of 
patent duration extensions when that history did not really 
reflect consistency on the retroactive application issue and, in 
any event, contained examples of extensions that would not 
pass constitutional muster today.176 
Regarding the majority’s focus on the congressional 
tendency to apply copyright term extensions to already existing 
works, Justice Stevens conceded that Congress had so applied 
the extensions provided for in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts.177  
He refused to subscribe, however, to the majority’s 
characterization of the 1790 Act as a retroactive extension of 
copyright duration.178  That statute, he insisted, was different 
because it created an entirely new federal copyright system.179  
Justice Stevens noted that the 1790 Act, far from being a 
blanket extension of duration, actually had the effect of 
shortening the period of protection for many works that until 
then had been entitled to perpetual common-law protection.180  
He argued that even though it followed fairly closely on the 
heels of the adoption of the Copyright Clause, the 1790 decision 
of Congress to allow already existing works to qualify for the 
newly created federal copyright should not be regarded as a 
strong indicator of the constitutionality of a retroactive 
 
a longer patent duration but applied only prospectively (i.e., to inventions 
developed after the statute’s effective date).  Id. at 237. 
 175. Id. at 233-35.  The statutory extension of Oliver Evans’ patent in 
1808, for instance, restored patent protection to an invention that had spent 
more than four years in the public domain.  Id.  So it was, wrote Justice 
Stevens, for the great majority of the individual patent extensions granted by 
Congress during the 19th Century.  Id. at 235.  He argued that 
notwithstanding the usual presumption of validity attaching to acts of 
Congress, a history so obviously lacking in constitutional legitimacy should 
have no bearing on the matter at hand.  See id. 
 176. Id. at 233-35. 
 177. Id. at 235 (“The federal Copyright Act was first amended in 1831.  
That amendment, like later amendments, not only authorized a longer term 
for new works, but also extended the terms of unexpired copyrights.”). 
 178. Id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the 1790 Copyright Act 
as a “general rule creating new federal rights that supplanted the diverse 
state rights that previously existed” but “did not extend or attach to any of 
those pre-existing state and common-law rights.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 230, 234-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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extension of existing copyrights’ duration.181 
The Eldred majority also placed more weight than it 
should have, Justice Stevens contended, on the history of 
retroactive copyright term extensions.182  As noted in the 
preceding paragraph, he regarded that history as having begun 
with the 1831 Act rather than with the 1790 Act.  By 1831, 
none of the same persons who had been delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were serving in Congress.183  Justice 
Stevens asserted that the 1831 Act’s application to existing 
copyrights should not receive any heightened presumption of 
constitutionality under the contemporaneous construction 
doctrine relied on by the majority.184  Moreover, Justice Stevens 
pointed out that courts, particularly the Supreme Court, had 
not ruled on the constitutionality of the retroactive applications 
of the duration extensions in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts.185  
The lack of prior judicial challenges should not somehow cloak 
the CTEA with protection against constitutional attack, he 
maintained.186 
Justice Stevens was not impressed by the majority’s 
offering of supposed justifications for the legislative judgment 
exercised by Congress when it made the CTEA applicable to 
existing copyrights.  Noting that the Court had mentioned the 
CTEA’s possible furnishing of incentives to restore and 
preserve certain copyrighted works, Justice Stevens observed 
 
 181. See id. at 231-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 182. See id. at 231-36. 
 183. Id. at 237. 
 184. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens identified another 
reason not to regard the 1831 Act as a strong indicator of the probable 
constitutionality of retroactive extensions of copyright duration.  He noted 
that the legislative history of the 1831 Act reveals its having been predicated 
on an interpretation of copyright as the legal mechanism for protecting an 
author’s supposed natural right, of a perpetual nature, to the “fruits of his 
labor” or the “sweat of his brow.”  Id. at 236.  Such an interpretation of 
copyright, Justice Stevens observed, was “rejected by this Court in 1834.”  Id. 
at 236. 
 185. Id. at 235-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 186. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Stevens, 
“the fact that Congress has repeatedly acted on a mistaken interpretation of 
the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an unconstitutional 
practice when it is finally challenged in an appropriate case.”  Id. at 235 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).  He 
added that “‘no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the 
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire 
national existence.’”  Id. at 236 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). 
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that this asserted justification for the CTEA applied mainly 
with regard to old movies.187  He also pointed out that such 
supposed incentives would not promote the creation of any 
truly new works and that any new expression in a restored or 
preserved edition would be protected by a copyright on that 
edition anyway.188  Justice Stevens stressed that even if the 
perceived need to preserve aging movies would warrant 
congressional action, “the remedy offered—a blanket extension 
of all copyrights” went far beyond what that need would 
justify.189 
Justice Stevens also labeled the majority’s equity 
rationale—that Congress made the copyright duration 
extension apply to existing works in order to treat existing and 
future copyrights the same as a matter of simple fairness—a 
“classic non sequitur.”190  He emphasized that “[t]he reason for 
increasing the inducement to create something new simply does 
not apply to an already-created work.”191  If anything, Justice 
Stevens contended, the equity argument favored Eldred 
because “[m]embers of the public were entitled to rely on a 
promised access to copyrighted . . . works at the expiration of 
the terms specified when the exclusive privileges were 
granted.”192  The owners of copyrights on already existing 
works have no entitlement to anything beyond “the exclusive 
terms that were promised as an inducement to their creativity, 
and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for 
doing nothing more.”193 
Commenting on the issues actually before the Court and on 
the implications of the decision in Eldred, Justice Stevens 
noted that the grant of certiorari called for the Court to decide 
whether the CTEA’s retroactive application was 
 
 187. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 240.  We offer a narrower “remedy” later in the article.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 478-482. 
 190. 537 U.S. at 240. 
 191. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  According to Justice Stevens, the equity argument made by the 
government and endorsed by the majority requires the “untenable 
assumptions . . . that the public interest in free access to copyrighted works is 
entirely worthless and that authors, as a class, should receive a windfall solely 
based on completed creative activity.”  Id. at 241.  He therefore took the 
position that “[e]x post facto extensions of existing copyrights, unsupported by 
any consideration of the public interest, frustrate the central purpose of the 
[Copyright] Clause.”  Id. 
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constitutional.194  The case, therefore, did not really present the 
question whether the “extraordinary length” of the duration 
enhancements in the CTEA amounted to the “functional 
equivalent of perpetual copyrights.”195  Even so, he observed, “a 
categorical rule prohibiting retroactive extensions would 
effectively preclude perpetual copyrights.”196  He warned that 
“unless the [Copyright] Clause is construed to embody such a 
categorical rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly 
privileges ad infinitum under the majority’s analysis.”197 
Justice Stevens summed up his dissent by contending that 
the Eldred majority had failed to safeguard free access to the 
public domain and had ignored the key purpose of the 
Copyright Clause.198  He expressed the concern that the Court 
had “quitclaimed to Congress its principal responsibility in this 
area of the law” and had effectively made the Copyright 
Clause-related actions of Congress “judicially unreviewable.”199  
This caused Justice Stevens to conclude that it was “not 
hyperbole to recall the trenchant words of Chief Justice John 
Marshall: ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.’”200 
C. THE BREYER DISSENT 
In launching a dissent that prompted various comments 
from the justices in the majority,201 Justice Breyer 
acknowledged the majority’s view that his conclusions 
 
 194. See id. at 241-42.  Evidently responding to the majority’s concern that 
holding the CTEA’s retroactive application unconstitutional would also call 
into question the validity of the 1976 Act, Justice Stevens emphasized that 
“the validity of earlier retroactive extensions of copyright protection [was] not 
at issue in this case.”  Id. at 241-42 n.14.  He also appeared to assert that even 
if a decision to strike down the retroactive aspect of the CTEA would have cast 
doubt on the 1976 Act, the Court could legitimately have found a way to 
protect the reliance interests that reasonably would been built up during the 
more than 25 years since the enactment of that statute.  No such reliance 
interests needed to be considered with regard to the CTEA, Justice Stevens 
stated, because the enactment was only four years old and had been subject to 
a judicial challenge for most of that time.  Id. 
 195. Id. at 241. 
 196. Id. at 242. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 242. 
 199. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 200. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 201. See e.g., id. at 193 n.1 (majority opinion); see also id. at 199 n.4, 205 
n.10, 207 n.15, 209 n.16. 
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suggested only a lack of wisdom—but no unconstitutionality—
in the congressional decision to enact the CTEA.202  Legal 
distinctions, he observed, “are often matters of degree,” and in 
the CTEA’s case, “the failings of degree are so serious that they 
amount to failings of constitutional kind.”203  Justice Breyer 
regarded the Copyright Clause as granting Congress broad 
powers that nevertheless had limits—limits exceeded by the 
CTEA.204 
Justice Breyer contended that the Copyright Clause could 
not properly be interpreted without keeping in mind the 
promotion-of-expression objective it shares with the 
Constitution’s First Amendment.205  He noted that the two 
constitutional provisions may “reinforce each other, the 
[Copyright Clause] serving as an ‘engine of free expression’ . . . 
[and the First Amendment] assuring that government throws 
up no obstacle to its dissemination.”206  Sometimes, however, a 
statute enacted under the copyright authority “may set Clause 
and Amendment at cross-purposes, thereby depriving the 
public of the speech-related benefits that the Founders, 
through both, have promised.”207  Justice Breyer asserted that 
when a copyright statute allegedly restricts speech, the statute 
should receive more careful examination than the Eldred 
majority gave the CTEA.208  He therefore proposed a three-part 
test for use in such situations, writing that the statute should 
be regarded as “lack[ing] the constitutionally necessary 
rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows 
are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to 
undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause 
embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any 
significant Clause-related objective.”209 
 
 202. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 243. 
 206. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation 
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer noted that it was not 
important to decide whether a label such as “intermediate scrutiny” should be 
given to the more careful examination he envisioned.  Id.  What was 
important, he stressed, was to “recognize that [the CTEA] involves not pure 
economic regulation, but regulation of expression, and [that] what may count 
as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational 
where we focus on expression.”  Id. 
 209. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Next, Justice Breyer applied his test to the CTEA and 
sought to demonstrate that the CTEA met all three conditions.  
He began by discussing Supreme Court precedents establishing 
that “copyright statutes must serve public, not private, 
ends,”210 and by pointing out similar statements in legislative 
history.211  Then Justice Breyer identified two types of 
expression-related costs that the CTEA imposed on the 
public.212  The first type comes in the form of royalties “that 
may be higher than necessary to evoke creation of the relevant 
work.”213  Justice Breyer stressed that although only about 2% 
of copyrighted works between 55 and 75 years old retain a 
commercial value (i.e., generate royalties), that 2% produces 
roughly $400 million per year in royalties.214  He therefore 
offered the “conservative[] estimate that 20 extra years of 
copyright protection will mean the transfer of several billion 
extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights.”215  
Rather than “com[ing] from thin air,” the added royalty 
payments “ultimately come from those who wish to read or see 
or hear those classic books or films or recordings that have 
survived.”216 
 
 210. See id. at 247; see generally id. at 246-47 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 228 (1990), Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984), Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975), and Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
 211. See id. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 
6-7 (1909) (House Report on Copyright Act of 1909) and H.R. REP. NO. 100-
609, at 22 (1988) (House Report on Berne Convention Implementation Act)). 
 212. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 248.  Justice Breyer observed that copyright statutes typically 
do this, but that “there are special reasons for thinking [such costs] especially 
serious here.”  Id. 
 214. Id. at 248-49.  Justice Breyer cited a Congressional Research Service 
study reporting the $400 million figure and various other numbers used in his 
dissent.  Id. at 248 (citing E. RAPPAPORT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE 
ECONOMIC VALUES, at 8, 12, 15 (1998) (hereinafter CRS REPORT)). 
 215. Id. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See CRS REPORT, supra note 214, 
at 16.  Moreover, these same copyrights together would have produced “many 
billions of dollars in royalty ‘reward’” before the CTEA was enacted.  Eldred, 
537 U.S. at 249. 
 216. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer noted, 
as an example, the $500,000 paid by United Airlines for a license to play 
George Gershwin’s 1924 “Rhapsody in Blue” in advertisements and for similar 
purposes.  See id.  That “cost of doing business,” Justice Breyer noted, would 
logically be “reflected in the ticket prices of those who fly.”  Id.  He stressed 
that lengthening copyright duration would likely lead to “unnecessarily high 
prices [that would] unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works.”  Id.  In 
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The second type of expression-related cost, wrote Justice 
Breyer, is the permissions requirement, which involves 
identifying and communicating with holders of the rights to 
works that one may want to reproduce or otherwise use.217  
Vast numbers of older copyrighted works, both classics and the 
obscure or out-of-print, remain of interest to potential users 
who “include not only movie buffs and . . . jazz fans, but also 
historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database 
operators, and researchers of all kinds.”218  Assuming they wish 
to avoid litigation, these potential users may find it necessary 
to expend time and money tracking down the copyright owner, 
perhaps only to learn that the owner is impossible to locate or 
is unwilling to give permission to use the work.  Would-be 
licensees may simply give up on the idea of using the 
copyrighted work if the effort and costs involved in identifying 
and locating the copyright owner and working out a licensing 
agreement become too unattractive.  The permissions 
requirement, Justice Breyer observed, thus stands as a 
significant obstacle to the ability of users of copyrighted works 
to “make the past accessible for their own use or for that of 
others.”219 
Justice Breyer conceded that costs of the sort produced by 
the permissions requirement would be associated with any 
copyright law, regardless of the copyright term’s length.220  
“But,” he protested, “to extend that term, preventing works 
from the 1920’s and 1930’s from falling into the public domain, 
will dramatically increase the size of the costs just as—
perversely—the likely benefits from protection diminish.”221  
Justice Breyer offered this further explanation: 
The older the work, the less likely it retains commercial value, and 
the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder.  
 
contrast, lower-priced editions of classic works would be expected once those 
works enter the public domain.  Id. (citing CRS REPORT, supra note 214 at 3). 
 217. See id. at 249. 
 218. Id. at 249-50.  By using Congressional Research Service figures, 
Justice Breyer noted, one could estimate that as of 2018, approximately 
350,000 copyrighted works would be 75 years old or older.  Id.  Eventually, the 
number of copyrighted works at least 75 years of age would be in the millions.  
Id. 
 219. Id. at 250.  Justice Breyer noted various examples of the burdens 
imposed by the permissions requirement that are a necessary part of a 
copyright regime but that may become unreasonable if copyright duration 
becomes overly lengthy.  See id. 
 220. Id. at 251. 
 221. Id. 
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The older the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the 
historian, artist, or teacher.  The older the work, the less likely it is 
that a sense of authors’ rights can justify a copyright holder’s decision 
not to permit reproduction, for the more likely it is that the copyright 
holder making the decision is not the work’s creator, but, say, a 
corporation or a great-grandchild whom the work’s creator never 
knew.  Similarly, the costs of obtaining permission, now perhaps 
ranging in the millions of dollars, will multiply as the number of 
holders of affected copyrights increases from several hundred 
thousand to several million.222 
Contesting an assertion by the majority, Justice Breyer 
contended that the fair use doctrine does not meaningfully 
lessen the costs associated with the CTEA’s 20-year extension 
of the permissions requirement.223  The fair use doctrine 
sometimes permits uses of copyrighted materials without the 
copyright owner’s permission, but the doctrine’s application is 
neither routine nor sweeping.224  It therefore cannot be counted 
on as a way of avoiding the costs about which Justice Breyer 
complained.225  Moreover, as he noted, the fair use doctrine 
would not help “those who wish to obtain from electronic 
databases material that is not there.” 226  This may occur when 
the permissions requirement has had the effect of keeping 
material out of the databases. 
Justice Breyer then considered whether Congress could 
reasonably have concluded that the costs imposed by the CTEA 
were outweighed by legitimate countervailing considerations.227  
He left no doubt that in his view, the CTEA produced scant 
copyright-related benefit.  The traditional “economic spur” 
rationale for copyright, he argued, cannot justify the CTEA.228  
 
 222. Id. at 251-52.  Justice Breyer predicted that the CTEA would produce 
huge costs for users of databases, and that the quality of education would 
suffer “as our children become ever more dependent for the content of their 
knowledge upon computer-accessible databases—thereby condemning that 
which is not so accessible, say, the cultural content of early 20th-century 
history, to a kind of intellectual purgatory from which it will not easily 
emerge.”  Id. at 252. 
 223. See id. at 252-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 224. Cf id. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the exemption 
applies “only where the copy is made for the special listed purposes” and 
rhetorically asking “[who] can rely on so limited an exemption” in light of such 
open-ended limiting phraseology). 
 225. See id. at 252-53. 
 226. Id. at 253.  Similarly, Justice Breyer did not regard copyright law’s 
idea-expression distinction as likely to minimize the damage to be done by the 
CTEA.  See id. 
 227. Id. at 254. 
 228. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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“No potential author,” Justice Breyer contended, “can 
reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of 
writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for 
the copyright extension to matter.”229  He based this conclusion 
on the fact that only 2% of copyrighted works retain 
commercial value when they are between 55 and 75 years old, 
and on the assumption that the percentage of works remaining 
commercially viable beyond the 75-year mark “must be far 
smaller.”230  In addition, Justice Breyer believed that “any 
remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by 
the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years 
or more into the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, 
or shareholders in a successor corporation, will receive 
them.”231  Relying upon the concept of present value, Justice 
Breyer argued that the marginal economic incentive provided 
by the CTEA to authors is so tiny as to approach zero, and that 
whatever copyright-related benefit the incentive would produce 
must be similarly puny.232  Justice Breyer insisted that a 
“potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway” who had not 
been stimulated to create under the pre-CTEA state of the law 
would not now be moved to create by the CTEA’s paltry 
additional incentive.233 
The majority’s reliance on broad propositions about 
incentives in general was insufficient, in Justice Breyer’s view, 
to justify the CTEA’s significant lengthening of copyright 
duration.  It should not be enough that “somehow, somewhere, 
some potential author might be moved by the thought of great-
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  Prior to the CTEA’s 20-year extension of copyright duration, 75 
years was the maximum duration for pre-1978 works, 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1976) 
(amended 1998), and the average term for works created in 1978 or thereafter.  
537 U.S. at 254. 
 231. 537 U.S. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 254-55. 
 233. Id. at 255.  “What monetarily motivated Melville,” Justice Breyer 
continued, “would not realize that he could do better for his grandchildren by 
putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account?”  Id.  As for the 
Court’s reference to testimony before Congress that income earned from one 
work may help support an author during his or her creation of other works, 
Justice Breyer found it “mysterious” that such testimony would be cited in 
support of the CTEA.  Id.  Given the retroactive application of the CTEA and 
the long duration extension for which it provided, the author who actually 
created the copyrighted work would no doubt be dead by the time the extra 20 
years of royalties materialized—if they materialized at all.  How, Justice 
Breyer asked, would the additional income traceable to the CTEA help a 
deceased author create any new works?  Id. 
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grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a century hence.”234  
If that justification were sufficient to support copyright term 
extensions, then what about “some potential author [who might 
be] moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two 
centuries, five centuries, 1,000 years, ‘til the End of Time’ “?235  
The problem was that “from a rational economic perspective 
the time difference among these periods makes no real 
difference.”236  The 20-year extension provided for in the CTEA 
“will produce a copyright period of protection that, even under 
conservative assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% of 
protection in perpetuity.”237  This effect of the CTEA raised 
serious questions, according to Justice Breyer, about whether 
the statute complied with the “limited Times” proviso in the 
Copyright Clause.238 
Summing up his discussion of the economic incentives 
purportedly provided by the CTEA, Justice Breyer stated that 
“the incentive-related numbers are far too small for Congress to 
have concluded rationally, even with respect to new works, that 
the extension’s effect could justify the serious expression-
related harms” produced by the CTEA.239  He then emphasized 
that “in respect to works already created—the source of many 
of the harms previously described—the statute creates no 
economic incentive at all.”240 
Next, Justice Breyer addressed the other alleged 
justifications for the CTEA.  The CTEA’s purported 
harmonization effects, he contended, failed to pick up the slack 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 237. Id. at 255-56 (emphasis in original). 
 238. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer questioned the relevance of 
the majority’s comments that nothing indicated an intent on the part of 
Congress to evade the “limited Times” directive when it enacted the CTEA.  
Id. at 256.  Justice Breyer implied that whether Congress possessed such an 
intent should not be determinative.  See id.  Even so, Justice Breyer observed 
that Congress “may have sought to test the Constitution’s limits.”  Id.  He 
cited statements in which the late Sonny Bono, Mary Bono (Sonny Bono’s 
widow and successor in the House of Representatives), other representatives, 
and composer Quincy Jones indicated their desire to have copyrights last 
forever or as close thereto as possible.  Id.  Later in the article, we will 
comment further on the significance of these statements.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 279, 293-296, 412. 
 239. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
2004] UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 231 
 
left by the weak incentive-related justifications.241  Though 
conceding that the life-plus-70 rule called for in the CTEA was 
consistent with the prevailing copyright duration in the 
European Union (EU), Justice Breyer stressed that the CTEA 
achieved harmonization with the EU’s copyright term only as 
to works created in 1978 or thereafter by natural persons.242  
The CTEA effected no harmonization with the EU regarding 
works-for-hire created in 1978 or thereafter because the life-
plus-70 rule does not apply to such works.243  Perhaps even 
more importantly, he noted, the CTEA did not achieve 
harmonization with the EU regarding pre-1978 works because 
the life-plus-70 rule does not apply to those works either.244  
“Despite appearances,” Justice Breyer explained, “the statute 
does not create a uniform American-European term with 
respect to the lion’s share of the economically significant works 
that it affects—all works made ‘for hire’ and all existing works 
created prior to 1978.”245 
 
 241. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. at 257-58. 
 243. Id.  Under the CTEA, works-for-hire are protected for a term of 95 
years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever comes first.  
17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000).  In the EU, some rights in works-for-hire carry a life-
plus-70 duration, whereas others exist for periods ranging from 50 to 70 years.  
Council Directive 93/98,  Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and 
Certain Related Rights, arts. 1-3, 1993 O.J. 290 [hereinafter EU Council 
Directive 93/98]. 
 244. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The CTEA instead 
calls for a duration of 95 years for qualifying pre-1978 works.  17 U.S.C. § 
304(a), (b).  Compare EU Council Directive 93/98, supra note 243, arts. 1-3. 
 245. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
Justice Breyer emphasized that because “uniformity [in copyright duration] 
comes so late, if at all, . . .  bringing American law into conformity 
with . . . European law will neither encourage creation nor benefit the long-
dead author in any other important way.”  Id. at 258.  He further noted that 
even if the CTEA’s harmonizing effects were broader, most of the arguments 
for harmonization—such as those urging that Europe’s then-superior terms of 
protection could have given pre-harmonization authors an incentive to publish 
overseas first instead of in the United States—would fall flat anyway.  He 
believed that “few, if any, potential authors would turn a ‘where to publish’ 
decision upon . . .  [differences] in the  length of the copyright term.”  Id. at 
259.  In a present value sense, the commercial worth of the 20-year difference 
in terms “amounts at most to comparative pennies.” Id.  No “rational 
legislature” could give significant weight to such a trivial incentive-related 
justification.  Id.  Moreover, Justice Breyer observed, even if a work’s 
publication in the United States were to come after publication in the EU, the 
Berne Convention still promises “full protection” as long as the second 
publication takes place at least 30 days after the first.  Id.  See Berne 
Convention, supra note 30, arts. 3(4), 5(4).  In such a situation, the supposed 
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Commenting on the asserted justification that copyright 
term extension may provide incentives to publishers and 
filmmakers to revisit older works by re-releasing or restoring 
them,246 Justice Breyer argued that the Copyright Clause did 
not permit Congress to act on a revisitation-by-publishers 
theory of progress promotion, regardless of its promise or lack 
thereof.247  In his view, the Copyright Clause “assumes an 
initial grant of monopoly, designed primarily to encourage 
creation, followed by termination of the monopoly grant in 
order to promote dissemination of already-created works.”248  
The Clause also “assumes that it is the disappearance of the 
monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will, on balance 
promote the dissemination of works already in existence.”249 
Although Justice Breyer acknowledged “the empirical 
possibility” that a copyright term extension might in some 
instances help a publisher resurrect a still-copyrighted but not 
especially visible work, he asserted that the disappearance-of-
the-monopoly rationale underlying the Copyright Clause 
prevented Congress from basing legislative action “primarily 
upon that empirical possibility.”250  If Congress could use that 
possibility as a primary basis for legislation, there would be too 
great a danger that repeated copyright extensions would be 
granted in favor of publishers and that copyrights would 
 
disincentive to publish first in the United States would not even be present in 
theory.  See 537 U.S. at 257-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 246. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  This justification, 
offered by the Motion Picture Association of America as amicus curiae, see id. 
at 239 n.13, and at least implicitly endorsed by the majority, see id. at 206, is 
discussed later in the article.  Although we leave some room for the assertion 
of this rationale in support of possible legislative action by Congress, we show 
it to be unpersuasive when offered in an attempt to justify a blanket extension 
of copyright duration.  See infra text accompanying notes 315-318, 478-482. 
 247. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 250. Id.  Justice Breyer came to these conclusions on the basis of the 
Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” and “to Authors” language, the anti-
monopolistic attitudes characteristic of the intellectual environment in which 
the Copyright Clause was written, and Supreme Court precedent.  Id. (citing 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).  Justice Breyer viewed 
the “to Authors” language as casting grave doubt on a legislative rationale 
that “rests entirely upon incentives given to publishers perhaps long after the 
death of the work’s creator.”  Id. at 261 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For our view 
of the proper role and effect of the “to Authors” language, see infra text 
accompanying notes 445-454. 
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effectively become perpetual.251  Justice Breyer therefore 
rejected the argument that extending copyright duration would 
generally promote, not hinder, the dissemination of existing 
works.  He regarded any such rationale for copyright term 
extension as “constitutionally perverse” and as “unable, 
constitutionally speaking, to justify the blanket extension” 
contemplated by the CTEA.252 
Justice Breyer made short work of other supposed 
justifications for the CTEA.  He dismissed the CTEA’s possible 
export-related benefits and other boons of a financial nature for 
the entertainment industry as irrelevant for Copyright Clause 
purposes.253  Such matters, he noted, are the business of 
Congress’ commerce authority, and not of its copyright 
authority.254  Referring to Justice Ginsburg’s account of 
“demographic, economic, and technological changes” justifying 
term extension,255 Justice Breyer wrote that technological 
changes seemed to weigh against term extension and that a 
life-plus-50 copyright regime would appear to have already 
corrected for a lengthening average life span.256 
Having responded to each of the asserted rationales for the 
CTEA, Justice Breyer emphasized that there “is no legitimate, 
serious copyright-related justification for this statute.”257  
Therefore, in his view, the Court would not have been 
improperly intruding on congressional authority if it had struck 
down the CTEA.  The Eldred majority’s deferential stance 
toward Congress involved inadequate consideration of the 
CTEA’s “rationality in light of the expressive values underlying 
the Copyright Clause, related as it is to the First 
Amendment.”258  Greater “vigilance” on the part of the Court, 
 
 251. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The “difficulty of 
finding any kind of logical stopping place” was a further reason for the Court 
not to accept “such a uniquely publisher-related rationale.”  Id. at 262. 
 252. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 207 & n.14 (majority opinion); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 103-109. 
 256. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  He also observed that 
the CTEA’s proponents had provided “no explanation of why the 1976 Act’s 
term of 50 years after an author’s death—a longer term than was available to 
authors themselves for most of our Nation’s history—is an insufficient 
potential bequest.”  Id. 
 257. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id. at 264. 
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Justice Breyer contended, “is . . . necessary in a new Century 
that will see intellectual property rights and the forms of 
expression that underlie them play an ever more important role 
in the Nation’s economy and the lives of its citizens.”259 
Justice Breyer was unmoved by the majority’s concern that 
striking down the CTEA would have consigned the 1976 Act to 
the same fate.  He observed that the 1976 Act, unlike the 
CTEA, served to accomplish an important international 
objective by satisfying a condition the United States needed to 
fulfill in order to join the Berne Convention, which required 
signatory nations to guarantee a life-plus-50 term.260  This 
accomplishment thus yielded a balance of benefit and harm 
much more favorable than that produced by the CTEA.261  After 
issuing a reminder that this case did not require the Court to 
consider the constitutionality of the 1976 Act, Justice Breyer 
observed that even if the 1976 Act’s validity were in question, 
“the law provides means to protect those who have reasonably 
relied upon prior copyright statutes.”262 
Near the end of his dissent, Justice Breyer responded to a 
majority opinion footnote suggesting that his argument had 
pushed beyond the limits of the case by addressing the CTEA’s 
prospective application rather than only its retrospective 
application.263  What appeared to Justice Ginsburg as a lack of 
argumentative restraint, Justice Breyer responded, served to 
show that even if one were to assent to the equity principle 
relied on by the majority, the CTEA could only be defensible in 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 264-65. 
 261. Id.  See Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 7(1).  Justice Breyer 
also argued that the 1909 and 1831 copyright term extensions produced 
balances of benefit and harm that were similarly more favorable than that of 
the CTEA.  The 1909 and 1831 Acts provided, according to Justice Breyer, 
significant marginal incentive to authors while minimizing the damage to the 
public domain by imposing a renewal requirement on copyright holders.  An 
effect of the renewal requirement was that many works entered the public 
domain at the end of the basic 28-year period because no renewal application 
was filed.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 264. 
 262. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Noting that he did 
not share the majority’s “aversion to line-drawing” with regard to the 
permissible length of copyright term extensions, Justice Breyer contended that 
the difficulty of “draw[ing] a single clear bright line” need not have stopped 
the Court from striking down the CTEA.  Id.  He believed that the Court 
should simply have decided that “this particular statute goes too far.  [S]uch 
examples . . . of what goes too far . . . sometimes offer better constitutional 
guidance than more absolute-sounding rules.”  Id. 
 263. Id.  See also id. at 193 n.1, 199 n.4 (majority opinion). 
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its retrospective application if it were likewise defensible in its 
prospective application.264  By showing the prospective 
application to be indefensible, he simultaneously condemned 
the retrospective application and its supposed attempt to 
provide parity between existing copyrights and new copyrights.  
“Where the case for extending new copyrights is so weak,” 
Justice Breyer asked, “what ‘justice,’ what ‘policy,’ what ‘equity’ 
can warrant the tolls and barriers that extension of existing 
copyrights imposes?”265 
Justice Breyer concluded by predicting that the CTEA 
would likely “cause serious expression-related harm,” hinder 
“traditional dissemination” of copyrighted works, “inhibit new 
forms of dissemination through the use of new technology,” and 
interfere with efforts to preserve, and teach students about, the 
nation’s history and culture.266  “It is easy to understand,” 
Justice Breyer stated, “how the [CTEA] might benefit the 
private financial interests of corporations or heirs who own 
existing copyrights.  But I cannot find any constitutionally 
legitimate, copyright-related way in which the statute will 
benefit the public.”267 
IV.  ASSESSING THE CTEA AND THE ELDRED DECISION 
In the introduction to this article, we indicated that we 
take a dim view of the CTEA and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Eldred to sustain it against constitutional attack.  Although 
the Eldred majority appeared to recognize that Congress took 
an unwise step in enacting the CTEA, the Court mishandled 
the constitutional issues.268  In this section, we subject the 
CTEA and Eldred to close inspection and lay out the reasons 
for our harsh evaluations of the actions of Congress and the 
 
 264. This refers to the notion that in making the CTEA and other duration 
extensions applicable to existing copyrights, Congress was simply attempting 
to place existing copyrights in parity with those that would come into 
existence after the enactment of the duration extension.  See id. at 204-05, 208 
(majority opinion).  For further analysis of this asserted rationale for the 
CTEA, see infra text accompanying notes 390-399. 
 265. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266. 
 266. Id. (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 267. Id.  Justice Breyer stressed that with regard to existing works, “the 
serious public harm and the virtually nonexistent public benefit could not be 
more clear.”  Id. 
 268. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[P]etitioners forcefully 
urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long 
terms.”). 
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Court. 
A. WHAT WAS CONGRESS THINKING? 
Occasionally, legislation can be a long-overdue update of 
an existing statute, the effectiveness of which would be 
seriously compromised had the legislature declined to take 
action.  Such a description does not fit the CTEA, however.  The 
CTEA, which was the fourth copyright duration extension in a 
series of extensions that began 167 years earlier, took effect 
only two decades after the extension provided in the Copyright 
Act of 1976. 269  Moreover, the CTEA provided a record-length 
term extension of 20 years, surpassing, by one year, the length 
of the previous extension.270 
In a period of less than a quarter-century, the CTEA and 
the 1976 Act lengthened copyright duration by 39 years, in 
marked contrast to the previous go-it-slow tendencies of 
Congress with regard to term extensions.  The first extension, a 
14-year increase beyond the previous maximum duration of 28 
years, came in 1831,271 41 years after Congress created 
copyright protection at the federal level.  After the 1831 
extension, it would be another 78 years before Congress would 
lengthen the maximum copyright term, again by 14 years.272  
More than six more decades would pass until the 1976 Act and 
its extension of 19 years.273 
What, then, was Congress’s justification for allowing the 
CTEA’s 20-year bonus so closely on the heels of the 1976 Act’s 
lengthy extension?  Congress and the proponents of the CTEA 
pointed to the supposed rationales detailed elsewhere in this 
 
 269. Besides the CTEA, the series includes the (1) Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 
16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439; supra notes 24-25; (2) Copyright Act of 1909, 
supra note 1; and (3) Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2.  We have followed 
the lead of Justice Stevens in not including the 1790 Act in the series, because 
that statute, rather than being an extension of copyright duration, created the 
federal copyright regime.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
The series also does not include the various annual extensions that Congress 
enacted beginning in 1962, in anticipation of what became the Copyright Act 
of 1976.  See supra note 41. 
 270. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (CTEA’s 20-year extension) with 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302, 304, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) 
(increasing duration of copyright on pre-1978 works by 19 years and 
substituting new rule contemplating longer average duration for copyrights on 
works created in 1978 or thereafter). 
 271. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439. 
 272. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1. 
 273. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2. 
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article.274  The asserted justifications passed constitutional 
muster—though in our view, they should not have—because 
they were evaluated by a Supreme Court majority that was not 
bowled over by the government’s arguments in favor of the 
CTEA but was nevertheless inclined to give Congress 
exceedingly broad latitude.  Regardless of whether one believes 
that the CTEA was constitutional, though a bad idea,275 or that 
it was unwise and unconstitutional, one cannot escape the 
conclusion that Congress did not serve the public well when it 
enacted the CTEA.  Our lawmakers set up a massive giveaway 
to private interests and imposed that giveaway’s considerable, 
long-enduring costs on a public that neither received nor will 
receive any new benefit in return.276 
The CTEA’s legislative history and the recitation of 
justifications in the Eldred majority opinion offer indications 
that Congress was star-struck.277  Disney, other similarly 
interested corporate copyright owners, and the organizations 
 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 94-112, 136-139. 
 275. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the CTEA . . . 
is an impermissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause.”). 
 276. See id. at 223-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 242-67 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  In their separate dissents, Justice Stevens and 
Justice Breyer both rely on the assertion that the Copyright Clause requires 
the interest in private protection to be balanced against the interest in public 
access.  Id.; see also Karjala, supra note 44 at 201 (referring to the CTEA as 
providing favored copyright owners with “a windfall at an incalculable but 
heavy cost” to the public).  For a discussion of that cost, see id. at 233.  Other 
commentators have referred to the CTEA as “guarantee[ing] an income stream 
to . . . favorite[s] of the legislature,” such as Disney and the Motion Picture 
Association of America, among others.  Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, 
Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as 
an Absolute Constraint on Congress, U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (2000). 
 277. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07 & nn. 11, 14 & 15; 144 CONG. REC. 
S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch, co-sponsor of the 
CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statements of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Feinstein when extension bill was first considered in 1995); 
Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50; 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 50.  See 
also Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of 
Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 656 (1996) (commenting that 
after the 1995 introduction of term extension bill, “[i]t is almost as though 
Congress cannot hear any copyright voices beyond that of the entertainment 
industry”). 
Note that the hearings dealing with what later became the CTEA occurred in 
1995, when congressional committees first considered extending existing and 
future copyrights by 20 years.  See S. 483, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th 
Cong. (1995).  For explanation of the delay between the 1995 bill proposing a 
copyright duration extension and the 1998 enactment of the CTEA, see supra 
note 41. 
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allied with them (referred to here, for convenience purposes, as 
simply “Disney”) possessed institutional star power, not to 
mention the financial resources and political influence that 
made for a powerful lobbying campaign.  In carrying out that 
campaign, Disney resourcefully stressed the full list of 
stakeholders who could benefit from a 20-year extension of 
copyright duration.  The proposed extension would apply to all 
copyright owners, not merely corporate owners such as Disney.  
The sales pitch emphasized the creative process and the 
individual authors, songwriters, composers, and visual artists 
who deserved extended copyright protection.  A copyright term 
extension, the argument continued, would be good for all 
creators and, of course, for their heirs who ultimately will own 
the relevant copyrights.278 
So, Disney the institutional star, hoping to widen the 
appeal of the proposed term extension and make the CTEA less 
closely resemble special-interest legislation drafted for Disney’s 
benefit, let human stars take much of the public lead in the 
promotional push. Celebrities weighed in, for instance, with 
congressional hearing testimony in support of the CTEA.  Few 
in Congress would disagree when Quincy Jones calls the CTEA 
“a good start” toward copyright protection of even greater 
duration,279 when Bob Dylan comments on the importance to 
creators of knowing that they may benefit their heirs numerous 
years hence,280 or when Don Henley and Carlos Santana 
indicate that they would like their far-removed descendants to 
have a chance to collect royalties stemming from their creations 
of many decades earlier.281  Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a 
 
 278. See Fonda, supra note 44; McAllister, supra note 44; Smith, supra 
note 44, at B9; Solomon, supra note 44. 
 279. Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50 at 277 (statement of Quincy 
Jones) (observing that “[i]f we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good 
start”).  See id. at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) (commenting on 
Representative Hoke’s “Why not forever?” remark, by noting that “I’m 
particularly fascinated with [the representative’s] statement. . . . Why not 
forever?”). 
 280. See 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 50 at 55-56 (statement of Bob 
Dylan). 
 281. See id. at 56-57 (statements of Don Henley and Carlos Santana).  Of 
course, their far-removed descendants would have had that chance even 
without the CTEA’s 20-year bonus.  Copyrights on those artists’ works, 
whether pre-1978 or dating from 1978 on, were already subject to very long 
durations.  See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) (75-year duration for copyrights on pre-
1978 works; now 95 years after CTEA); id. § 302 (life-plus-50-years duration 
for works created in 1978 or later; now life-plus-70 after CTEA).  In his Eldred 
dissent, Justice Breyer correctly noted that remarks such as those made by 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
2004] UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 239 
 
successful songwriter on the side,282 may have shared a special 
sense of identification with Dylan.283  But Senator Hatch and 
his party deserve no more blame than other senators and 
representatives.  Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), for 
example, and others of her party were equally enthusiastic and 
uncritical backers of the CTEA.284 
The clincher for Congress may have been that the CTEA 
also appeared to benefit copyright owners who were “little 
guys” or were the heirs of such figuratively diminutive persons.  
With the CTEA applying across the board to all owners of 
copyrights on new works and pre-existing works still under 
copyright as of the CTEA’s 1998 effective date,285 Congress 
could reason that not only was it taking care of Disney et al., it 
was protecting Jones, Henley, Dylan, and Santana (and their 
grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and so forth), and it was 
doing a great thing for “regular” creators (and their distant-
time heirs) who would remain largely unknown to the public.  
 
Dylan, Henley and Santana in supposed support of the CTEA were really only 
comments about general incentives furnished by a scheme of copyright 
protection.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court . . . refers to testimony before Congress . . . that the 
copyright system’s incentives encourage creation . . . [but this] amounts to no 
more than a set of undeniably true propositions about the value of incentives 
in general.”).  The musical artists’ remarks did not speak directly to the 
incentive value of the added 20 years.  Therefore, the comments should not 
have been given credence in the determination of whether the CTEA was a 
permissible exercise of Copyright Clause authority.  See id. 255-56 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  It seems highly unlikely that Dylan, Henley, Santana, or Quincy 
Jones would have been moved by the CTEA’s 20-year bonus to write any piece 
of music that he would not otherwise have written. 
 282. For a listing of the Senator’s many songs, see 
http://www.hatchmusic.com/songs.  Background on Sen. Hatch’s musical 
pursuits appears at http://www.hatchmusic.com/history. 
 283. Senator Hatch was a co-sponsor of the bill that became the CTEA and 
was probably its most outspoken advocate in the Senate.  During the 
legislative process, he commented at length on the supposed merits of 
copyright duration extension and punctuated his remarks with references to 
various copyrighted songs that would soon enter the public domain if not 
saved from that fate.  144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) 
(statement of Senator Hatch regarding bill that became CTEA); 141 CONG. 
REC. S3390 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statement of Senator Hatch regarding 
20-year extension bill considered in 1995). 
 284. See id. 
 285. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304(a), 304(b) (2000).  According to Professors Heald 
and Sherry, the retroactive aspect of the CTEA “has the same effect as a direct 
subsidy to Disney or ASCAP but takes a form that diminishes public 
awareness of the effect of the law and therefore erodes political 
accountability.”  Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1175. 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
240 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
It would be unlikely that any copyright owner would object to 
such a term extension, unless he is inclined to consider the 
bigger picture we address later in the article. 
Not having heard protests from copyright owners, human 
or corporate, Congress probably was too inclined to assume 
that the CTEA was a largely uncontroversial bill.  Certainly, 
there were objections raised in congressional hearing testimony 
by academics and others who voiced concerns about the effect 
on the public domain.286  But those objections, made by less 
well-known—not to mention less well-financed and less 
glamorous—spokespersons,287 could be discounted as seeking to 
further the interests of users of works rather than those of the 
works’ creators.  Users of works, after all, may sometimes seem 
less worthy of legal protection than those who actually 
produced the copyrighted works and gave them value—
especially if the observer is not inclined to pay much attention 
to the balance drawn by the Framers in the Copyright 
Clause.288  It appears that the objections to the CTEA were 
listened to politely and then summarily dismissed.  The CTEA 
passed with essentially no opposition and took effect, by its 
terms, immediately upon being signed into law by President 
Clinton.289 
Congress thus did Disney’s bidding and enacted what was 
effectively special-interest legislation to further private 
concerns, perhaps all the while thinking that it had benefited 
society by striking a blow for creativity.  In the process, 
Congress was frighteningly uncritical in its acceptance of the 
arguments and rationales offered by the CTEA’s proponents.  
Concern about what was really contemplated by the Copyright 
Clause appeared to be confined to the narrow issue of whether 
copyright protection could be made to last forever.290  Perpetual 
 
 286. E.g., the Dennis Karjala-led group of professors who provided 
Congress the Statement of Copyright Law Professors.  See supra note 51. 
 287. We are referring here, remember, to a group of professors.  See id. 
 288. With its admonition that copyright protection must endure for a 
“limited [t]ime[],” the Copyright Clause contemplates the existence of a public 
domain.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This means that the rights of users of 
formerly copyrighted works have constitutional stature, and that the passage 
of works into the public domain, an event that Senator Hatch considered so 
undesirable, see supra note 283, is the fate ordained by the Constitution.  
Moreover, the rights of creators and those of users of works need not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive.  See infra text accompanying notes 473-475. 
 289. See supra note 41.  Testimony against the CTEA simply “fell on deaf 
ears.”  Hamilton, supra note 277, at 656. 
 290. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
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protection had been the goal of Sonny Bono, the deceased 
representative to whom tribute was paid in the CTEA’s official 
name.291  Mary Bono, who succeeded her late husband in the 
House and helped lead the successful push for the CTEA, had 
to be “informed by staff” that a law expressly protecting 
copyrights forever would be unconstitutional.292  She remarked 
that perhaps at a later time, Congress should take up a 
copyright duration proposal of the “forever, less one day” 
variety—a suggestion supposedly made by Motion Picture 
Association of America executive Jack Valenti.293  Finally, in 
enacting the CTEA, Congress appeared to give little thought to 
the implications of granting another term extension to huge 
numbers of copyrights that had already received a lengthy 
extension under the 1976 Act. 
Adopted by a Congress that paid insufficient attention to 
the full range of issues at stake and seemed overly concerned 
about preserving the potential stream of royalties for far-
removed heirs and other eventual owners of copyrights,294 the 
CTEA has placed a noteworthy freeze on the public domain.  No 
works will enter the public domain until January 1, 2019.  In 
this sense, the CTEA has drastically thrown off the balance 
contemplated by the Copyright Clause.295  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court held in Eldred that any failings of Congress in 
regard to the enactment of the CTEA fell on the permissible 
 
Mary Bono, noting that her late husband, Sonny Bono, had favored perpetual 
copyright protection but that she had been “informed by staff” of the 
unconstitutionality of such a move by Congress); Hearing on H.R. 989, supra 
note 50, at 94 (citing Rep. Sonny Bono as asking why copyrights should ever 
expire and cited by the Eldred Court at page 256); Hearing on H.R. 989, supra 
note 50, at 94 (statement of Rep. Berman, expressing his “guess [that] we 
could . . . just make a permanent moratorium on the expiration of copyrights”); 
cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at230 (quoting statement of Rep. Hoke, asking “Why 70 
years?  Why not forever?  Why not 150 years?”). 
 291. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Mary Bono); see also Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50, at 94. 
 292. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Mary Bono). 
 293. See id. 
 294. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement 
of Senator Hatch regarding bill that became CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390 
(daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statement of Senator Hatch regarding 20-year 
extension bill considered in 1995); Karjala, supra note 44 at 199, 235. 
 295. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223-28, 240-41, 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
id. at 243-46, 265-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also Heald & Sherry, supra 
note 276, at 1165 (observing that the Copyright Clause contemplates an 
“inviolable” public domain). 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
242 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
side and resulted in a statute that probably was not wise public 
policy but did not violate the Copyright Clause.296  We now 
explore the Copyright Clause more fully, in order to expose the 
CTEA’s unconstitutional nature and the errors committed by 
the Court in Eldred. 
B. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND POSSIBLE PROMOTION-OF-
PROGRESS THEORIES 
It has been asserted by some that the policy arguments 
against the CTEA are stronger than the constitutional ones.297  
This claim, however, can be misleading.  Even though the bulk 
of the constitutional arguments may resemble policy 
arguments, the presentation of the debate as a constitutional 
one provides an effective means of responding to “moral rights” 
policy arguments that, at first glance, might seem to weigh in 
the CTEA’s favor.  The Copyright Clause specifies the end that 
the statutory regime of copyright must serve: promotion of the 
“Progress of Science.”298  Therefore, auxiliary policy aims—such 
as harmonization and ensuring that the author’s great-
grandchildren have control over the author’s work—must 
either be dismissed as constitutionally inappropriate or be 
shoe-horned into some larger, more utilitarian scheme. 
For the most part, this article works with the traditional 
view of copyright as furnishing an incentive for the production 
of creative works that, at the appropriate time, will pass into 
the public domain.  Under this view, the term of copyright can 
be thought of as the fulcrum of a scale balancing private 
licensing against public access with the aim of producing the 
greatest quantity of publicly accessible creative work.299  This 
traditional view is admittedly narrow, however, in its 
 
 296. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 297. See, e.g., Symposium, Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 797 (2003) 
(comments of David O. Carson); Marci Hamilton, Mickey Mouse versus Wired 
Magazine: The Supreme Court Considers Whether a Law Extending the 
Copyright Term is Constitutional, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Oct. 
24, 2002), at http://writ.findlaw.com/hamilton/20021024.html. 
 298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  For a careful examination of the 
Copyright Clause language, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual 
Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: Congress’s Power to 
Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 
(2002). 
 299. For the classic account, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989). 
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perspective on intellectual property and its benefits.  Before 
delving into criticism of the majority opinion in Eldred, we 
should concede that the Copyright Clause’s “progress” 
provision, in and of itself, does not shut out other 
nontraditional views altogether.300  These nontraditional views 
would take copyright to “promote the Progress of Science” in 
ways that have nothing to do with inducing authors to create 
new works.  In doing so, these views would expand the notion of 
the “Progress of Science” beyond its traditional Copyright 
Clause sense, which tends to equate it with public access, or 
perhaps even more strictly, with the public domain.301 
William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner give a 
lucid airing to such a view in a recent article302 in which they 
discuss the economic bases for property as such and proceed to 
draw an analogy to intellectual property in particular.  Take a 
parcel of land, for instance.  The land has existed forever, yet 
someone is allowed the exclusive right to it.  Obviously, the 
exclusive right was never an incentive for the land’s creation.  
Nevertheless, granting someone the exclusive right to the land 
produces a more desirable social outcome.  Now imagine that 
everyone had rights to the land.  Everyone would have free, 
unlimited use of it, and the land would quickly become 
“overgrazed,” drained of all value, useful to no one.303 
The principle’s applicability to copyright is questionable, 
however, and it should be noted that Landes and Posner do not 
place too much weight on it.  They also point out that there are 
notable counterexamples.  For instance, the works of 
Shakespeare seem to retain their “value” despite endless 
 
 300. Below, we propose that a new emphasis be placed on the Clause’s “to 
Authors” provision—to the effect that most conceivable non-incentive-related 
means of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” would be judged impermissible.  
It is important to note, however, that even though completely ruling out the 
nontraditional theories of “progress” would produce the same effect, we do not 
propose such a ruling-out.  See infra text accompanying notes 445-454. 
 301. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); see also Eldred, 
537 U.S. at 245-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In taking a broad view of the 
copyright power’s scope, though, we should be wary of going too far.  Even if 
the Framers could have accepted theories of “promot[ion of] Progress” beyond 
the incentive-for-creation model, the “limited [t]imes” restriction indicates that 
the public domain was central to the Framers’ idea of “Progress.”  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 302. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
 303. Id. at 485. 
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rehashing and recycling.304  In our view, though, the 
“overgrazing” principle’s problems come yet closer to the fore 
when Landes and Posner name works that would conform to it: 
“the Mona Lisa, the opening lines of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony, and several of Van Gogh’s most popular 
paintings.”305  One is compelled to ask what “value” these 
classic works have really lost.  The Mona Lisa’s “devaluation,” 
for instance, results merely from its having become, in part, an 
article of kitsch in the popular mind.  Here, the devaluation 
refers solely to consumers’ response to the work (or possibly 
even the number of less refined consumers who can identify it 
readily) and not to any change in the Mona Lisa itself.  The 
overgrazed parcel of land, on the other hand, is devalued 
because it literally undergoes an unfavorable physical 
transformation.  This discrepancy is crucial.  In his discussion 
of It’s a Wonderful Life, a film the rights over which went 
unenforced for a time, one commentator unwittingly calls its 
significance into sharp and painful detail: “Before [certain 
parties] began enforcing their claim to the underlying rights in 
the film, local stations and cable channels looking for no-cost 
programming broadcast the film endlessly, with the result that, 
‘to put it politely, the film’s currency was being devalued.’”306 
To put it less politely, some people watched It’s a 
Wonderful Life a few too many times on TV, and they grew 
tired of it.  But a desire to prevent such a “devaluing”—
effectively a desire to restrict access to works so that the 
public’s opinion of them is not adversely affected by over-
exposure to them—should not be used to justify expansions of 
the exclusive rights afforded by copyright.  It seems doubtful, 
for instance, that society would be better off if our access to the 
Mona Lisa were more restricted and if that work had remained 
solely one of fine art rather than also becoming an oft-
encountered item of popular culture.  Creativity, after all, is 
more likely to be promoted by freedom to use the Mona Lisa as 
one sees fit than by restrictions on access to it.307  A rationale of 
 
 304. Id. at 488. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Scott Martin, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional 
Power, and the Constitution: The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring 
the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Extension, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 253, 273 (2002) (quoting Bill Carter, Where Have You Gone, 
Tyrone Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at D10). 
 307. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990). 
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preventing “overgrazing” of works of authorship thus appears 
not to correspond well with the constitutional notion of 
promoting the “Progress of Science.”308 
Admittedly, exclusive rights may have certain supposed 
benefits to the “Progress of Science” that are more material in 
nature, and it would be unfair for us not to acknowledge that 
the writer quoted above in regard to It’s a Wonderful Life went 
on to note that during the movie’s period of no exclusivity, 
many of the versions being shown had fallen into disrepair and 
were substandard in quality.309  It can be argued, for instance, 
that if one has the exclusive rights to a certain film, then the 
film is more likely to be restored when that becomes necessary 
and more likely to be distributed in new digital formats.  What 
about films in the public domain?  Suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that restored editions of public domain films 
received legal protection under an enactment separate from 
copyright law.310  If a firm were to restore a public-domain film, 
then it would have the exclusive rights to the restored edition 
under the hypothetical legal rule being assumed here, and 
would charge a price high enough to cover the costs of 
restoration.  Other firms, though, would continue to distribute 
lower-quality (i.e., non-restored) editions of the old film.  They 
would have no restoration costs to cover and they would be able 
to charge a price lower than that charged for the restored 
edition.  Given the choice, consumers might place greater 
importance on price than on quality.  If this were so, then no 
firm would have an incentive to restore the work.311 The 
demand for the restored edition would be undercut by the 
demand for the cheaper, albeit lower-quality, editions. 
The natural reaction to this hypothetical is to conclude 
that if demand is insufficient to give the restored edition a 
significant market niche, the restoration is unimportant in any 
 
 308. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228. 
 309. Martin, supra note 306, at 273. 
 310. This hypothetical enactment would address restored editions with no 
new expression added—no insertion of commentary by film experts, no 
inclusion of  new footage, etc.—because the presence of new expression in the 
restored edition would trigger copyright protection for that new expression.  
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 311. Obviously, there would be no economic incentive to restore the film if 
exclusive rights were not enforced over the restored edition.  In the absence of 
such rights, prices on the restored edition would quickly be bid down by 
copiers to a price lower than that necessary for the restorers to recoup the 
investment made in restoration. 
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case.  If in the long run consumers would prefer that a restored 
edition exist, it might seem to make sense for the restorers to 
be granted temporary exclusive rights not only to the restored 
edition of the film, but also to the film itself.  This would allow 
the restorers to cut off the supply of all the lower-quality, 
lower-priced editions.  Until expiration of the restorer’s rights 
in the film under this hypothetical legal regime, all consumers 
of the film would pay a kind of “tax” in the form of monopoly 
pricing and would thereby subsidize a restoration project whose 
benefits would be felt long after the tax disappeared. 
The above argument, a variant on Landes’ and Posner’s,312 
offers substantial support to the theoretical system of renewals 
discussed in their article, for under that system the burden of 
renewal would ensure a narrowing of copyright’s coverage to 
works that remain commercially viable.313  The argument in 
support of a narrowly defined restorer’s right—even one that 
would not present the constitutional difficulties of the 
hypothetical right discussed in the preceding paragraph314 —
does not provide support, however, for the legal protection 
provided by the CTEA’s late-in-the-game blanket term 
extension.  As Justice Breyer emphasized in his Eldred dissent, 
only 2% of all works published continue to generate royalties by 
the time their copyrights enter CTEA territory.315  The 
remaining 98% have little chance of being revisited by the 
rights-holders during the final years of copyright.  At the same 
time, many of them, though not cost-effective investments for 
their current rights-holders, would stand a far better chance of 
restoration or other revisitation if they were in the public 
domain.  Eric Eldred, the plaintiff in Eldred, is one such 
disseminator of public domain works.316  The film Metropolis, 
long in the public domain, was recently remastered and 
restored by the Murnau Foundation and given a small-scale 
theater and DVD release317 that may not have been cost-
 
 312. See Landes & Posner, supra note 302, at 488-90. 
 313. See id. at 517. 
 314. The hypothetical right under discussion would present serious 
constitutional problems to the extent that it would grant protection over an 
underlying work that was already in the public domain.  See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 
(2003). 
 315. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 316. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618) available at 2002 WL 1041928.  See Fonda, supra note 44. 
 317. Press Release, Kino International, Kino on Video to Release Digitally 
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effective for a large-scale corporate rights-holder of the type 
that owns most copyrights on films. 
Even if the CTEA does fund certain works’ revisitation, it 
does so only at a significant price to the vast majority of other 
works—the 98% of works whose chances of revisitation would 
be greater if they entered the public domain sooner.  It seems 
reasonable, moreover, to project that as more and more works 
are stored in digital formats, restoration and other kinds of 
revisitation will become cheaper and less necessary.  If this is 
indeed the case, then the CTEA, which will apply to 
innumerable future works in no need of revisitation, looks even 
more overbroad.318 
Another nontraditional theory holds that greater 
international harmonization of and cooperation concerning 
copyright policy promotes the “Progress of Science.”  
Harmonization, for instance, simplifies licensing and 
distribution agreements somewhat.  In addition, making some 
concessions and playing an active role in the negotiation of 
international treaties may allow the United States considerable 
sway over other nations’ copyright policies.  Such effects may 
influence the “Progress of Science” abroad, and the benefits 
could be felt domestically.319  The problem, however, is that the 
benefits, as far as the “Progress of Science” is concerned, may 
be great or may be small; it is a question that has yet to be 
answered with good empirical data. 
On the other hand, there can be no question as to the 
considerable costs of an additional 20 years of copyright.  Any 
sincere argument for term extension employing the 
“international copyright system” rationale would have to take 
account of data demonstrating that its benefits were at least as 
substantial as the duration extension’s costs.  But the CTEA 
does not even reach the point of making such a showing 
relevant, for as Justice Breyer observed, the CTEA’s 
“harmonization” of U.S. copyright duration with that of the 
 
Restored Metropolis with Orchestral Soundtrack, at 
http://www.silentera.com/info/kinoMetropolis.html (e-release June 5, 2002) 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004). 
 318. Cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that 
even if providing incentives to restore old films would merit action by 
Congress, CTEA is far too sweeping to be justified on such basis). 
 319. Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System 
as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 323, 329-30 (2002). 
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European Union is pitifully incomplete.320  The CTEA 
harmonized only the terms of copyright on post-1977 works 
created by natural persons.  These works comprise a mere 
subset of commercially viable works, and only a tiny subset of 
works belonging to that subset will still be in print by the time 
the harmonized period begins.321 
It can be granted that the copyright power, as an “engine of 
free expression,”322 could conceivably operate otherwise than as 
a means of setting incentives for authorship.  Though the 
argument would be weak, one could contend that these kinds of 
effects will result from the CTEA’s grant of incentives to 
certain rights-holders to “revisit” old films and from its inter-
continental harmonization of the terms of copyright on post-
1977 works attributed to natural persons.323  But the CTEA’s 
application is not so restricted.  If there remains a case to be 
made for the full sweep of the CTEA’s term extensions, the 
possible nontraditional arguments we have just examined will 
not do.  Therefore, we now turn to the traditional copyright 
model.  In order for the bulk of the CTEA to pass even a 
rational basis test, it must have its grounding in the standard 
“incentive for creation” model.324  As we shall show, such 
grounding is nowhere to be found. 
C. THE CTEA, THE TRADITIONAL INCENTIVE MODEL, AND 
ELDRED’S ERRONEOUS ANALYSIS 
The creation-incentive value of even the prospective 
application of the CTEA (i.e., the application to works created 
after the CTEA’s effective date) is questionable at best.  Recall 
that the creation-time value given by a CTEA-regime copyright 
equals 99.8% that of a hypothetical perpetual term.325  Justice 
Ginsburg misrepresents the economic analysis as culminating 
in a ludicrous assertion that the term of copyright is somehow 
99.8% perpetual,326 and with a reasonable but misplaced 
 
 320. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 321. See id. at 258 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 322. Harper & Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 323. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206.  But see id. at 239-240 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 253-54, 225-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 324. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 429 (1984). 
 325. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion); id. at 256 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 326. Id. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion).  Justice Ginsburg’s 
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remark about calculators and calendars, wholly dismisses the 
numbers.327  Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion, the 
economic analysis does not directly apply to the “limited 
[t]imes” question.  Instead, it relates to the copyright power’s 
utilitarian basis.328  The figure of 99.8%, then, speaks to 
incentive rather than term length and does not, in and of itself, 
point to any great evil.  Indeed, even a much shorter term of 
copyright could yield this figure if interest rates were higher.329  
A proper look at the economic analysis would also take account 
of two other figures, namely, the length of the term extension 
and the average percentage of a perpetual term’s creation-time 
value—99.4%—provided by a pre-CTEA copyright.  Under this 
view, the public gives up 20 years’ full access so that the 
creation-time value of copyright on an ideal work can increase 
by about 0.4%.330 
We write of “creation-time value” rather than “incentive-
value” because it is unlikely that the two values are directly 
correlated.  One should recall that works tend not to collect a 
steady stream of royalties up through their 95th year and that 
only 2% of all works survive to the 56th.331  The 0.4% of 
additional incentive would have to be adjusted downward by 
the likelihood of premature commercial death and the near-
certainty of commercial slowdown.332 
By this rational-economic measure, the CTEA’s prospective 
application provides little additional incentive.  We should be 
careful, however, to account for other possible frameworks.  A 
 
misrepresentation involved her treatment of the numbers, but Justice Breyer 
made the same misstatement in an outright manner, writing that “ [t]he 
economic effect of this 20-year extension . . . is to make copyright not limited, 
but virtually perpetual.”  Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 327. Id. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 328. The economic analysis of a work’s incentive value may inform the 
“limited times” analysis indirectly, though, if one regards as unlimited any 
term outliving a work’s ability to produce substantial retroactive incentive 
value.  See infra text accompanying notes 410-415, 439-454. 
 329. For the sake of demonstration, if the interest rate, absurdly, were set 
at 25%, then a 28-year term would yield the 99.8% figure. 
 330. We mean, in other words, roughly a 0.4% increase on the old 
premium.  See Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1173-74 (asserting that the 
prospective application of the CTEA furnishes no added economic incentive 
beyond what prior law provided, and noting that “adding . . . 20 years [to the 
copyright term] buys the public nothing”). 
 331. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248, 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 332. This would be so unless, of course, the creator has reason to expect 
significant enough inflation in the next 95 years to offset the improbability’s 
rarefying effect. 
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“boundedly rational” artist, for instance, may lose sight of the 
role of interest, overlook the possibility of accruing money over 
time by saving, and assume that the 20 years of term extension 
will give him revenues proportional to those that he expects to 
make in the first 20 years.333  But then, few artists would dare 
hope that their works’ commercial viability would live out the 
entire 95 years, and not even they would have the audacity to 
attempt to negotiate any kind of long-term financial agreement 
based on so highly speculative a projection of commercial 
longevity.  And the extra years of term length would scarcely 
improve the artist’s bargaining position with publishing 
houses, which we could reasonably expect to possess the 
rational-economic view of things. 
Even so, another artist may, irrespective of economics, 
simply take pleasure in the thought of his or her estate owning 
the rights to his or her work for a long time.  But the “moral” 
incentive here would not likely be furthered greatly by the 
CTEA, which merely postpones the date of passage into the 
public domain by 20 years.  A look to the history of copyright 
renewals suggests, moreover, that the moral incentive was not 
of great importance to the majority of authors anyway.  
Regarding works registered for copyright between 1883 and 
1965, only 11% of authors took the opportunity to renew their 
copyrights, even though the price of renewal was slight.334  
Interestingly, renewals during that period would have 
prolonged the life of their copyrights by 28 to 47 years, longer 
than the CTEA’s 20-year prolongation.335  We have no way of 
knowing what proportion of these authors chose to renew for 
moral reasons, but it is a conservative wager that some of the 
aforementioned 11% were motivated by royalties to be gained 
from the additional years of duration.  Yet it would appear that 
at least 89% of authors cared little for the moral or economic 
value of a significantly long period of copyright effective during 
their lifetimes.  Thus, if 28 to 47 years’ income gain were 
insufficiently attractive motivation for renewal, the CTEA’s 
additional 20 years appears overly broad for the moral 
incentive it delivers, namely, the knowledge that one’s family 
will continue to exercise some measure of control over one’s 
 
 333. From this view, the CTEA would sweeten the pot by 26.6%, in sharp 
contrast with the 0.4% discussed at supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 334. Landes & Posner, supra note 302, at 473. 
 335. See supra note 2 for review of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts’ 
duration terms. 
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work for an additional 20 years from the fiftieth year after 
death. 
The citation by Congress and the Supreme Court of 
demographic trends toward a longer life span336 should have 
little impact on the analysis of the CTEA’s incentive effect.  
Recall that only 2% of works retain commercial viability after 
their 55th year.337  The works of venerated graybeards Bob 
Dylan, Carlos Santana, and Quincy Jones may indeed outlast 
their creators’ grandchildren, but a shrewder Congress would 
have recognized that those works are in the minority.  Had 
Congress listened to other artists, particularly contemporary 
artists who rely more heavily on sampling than their 
predecessors did, it might have learned that many artists are 
more concerned with heightened access than with heightened 
protection.  Hip-hop artist Chuck D of Public Enemy, for 
instance, has railed against tight restrictions on sampling338 
while aligning himself with file-sharing services such as 
Audiogalaxy.com.339 
Thus, the CTEA’s prospective application has questionable 
creation-incentive value in terms of the actual economic and 
moral rewards it would give artists.  The CTEA’s retrospective 
 
 336. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07, 207 n. 14. 
 337. See id. at 254. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 338. In the audio track Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, Chuck D takes a 
Jeffersonian view of audio recordings: 
Caught, now in court ‘cause I stole a beat 
This is a sampling sport 
But I’m giving it a new name 
What you hear is mine 
P.E. [Public Enemy] you know the time . . . 
I found this mineral that I call a beat 
I paid zero 
I packed my load ‘cause it’s better than gold 
People don’t ask the price, but its [sic] sold . . . 
We ain’t goin’ for this 
They say that I stole this 
Can I get a witness? 
PUBLIC ENEMY, Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, on IT TAKES A NATION OF 
MILLIONS TO HOLD US BACK (Columbia/Def Jam Recordings 1988), available 
at http://www.lyrics.net.ua/song/133388 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). 
 339. Biography of Keynote Speaker, Chuck D, First Joint Convening of 
Americans for the Arts and the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, 
July 28-31, 2001, at http://www.participate2001.org/innerpages/keynotes/d.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004); see also Audiogalaxy, at 
http://www.audiogalaxy.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (Audiogalaxy.com is a 
music search and file sharing web site). 
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application, viewed within the confines of the economic model 
only, is of even more questionable value, particularly if its 
primary goal is to augment the incentive of a lengthened 
prospective term with a further incentive for future authors: 
that they might benefit even more from later-enacted term 
extensions.340  This further incentive fails on two grounds.  
First, if future authors bet on later extensions to their 
copyright term as their incentive to create, the bet would have 
to be of enough value to overcome the probability that the 
benefit would never be received.  Yet as discussed above, a 
majority of authors would probably find the “moral value” of 
even a significant term extension to be minimal, and the 
marginal economic value would be extremely small even if the 
term were extended to perpetuity.341  Second, in order for 
Congress to maintain a reasonable expectation of extension, 
Congress would have to extend existing copyright terms 
regularly and make sure each time that a significant number of 
copyrights benefited from the extension.342  These periodic 
extensions, strung together, would seem dangerously close to 
an effectively perpetual copyright.  Viewed in the fairest light, 
 
 340. Sen. Orrin Hatch suggests that the CTEA delivers just that: 
Contrary to the argument made by the CTEA’s detractors, this 
extension was not a naked windfall to copyright holders.  Rather, it 
fulfills the justified expectation that Congress will periodically review 
and revise the copyright term.  In so doing, Congress not only 
confirmed the expectation of existing copyright holders, it also 
preserved its ongoing good faith in the eyes of the creators of 
copyrightable works.  Accordingly, such an extension does advance 
the goal of enhancing the incentive for the creation of new 
copyrighted works. 
Orrin Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 21 (2002).  The Senator’s attempt to justify the CTEA in this fashion 
merely clothed, in transparent semantics, what the authors assert is a “naked 
windfall.” His rationale that copyright holders have a “justified expectation” of 
extensions would seem to require Congress to string together extension after 
extension, but even the Eldred majority would not approve of such action by 
Congress.  See supra text accompanying notes 86-88, 110-115; infra text 
accompanying notes 342-343, 400-415, 459-467. 
 341. See Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 10, Eldred (No. 
01-618) (remarking that overall, a twenty-year extension “seems unlikely to 
have a significant effect” on both pre-creation and post-creation incentives). 
 342. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: 
“Have I Stayed Too Long?”, 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1031 (2000) (arguing that 
because such a “bet” on retroactive extensions would be a “bizarrely rarefied 
long shot” for authors, repeated extensions would not necessarily produce 
more incentives to create nor correspondingly more copyrights that would 
benefit). 
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the retroactive component’s incentive to future authors simply 
approaches nil.  Viewed more harshly, it suggests something 
akin to the congressional bad faith of which Justice Ginsburg, 
in the Eldred decision, professed to find no trace.343  Surely at 
some level Congress was influenced by overt requests for 
perpetual copyright.344 
In his challenge to the retroactive component, petitioner 
Eldred asserted just this concern.  He alleged that the 
Copyright Clause “imbeds a quid pro quo,” and that the CTEA, 
in light of arguments similar to those we have just advanced, 
represents a “quid pro nihilo.”345  As noted above, Justice 
Ginsburg disagreed, arguing that the CTEA involved a quid pro 
quo and, in effect, that the beneficiaries of the CTEA’s term 
extensions paid for the CTEA before they knew they would be 
receiving its benefit.346  Given Congress’ history of retroactive 
term extensions, she countered, an author could have a 
reasonable expectation at the time of creation that he or she 
would eventually benefit from some extension of copyright.347 
Certainly, some authors would know that Congress has 
extended durations in the past and would hope that Congress 
might do so again in the future.  But it makes neither legal nor 
practical sense to speak of a possible future extension as if it 
were part of a contract with the authors.  Having reason to 
 
 343. Justice Ginsburg focused instead on the lack of clear evidence in the 
House and Senate reports that Congress intended copyright protection to be 
perpetual, and on assertions in the congressional debates that copyright 
duration should be limited.  She therefore concluded that the CTEA does not 
establish an unlimited duration.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16, 209-10. 
 344. Shortly before the enactment of the CTEA, Rep. Mary Bono made 
telling remarks regarding the CTEA, the copyright duration preference of her 
late husband (former Rep. Sonny Bono), and a future course of action she 
wished to see Congress undertake: 
Copyright extension is a very fitting memorial for Sonny. . . .  
Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last 
forever.  I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the 
Constitution. . . . As you know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal 
for the term to last forever less one day.  Perhaps the Committee may 
look at that next Congress. 
144 CONG. REC. H9951-52.  Quincy Jones almost certainly would like the idea 
of a continuing pattern of duration extensions.  See Hearing on H.R. 989, 
supra note 50 at 277 ( “If we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good 
start”); id. at 234 (approving an earlier speaker’s suggestion that copyright 
duration last forever). 
 345. Petitioner’s Brief at 23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618) available at 2002 WL 1041928. 
 346. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text. 
 347. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214-15. 
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hope for a possible future benefit does not amount to payment 
for the hoped-for benefit.  No strict expectation would be 
violated if an author did not receive a hoped-for extension, and 
no one would accuse Congress of not upholding its end of the 
bargain if it left copyright duration set at the level guaranteed 
to authors at the time their works acquired copyright 
protection.348  If future extensions were truly part of the 
public’s bargain with authors, Congress might be 
constitutionally bound to a perpetual series of retroactive term 
extensions. 
In order for Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of the 
CTEA’s retroactive component as a quid pro quo to make sense, 
Congress must be seen as having an intent to string together 
an effectively perpetual copyright.  One would prefer to believe 
Justice Ginsburg when she noted that this “clearly is not the 
situation before us.”349  Yet if this “is not the situation,” then 
either Congress intends to violate the terms of its supposed 
agreement with the creative community,350 or Justice 
Ginsburg’s quid pro quo theory is bankrupt. 
Presumably conscious of the CTEA’s doubtful conformity 
with any quid pro quo requirement, the Court attempts to shift 
some weight away from its earlier argument by noting that its 
use of quid pro quo language has typically appeared in patent 
cases rather than in copyright cases.351  Patents are 
distinguishable from copyrights, Justice Ginsburg argued, so 
the quid pro quo point may be misplaced in the copyright 
context.352  She observed that a copyright is effective from the 
time of creation, whereas a patent is effective only from the 
point of the disclosure required as part of the patent approval 
process.353  In the patent context, then, disclosure is the quo 
exacted from the inventor; in the copyright context, disclosure 
is the desired objective but is not formally required for 
copyright protection to adhere to a work.354 
 
 348. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240-41 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 349. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 350. See id. at 214-15 (noting that congressional history of granting 
retroactive extensions of copyright duration could give rise to expectations on 
part of creators that further such extensions would be enacted). 
 351. See id. at 216. 
 352. See id. at 216-17. 
 353. See id. (noting that the Patent Act first requires disclosure for the 
grant of a patent; copyright runs from the date of creation). 
 354. See id. 
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Justice Ginsburg seemed to suggest that copyright law has 
no quo comparable to that of patent law.355  The Justice 
quibbles over semantics, for even though copyright vests in the 
author at creation when the work is fixed,356 the copyright 
owner normally has little need to enforce his or her rights 
against another party until the work has been disclosed, that 
is, published.  The exclusive right over an unpublished work 
gives the author little reward, because typically no one 
unsanctioned by the author has access to the work.  To the 
extent the author holding exclusive rights can reap rewards 
from the public for the work’s use, payment does not begin until 
the author discloses his or her work.357  In this respect, then, 
copyright and patent are similar.  Furthermore, it should make 
no difference that patent disclosure requires completion of a 
formal legal procedure,358 whereas copyright disclosure does 
not.359  The patent approval process serves to ensure that an 
invention has been fully disclosed, i.e., that all of its relevant 
details are made plain to the public.  Copyrighted works, on the 
other hand, are fully disclosed from the point of publication; no 
further formal disclosure scheme is required.360  Copyright and 
patent thus both exact disclosure in order for creators to reap 
benefits; the differences between their respective objects simply 
allow the process of extraction to be less formalized in the 
context of the former than in that of the latter.  Therefore, 
contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s apparent suggestion, it would be 
incorrect to deduce from this formality gap that patent 
contemplates a meaningful quid pro quo but that copyright 
 
 355. See id.; see also id. at 217 n.22 (conceding that patent and copyright 
law involved different exchanges). 
 356. Id. at 217; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 201 & 302(a) (2000). 
 357. A copyright owner has exclusive rights with regard to the use of one’s 
work.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  The owner may enforce such rights against 
unauthorized users.  Id. at §§ 501-06.  Such use necessarily presupposes the 
disclosure of the work before others can use it, either with permission or 
without. 
 358. Sections 111-154 of the Patent Act describe the process for application 
for and issuance of a patent.  35 U.S.C. §§ 111-154 (2000) (as amended at 35 
U.S.C.A. §§ 111-154 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003). 
 359. See supra text accompanying notes 353-354, 356. 
 360. Although there is a copyright registration process that furnishes 
certain legal benefits to copyright owners who complete it, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 
408-412 (2000), registration with the United States Copyright Office is not 
required for copyright protection to begin.  Id. at § 408.  Rather, copyright 
begins once an eligible work has been created and placed in a tangible medium 
of expression.  Id. at §§ 101, 102, 201, 302(a). 
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does not. 
The Court further attempted to distance the treatment of 
copyright duration from patent law’s quid pro quo exchange.361  
The Court noted that patent and copyright grants differ, 
because unlike copyright owners, patent holders effectively 
obtain temporary monopolies over their knowledge.362  
Copyright owners do not gain a similar monopoly.363  Therefore, 
in the Court’s view, patent law’s quid pro quo was “more 
exacting than copyright’s.”364  The majority seemed to suggest 
that because copyright was not a “monopoly of knowledge,”365 
judging the CTEA’s extended copyright duration according to 
the same quid pro quo balance contemplated by patent law 
would be incorrect.366  However, the Court’s argument breaks 
down.  It is true that patent law does not feature the explicit 
expression-versus-idea dichotomy established in copyright 
law.367  Contrary to what the Court suggests, however, 368 this 
is not because patent protection somehow reaches beyond the 
expression of an idea to a monopoly on the underlying idea, i.e., 
the idea beneath the invention’s concept.  Patent law reaches 
no further than a particular embodiment of an invention.369  
Patent and copyright therefore cover similar ground.  Even 
though the Court may have intended the difference in 
copyright’s coverage to devalue the petitioners’ quid pro quo 
arguments, the effort fails, for patent and copyright bear too 
many conceptual similarities as primary guardians of 
 
 361. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See id. (the author gains no monopoly on any knowledge; a reader of 
an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from 
her reading). 
 364. Id. at 217 n. 22. 
 365. Id. at 217. 
 366. See id. (“In light of these distinctions, one cannot extract from 
language in our patent decisions . . . support” for the petitioners’ claim that 
CETA is an improper violation of an implicit copyright quid pro quo bargain). 
 367. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“[w]hoever invents . . . any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition off matter . . . may 
obtain a patent therefor”) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (copyright on original 
work of authorship does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). 
 368. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217 (arguing copyright law differs from patent 
law in that it does not protect ideas). 
 369. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also § 100 (2000) (defining invention as 
“invention or discovery,” and defining process as “process, art or method” and 
new uses of existing processes, machines, manufacture, etc.). 
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intellectual property rights.370 
In sum, the Court, instead of settling affirmatively on a 
response to Eldred’s quid pro quo argument, presents us with 
two disjoint responses.  We may either accept Justice 
Ginsburg’s demonstration of the retroactive term extension’s 
quid pro quo effect, or accept her argument that the quid pro 
quo balance articulated in earlier patent decisions is not 
applicable in the copyright context.  The first option is 
unacceptable.371  The second asks that we assent to an 
argument based on a questionable distinction between patent 
and copyright law, one that Justice Ginsburg herself stops 
short of fully embracing.372 
D. OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN THE ELDRED MAJORITY OPINION 
It is difficult to come away from a reading of the Eldred 
majority opinion without a feeling that the primary reasons for 
the decision received less attention in the opinion than the 
rationales actually articulated by the Court.  Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg used considerable ink commenting instead on Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, which the majority repeatedly referenced and 
refuted.373  The Court seemed motivated by two underlying, 
and related, concerns: first, if the CTEA were held 
unconstitutional in its application to existing copyrights, the 
term extension set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976 would be 
vulnerable as well;374 second, striking down the CTEA would 
open up a proverbial can of worms featuring the upsetting of 
 
 370. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the same constitutional 
clause provides Congress its authority to enact patent and copyright 
legislation, and that regardless of whether Congress legislates regarding 
patents or regarding copyrights, the Progress of Science and limited Times 
provisions in the clause operate as constraints on congressional power.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 371. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1169 (observing, in regard to 
the CTEA, that “it is difficult to imagine a more overt violation” of the quid pro 
quo principle).  “The retroactive extension of the copyright term cannot 
possible provide any incentive for [authors] to create an already existing 
work.”  Id. 
 372. Justice Ginsburg rejects the quid pro quo argument where it would 
limit Congress’s ability to extend copyright terms, see Eldred, 537 U.S. 217, 
yet continues to analogize copyright term extensions to patent law’s, see id. at 
217 n.22 (if patent’s quid pro quo allows extensions, by analogy, it should 
allow copyright’s). 
 373. On at least five occasions, Justice Ginsburg commented on or 
answered statements in Justice Breyer’s dissent.  See id. at 193 n.1, 199 n.4, 
205 n.10, 207 n.15 & 209 n.16. 
 374. Id. at 209 n.16. 
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many parties’ expectations and the prospect of numerous legal 
proceedings challenging licensing and transfer agreements 
entered into in reliance on the CTEA.375  The Eldred majority 
reiterated the first concern, albeit briefly, near the end of 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion after raising it earlier.376  Although 
the Court did not expressly note the second concern, it may be, 
in part, the rationale that drove the Court to defer to Congress 
repeatedly in its opinion.377  Both dissenters referred to it 
explicitly, suggesting that any such concern on the part of the 
majority was overblown.378 
On the first concern, the Court was more worried than it 
needed to be about the fate that supposedly would have 
befallen the 1976 Act’s term extension if the retrospective 
aspect of the CTEA had been held unconstitutional.  Although 
the Supreme Court of course must be cognizant of the potential 
long-term implications of issuing a certain holding in a case, 
the Court must also be careful not to allow an issue that is not 
before it to dictate the resolution of the issue it must actually 
decide.  The Eldred case did not call for a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the 1976 Act’s term extension.379  
Nevertheless, concern about that non-issue almost certainly, 
and regrettably, played a pivotal role in the Court’s decision to 
sustain the CTEA against constitutional attack.380 
 
 375. See id. at 210 (noting that if CETA’s application to existing works 
were unconstitutional, the same would be true of “extending the protections of 
U.S. copyright law to [foreign authors’] works . . . that had already been 
created” by the time of the relevant U.S. copyright enactment) (quoting 
Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 56 n.13 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted); id. at 
221-22 (if the CETA’s retrospective application to existing works were struck 
down under the Copyright Clause, it might make the prospective application 
vulnerable as well); see also Solum, supra note 298, at 62 (predicting that the 
Court could have such concerns prior to the Eldred decision). 
 376. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16, 222. 
 377. See id. at 193, 196, 208, 212-13, 221-23. 
 378. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“we need not consider 
whether the reliance and expectation interests . . . established by prior 
extensions . . . would alter the result”); id. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“the 
law provides means to protect those who have reasonably relied upon prior 
copyright statutes”). 
 379. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the validity of earlier 
retroactive extensions of copyright protection is not at issue”); id. at 265 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“we are not here considering . . . the constitutionality 
of other copyright statutes”). 
 380. See id. at 209-10 (declining to find the CTEA unconstitutional when it 
had not found the previous term extensions in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts 
unconstitutional). 
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Even if striking down the CTEA would have led to a later 
judicial determination that the 1976 Act’s extension was 
unconstitutional—a supposed eventuality that is far from 
certain—a court deciding a case regarding the 1976 Act could 
have devised an appropriate decree to allow for the interests of 
those who for many years had relied on the statute’s validity.381  
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a later court would have 
struck down the 1976 Act’s term extension, despite the 
apparent relevance of some of the same arguments leveled 
against the CTEA.  A court determining the constitutional fate 
of the 1976 Act’s duration extension could have distinguished it 
from the CTEA (assuming the CTEA had been held invalid) by 
pointing out that: (1) the 1976 Act’s term extension was only 
one part of a fundamental and multi-faceted restructuring of 
U.S. copyright law;382 and (2) in altering the copyright duration 
rules, the 1976 Act helped enable the U.S. to sign on to the 
Berne Convention, the most important international agreement 
regarding copyright.383 
Having become too focused on what it mistakenly believed 
would be inevitable consequences of a holding that the CTEA 
was unconstitutional, the Eldred majority resorted to 
rationales that were not developed convincingly.  We have 
already explored the flaws in the Court’s treatment of incentive 
and quid pro quo issues in regard to the Copyright Clause.384  
Equally glaring flaws appear in the Court’s heavy reliance on 
the history of congressional extensions of copyright and patent 
duration on a retrospective basis.  As Justice Stevens stressed 
in his dissent, that history, besides being less consistent than 
the majority made it out to be, contained what today would 
clearly be seen as unconstitutional resurrections of formerly 
patented items from the public domain.385  Justice Stevens 
 
 381. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 265 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  Justice  Stevens asserted that any reliance interests in regard to 
the CTEA were not worthy of such consideration, however, in view of the short 
number of years since passage and the fact that it had been the subject of 
litigation since shortly after it took effect.  Id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 382. Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The CTEA, in contrast, was simply 
a bonus for copyright owners. 
 383. Id.  The 1976 Act thus served a very important end that was far more 
meaningful than the token international harmonization supposedly 
accomplished by the CTEA.  See supra text accompanying notes 243-245, 319-
320. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 325-372. 
 385. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 233-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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made sense when he asserted that the majority had placed too 
much weight on the historical analysis.386 
Even more troublesome is the Court’s suggestion that the 
lack of legal challenges to earlier copyright duration extensions 
somehow supports a conclusion that the CTEA should be held 
constitutional.387  The absence of legal challenges to previous 
term extensions, however, does not furnish the CTEA a 
stronger presumption of constitutionality than any other 
enactment of Congress would normally receive.  Neither does it 
estop parties such as Eldred from raising constitutional 
objections to the CTEA.  Assuming for the sake of argument 
that a previous term extension would have been held 
unconstitutional if it had been challenged shortly after its 
enactment, the failure of affected parties to launch a prompt 
challenge cannot convert an unconstitutional statute into a 
constitutional one.388  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, even if 
the previous copyright duration extensions could have 
withstood constitutional challenges, such outcomes would not 
dictate the same result for the CTEA.389 
In connection with its reliance on term extension history 
and the lack of previous judicial challenges, the Eldred 
majority approvingly noted that when it made the CTEA 
applicable to existing copyrights, Congress utilized an equity 
rationale under which existing copyrights would receive the 
same benefit as copyrights coming into existence after the 
CTEA’s effective date.390  The equity rationale, however, is both 
flimsy and transparent.  Most statutes have only prospective 
effect.  As a result, a new statutory rule usually applies only to 
later-occurring subject matter, with the “old” rule still 
governing similar subject matter that dates back to a time 
preceding the new rule’s effective date.  Lines must inevitably 
be drawn, and when they are drawn at the prospective-
 
 386. See id. at 230-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 387. See id. at 217 n.22 (majority opinion). 
 388. As the Court has observed, “no one acquires a vested or protected 
right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time 
covers our entire national existence.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New 
York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). 
 389. For instance, if the 1976 Act had been challenged on constitutional 
grounds but was upheld for reasons of the sort noted earlier, see supra text 
accompanying notes 382-383, the supposed precedent would not necessarily 
mean much in a later challenge of the CTEA, because the justifications 
supporting the 1976 Act would not apply to the CTEA. 
 390. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200, 204 (majority opinion). 
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application-only point, Congress and the courts typically do not 
lose sleep over equity-related concerns.  Why should copyright 
law be any different?  As Justice Stevens suggested in his 
dissent, there is nothing inequitable about not giving existing 
copyrights a term extension, so long as the term promised by 
law at the time of copyright acquisition is respected.391 
Although Congress has made copyright duration 
extensions apply to existing copyrights as well as to future ones 
because of supposed concerns about equity, Congress has 
produced results that hinge to a great extent on fortuity and 
seem more inequitable than those that would result from use of 
the standard legislative approach of line-drawing at the 
prospective-application-only point.  Consider again our two 
opening hypotheticals, with the addition of two assumed facts: 
(1) that the 1922 work came under copyright in the closing days 
of 1922; and (2) that the 1923 work acquired copyright 
protection early in 1923.  As earlier explanation revealed,392 the 
copyright on the 1922 work expired at the end of 1997—75 
years from when it began.  Under pre-CTEA law, the copyright 
on the 1923 work would have expired at the end of 1998, but 
because the copyright still existed in 1998 and was thus “alive” 
when the CTEA took effect late that year, the duration of the 
copyright on the 1923 work was extended to the end of 2018.  
Therefore, even though the two works came under copyright 
within a very short time of each other, the second work 
received 20 more years of copyright protection than the first 
did.  So much for equity.  It is also worth noting that the 
differing treatments extended to the copyrights on the 1922 
and 1923 works depended upon the fortuity of when Congress 
enacted the statute.  Had Congress debated the CTEA longer 
and not enacted it until early 1999, the copyright on the 1923 
work would have been consigned to the same fate as the 
copyright on the 1922 work: expiration after 75 years and an 
ever-so-close failure to qualify for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus. 
It may be argued that the former owner of the expired 
copyright on the 1922 work should not be seen as having much 
of an equity-related objection because, after all, he, she, or it 
did at least benefit from the duration bonus provided for by the 
 
 391. See id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 392. For explanation of the reasons for the significantly different durations 
of the respective copyrights on the 1922 and 1923 works, see supra notes 7, 9, 
42, 58-59 and accompanying text. 
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Copyright Act of 1976.393  Therefore, the argument might 
continue, the ex-copyright owner could be told to “be satisfied 
that you received 75 years of protection when you originally 
were supposed to have only 56 years.”  Try telling that to 
Disney, which clearly was not content to receive “only” 75 years 
of protection instead of the 56 to which it originally was 
entitled under then-applicable law.  Disney also wanted the 20 
additional years of protection tacked on by the CTEA, as did 
the owner of the copyright on the 1923 work in the hypothetical 
we have been discussing.  The mid-1970s conferral of a 19-year 
duration bonus may make it hard to feel especially sorry for the 
former owner of the expired copyright on the 1922 work, but it 
is understandable why such a party might not see it as 
equitable that the copyright on a work very nearly as old 
received not only the earlier duration bonus but also the 
CTEA’s 20-year windfall.  When the government is handing out 
gifts, should the identities of the recipients and non-recipients 
be so arbitrarily determined? 
Of course, the fortuity factor of when bill passage occurs is 
also present when Congress enacts a statute and gives it the 
usual prospective-only effect.  Some parties will have the bad 
luck to miss out narrowly on the benefit that the new rule 
confers on others who qualify for the treatment called for by the 
new rule.  When Congress draws the standard line of 
prospective operation, however, the differential treatment of 
future activities and past activities, of “new” and “old,” at least 
seems more logical.  Perhaps because that standard line is 
familiar, the outcome it produces also seems more equitable.394 
 
 393. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).  Because the copyright on the 1922 work 
remained “alive” as of January 1, 1978, the renewal term that began in 1950 
became a 47-year term rather than the 28-year term it had been under prior 
law.  See id. at § 302(b). 
 394. The above should not be taken as an argument that Congress acted 
unwisely and unconstitutionally only insofar as the CTEA’s retrospective 
operation is concerned, and that the CTEA’s prospective operation is 
unassailable.  As we indicate elsewhere in the article, the prospective aspect of 
the CTEA is also vulnerable to serious public policy and constitutional 
objections.  See supra text accompanying notes 263-265, 325-372; infra text 
accompanying notes 400-415.  Neither are we advocating that Congress should 
feel free to enact future copyright term extensions, so long as they are made 
purely prospective in operation.  Instead, as we urge later, Congress should 
bring the copyright duration extension train to a halt.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 455-456, 471-476.  Our real point in this section is that 
the supposed equity rationale for the retrospective operation of the CTEA was 
superficial and so riddled with deficiencies that the Eldred majority should not 
have given it credence in the analysis of the CTEA’s constitutionality. 
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The equity rationale’s problems are not restricted to the 
previously identified ones associated with distinguishing 
among different holders of existing copyrights.  There is also 
the public interest, which any credible equity analysis should 
consider and which must be taken into account because of the 
Copyright Clause.395  Yet when Congress employed the equity 
rationale, it seemingly gave no consideration to the public 
interest, which centers around the public domain from which 
all may freely borrow.396  How is it equitable to delay by 20 
years the entitlement of the public to have unrestricted ability 
to use certain works—especially when that entitlement had 
already been delayed by 19 years under a previous duration 
extension?  How is it equitable to freeze the public domain so 
that no works will enter it until January 1, 2019?  With the 
Copyright Clause contemplating the existence of a vibrant 
public domain, the congressional failure to consider the public 
interest in its equity analysis raised constitutional red flags 
that the Eldred majority should not have overlooked. 
Congressional utilization of the equity rationale in regard 
to the CTEA provided convenient cover for an enactment that 
would benefit the statute’s outspoken proponents.  Let’s face it, 
there would have been no CTEA if not for the efforts of Disney 
et al., whose desire to lengthen the duration of their otherwise 
soon-to-expire copyrights triggered the lobbying push.397  
Congress, on its own, would not have come to the conclusion 
that another extension of copyright duration was necessary.  
Individual artists and associations representing their interests 
were not clamoring for a term extension, at least not until 
Disney engaged them in the effort.  Neither had scholars issued 
calls for another duration extension.  Disney succeeded, 
however, in convincing a compliant Congress that the CTEA 
was a critically important step to take. 
 
 395. The “limited [t]imes” language of the Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST., 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8, furnishes a clear indication that the interests of copyright 
owners are not to be the sole focus of legislative efforts in the copyright realm.  
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 396. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 266 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  See also Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228 (noting that 
copyright duration is limited so that the public “will not be permanently 
deprived of the fruits of an artist’s labors”). 
 397. For discussion of the lobbying blitz, see supra text accompanying notes 
44-54, 277-289.  Others’ accounts of the lobbying effort appear in the sources 
cited at supra note 44. 
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By making the CTEA applicable to existing copyrights, 
Congress treated Disney in a manner similar to a court’s 
treatment of a successful plaintiff who convinces the court that 
a new legal rule or interpretation is necessary: the plaintiff gets 
the benefit of the new rule as a reward, of sorts, for having 
brought the case.  But Congress is not a court, and Disney was 
not a litigant.  Congress did not need to reward Disney by 
making the CTEA apply to existing copyrights.  In doing so and 
in also rewarding other holders of existing copyrights, Congress 
granted a purely private gift at an enormous public cost in 
terms of the freezing of the public domain and the 20 additional 
years of licensing and search expenses for users whose 
interests have constitutional legitimacy under the Copyright 
Clause.398  The Eldred majority chose not to nullify that gift, 
and in the process ignored clear indications of its 
unconstitutionality.  That Congress would pay so little 
attention to the public interest aspect of the Copyright Clause 
is disappointing, if not surprising.  It is both disappointing and 
surprising that the Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of 
what is and is not constitutional, went to great lengths to re-
cast a statute raising serious Copyright Clause problems as 
merely an unfortunate enactment of the sort we have to expect 
now and then from our senators and representatives.399 
The Eldred Court was extremely deferential to Congress 
and its judgments regarding incentives to creators and other 
justifications for the CTEA.  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that the appropriate test for Copyright Clause 
compliance is whether the “system” of copyright enacted by 
 
 398. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227, 240, 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 
244-250, 266-7 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  There is a certain irony in the gift 
Disney received when the CTEA lengthened copyright duration just in time to 
keep the Steamboat Willie copyright and other early Disney copyrights from 
falling into the public domain.  Disney, after all, has made heavy—and highly 
successful—use of public domain material as the basis of its creative efforts in 
movies and the like.  See Solomon, supra note 44 at E2 (listing, as examples, 
The Little Mermaid, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Cinderella, Pocahontas, 
and Beauty and the Beast).  Thanks to an accommodating Congress, Disney 
can have its cake and eat it too.  On a similar note, Professor Lessig has 
pointed out that even in the Steamboat Willie cartoon whose copyright Disney 
was so eager to preserve, Disney based its creative efforts in part on those of 
others. Steamboat Willie was a take-off on, and commentary about, a Buster 
Keaton character known as “Steamboat Bill.”  Lawrence Lessig, Keynote 
Address at the Open Source Convention (July 24, 2002), at 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html [hereinafter 
Lessig, Keynote Address]. 
 399. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-202. 
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Congress would tend to furnish an incentive to create.400  
Justice Ginsburg later stated that the focus should be on the 
whether the copyright regime “overall” tends to promote the 
purposes of the Copyright Clause.401  The Court thus saw no 
need to conduct a careful review of the relationship (or lack 
thereof) between a particular copyright statute such as the 
CTEA and the Copyright Clause, so long as the general 
copyright regime enacted by Congress seems consistent with 
the objectives of the constitutional provision.402  By keeping the 
analysis largely restricted to whether the general copyright 
system is in tune with the Copyright Clause, the Court allowed 
Congress remarkable latitude concerning individual 
enactments within that general system.  One cannot imagine 
any court ever holding that our overall copyright regime does 
not promote Copyright Clause objectives.  Indeed, the Clause 
itself contemplates that any system of copyright enacted by 
Congress will get the job done constitutionally, assuming that 
the exclusive rights guaranteed by the system exist only for 
“limited [t]imes.”403 
It was therefore disingenuous for the Court to say that the 
real concern is over whether the general copyright regime 
complies with the Copyright Clause when the Clause itself 
indicates that a general regime will almost by definition 
comply.  To be a meaningful check on congressional authority 
within the intellectual property realm, the Copyright Clause 
must logically be seen as concerned with whether individual 
enactments within the general copyright scheme are consistent 
with the Clause’s objectives.  The approach taken by the Court 
in Eldred, however, drains the Clause of its meaning and 
significance and hands Congress a free pass to do almost 
anything it wishes regarding individual copyright enactments 
without having to worry about whether that enactment would 
pass muster under the Copyright Clause.  Justice Stevens 
therefore may not have been exaggerating when he observed 
that the Eldred majority had “quitclaimed” to Congress the 
Court’s proper role in deciding Copyright Clause issues.404 
The extremely lenient review conducted in Eldred resulted 
in part from the Court’s payment of insufficient attention to the 
 
 400. Id. at 212. 
 401. Id. at 222. 
 402. See id. at 204-05, 207-08, 212-13, 221-22. 
 403. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 404. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
266 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
relationship between the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment.  In their own respective ways, these constitutional 
provisions promote and encourage expression.405  The Court 
accurately noted the existence of precedents indicating that a 
formal First Amendment privilege or defense is unnecessary in 
copyright infringement cases because copyright law’s fair use 
doctrine and expression-versus-ideas distinction adequately 
safeguard the same interests arising under the First 
Amendment.406  Even so, the Court missed the point.  Although 
it may be understandable that these precedents would make 
the Court hesitant to recognize a First Amendment privilege or 
defense in the copyright context, the Eldred majority could 
have allowed free speech concerns to inform the Copyright 
Clause analysis without creating a First Amendment defense to 
copyright infringement liability. 
In infringement cases, the fair use doctrine and the 
expression-versus-idea principle indeed are viable means of 
protecting the free speech interests of users of copyrighted 
works.407  However, the freedom-of-expression concern in the 
context of the CTEA and the Copyright Clause is different.  The 
Copyright Clause’s requirement that works enter the public 
domain after a “limited [t]ime[]” means that upon the 
expiration of the copyright, the public may use all or any 
portion of the work for whatever purpose, including (but not 
limited to) expressive uses and uses that would not be 
protected by the fair use doctrine if the work were still under 
copyright.408  With its two-decades-long freezing of the public 
domain at its 1998 composition and its 20-year delay in the 
 
 405. Id. at 243, 265-66 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 406. Id. at 219-20 (majority opinion).  The Eldred Court cited Harper & 
Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985), for its 
discussions of the fair use doctrine and the expression-versus-ideas 
distinction, and Feist Publ’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 
(1991), for its discussion of the latter subject.  The relevant statutory sections 
are 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (outlining types of uses that may be good 
candidates for fair use doctrine and specifying factors courts must use in 
making fair use determinations) and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (ideas and facts 
in copyrighted work not protected). 
 407. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556, 560; Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-
50.  See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
(indicating that parody of copyrighted work may be strong candidate for fair 
use treatment). 
 408. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (2003); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 
228 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984). 
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entry of works into the public domain, the CTEA raises a 
substantial freedom-of-expression concern to which the Eldred 
majority’s citation of the fair use doctrine and the expression-
versus-ideas distinction is an unsatisfactory answer.  To 
account for the free speech concern presented by the CTEA and 
to recognize the relationship between the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment, the Court should have employed some 
sort of heightened review when it determined whether the 
CTEA was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause authority.409 
 
 409. Justice Breyer suggested a test that would have been appropriate.  
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer noted that 
he would hold the CTEA unconstitutional “(1) if the significant benefits that it 
bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the 
expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find 
justification in any significant Clause-related objective.”  Id.  In Justice 
Breyer’s view, each element of his proposed test was satisfied.  Id. at 266-67.  
Eldred’s brief proposed an alternate form of heightened review that 
presumably would have led to a striking-down of the CTEA’s retroactive 
component as an unjustifiable exercise of Copyright Clause authority.  Brief 
for Petitioners at 31-32, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) 
available at 2002 WL 1041928.  In an abbreviated and unsatisfactory 
discussion late in the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg rejected Eldred’s 
proposal.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217-18.  Eldred urged the use of “congruence 
and proportionality” review, of the sort employed in cases dealing with 
congressional enactments pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, 
e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
Justice Ginsburg maintained, however, that the congruence and 
proportionality standard was purely a Fourteenth Amendment-related test 
that had never been applied in a case dealing with an exercise of a power 
given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.  
Justice Ginsburg stated that whereas § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
Congress the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment, 
the Copyright Clause “empowers Congress to define the scope of the 
substantive right.”  Id.  With Congress having the power to define the right at 
issue under the Copyright Clause, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to employ a standard of review that was designed 
for a determination of whether Congress employed appropriate (i.e., 
“proportional[] or congruen[t]”) means to enforce rights contemplated by the 
relevant constitutional provision.  See Flores, 521 U.S. at 533.  Therefore, she 
concluded that congruence-and-proportionality review should not be utilized.  
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218. 
Justice Ginsburg’s cursory treatment of the congruence-and-proportionality 
proposal, however, relies on a distinction ill-drawn.  Properly made, the 
comparison between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Copyright Clause 
would show that each grants a certain power to Congress, and that each 
contains an end toward which that power must be aimed.  Just as the 
Copyright Clause allows Congress to define a certain right such that it 
“promote the Progress of Science,” U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8, the 
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to define enforcement measures that 
promote the realization of the rights established elsewhere in the amendment.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  The Copyright Clause and the Fourteenth 
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The Eldred majority also failed to give adequate 
consideration to the full range of issues raised by the Copyright 
Clause’s “limited [t]imes” provision.  According to the Court, 
the longer duration called for by the CTEA was still “limited” 
because it would end at some point.410  Under this form-over-
substance approach, a huge duration extension would be 
permissible if it stopped somewhere short of “forever.”411  One 
suspects that the Valenti/Bono proposal of “forever, less one 
day”412 might go too far, even for the Eldred majority, but how 
does one know what crosses the line? 
Help in answering that question would be provided by an 
approach the Court failed to take in Eldred: examining the 
“limited [t]imes” provision of the Copyright Clause in light of 
what the Framers probably intended regarding permissible 
lengths of time when they used that language.  In her 
discussion of the history of copyright duration extensions, 
Justice Ginsburg noted that statutes enacted by Congress 
shortly after the Constitution was ratified should be seen as 
reliable indicators of what the Constitution permits (and of 
what the Framers intended), because some of the same persons 
who served as Framers of the Constitution were members of 
Congress at the time of those enactments.413  Instead of 
attempting to use this almost-contemporaneous-construction 
principle as a way to bolster its conclusion that the Copyright 
Clause allows Congress to apply duration extensions to existing 
copyrights, the Court should have employed the principle in an 
effort to determine what sort of copyright duration the Framers 
 
Amendment may seem dissimilar if viewed with respect to “rights.”  But when 
the constitutional provisions are viewed with respect to means and ends—the 
true objects of the congruence-and-proportionality test—no meaningful 
difference appears.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra, at 31-32. 
Just as Congress lacks the power to redefine the ends specified in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Flores, 521 U.S. at 519, 534, so it is with the 
Copyright Clause.  With its single-minded focus on copyright owners and its 
neglect of the public interest portion of the copyright bargain, however, the 
CTEA effectively amounts to such a redefinition. 
 410. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199, 210. 
 411. See id.  The Court appeared, however, to leave an opening for a 
challenge to a future extension if it were part of a stringing-together of 
extensions evincing an intent to evade the “limited [t]imes” constraint in the 
Copyright Clause.  See id. at 209 n.16. 
 412. See supra text accompanying note 293; see also supra note 343.  It 
seems “unlikely that [the Framers] intended the limited-time provision to be 
rendered a dead letter by linguistic manipulation.”  Heald & Sherry, supra 
note 276, at 1172. 
 413. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200-01, 213. 
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likely had in mind when they placed the “limited [t]imes” 
provision in the Copyright Clause. 
The Copyright Act of 1790 clearly qualifies for the almost-
contemporaneous-construction principle because of its close 
proximity to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.  
The 1790 Act is noteworthy for a feature that the Eldred 
majority did not stress: its provision establishing that copyright 
protection would last for a basic term of 14 years, with the 
prospect of a 14-year renewal term.414  Twenty-eight years thus 
could serve as a reasonable benchmark for what the Framers 
probably intended as a “limited [t]ime[].”  This is not to say 
that 28 years is any kind of maximum, or that each of the term 
extensions enacted from 1831 on was unconstitutional.  It is to 
say, however, that if the Framers had something along the 
lines of 28 years in mind, the CTEA’s establishment of 
copyright durations more than three, four, or even five times 
that long seems a far cry from what the Framers meant by 
“limited [t]imes.”  No such discussion appears, however, in 
Eldred. 
With its posture of extreme deference toward Congress, its 
adoption of a lenient standard of review, and its failure to pay 
adequate attention to Copyright Clause language and 
objectives, the Eldred Court interpreted a relatively narrow, 
condition-restricted grant of congressional power in the 
Copyright Clause as contemplating sweeping, almost 
unrestricted regulatory authority on the part of Congress.  This 
seems ironic, coming as it did from a Court that in recent years 
has not hesitated to engage in careful scrutiny and second-
guessing of enactments of Congress pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, which provides a seemingly much broader and less 
restricted grant of power than the grant specified in the 
Copyright Clause.415  We are stuck with Eldred, however.  It 
 
 414. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (“An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and 
Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies, during the Times 
therein mentioned.”). 
 415. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, (Copyright Clause, which sets 
forth promotion-of-progress, “to Authors,” and “limited [t]imes” constraints 
regarding copyright power) with id. cl. 3 (Commerce Clause, giving Congress 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes”).  In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as a 
violation of the Commerce Clause, because the statute did not have a 
sufficient connection with interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 560-
65, 567.  The Lopez Court indicated that even when the Constitution’s grant of 
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therefore becomes important to consider where we go from 
here. 
V.  IN ELDRED’S WAKE: WHAT’S NEXT? 
In the subsections that follow, we survey the post-Eldred 
landscape, identify emerging issues and developments 
stemming from the decision, suggest analytical approaches for 
courts to use if Congress enacts another copyright term 
extension and a constitutional challenge is brought, and offer 
recommendations for future action on the parts of Congress, 
copyright owners, and the public.  We begin by examining a 
proposed bill that would re-inject a renewal requirement into 
U.S. copyright law. 
A. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC DOMAIN ENHANCEMENT ACT 
In an op-ed piece published shortly after the Eldred 
decision, Lawrence Lessig proposed an “Eric Eldred Act” that 
would reintroduce a renewal requirement to the copyright 
regime. 416  Professor Lessig’s proposal provided that if a work’s 
copyright owner wished to keep the copyright in force, he, she, 
or it would be obligated to pay a small tax 50 years after the 
 
power to Congress is broad, the grant of power is not without limits, and that 
the Court will not sustain congressional enactments that could be upheld only 
if the relevant enumerated power were unlimited.  See id. at 552-53, 556-57, 
567-68.  Professor Lawrence Lessig, who represented the petitioners in Eldred, 
believed that the justices who signed on to Lopez would be hard-pressed to 
sustain the CTEA because doing so would seem to indicate that the copyright 
power granted in Article I, § 8 is essentially unlimited.  Such an indication 
would be inconsistent with Lopez, not to mention the significant constraints 
placed on the copyright power by the literal language of the Copyright Clause.  
The petitioners in Eldred made a Lopez-based argument, with Professor 
Lessig believing that the justices who had formed the majority in that decision 
could be moved to lean the petitioners’ way in Eldred in order to maintain 
intellectual, conceptual, and jurisprudential consistency.  Professor Lessig 
regarded the argument as the probable key to the case.  See Lessig Blog, Jan. 
16, 2003 entry posted by Lawrence Lessig, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/ 
archives/2003_01.shtml (last visited, Apr. 9, 2004).  But the Eldred majority, 
populated largely by those who had been in the majority in Lopez, sidestepped 
the Lopez argument by avoiding all mention of it in the Eldred decision.  See 
id.  A dismayed Professor Lessig offered this assessment shortly after Eldred 
was decided: “The impossible thing is, How do people on that court [who] 
believe Congress’s power is so constrained sign onto an opinion that says 
Congress’s power is not constrained?”  Linda Greenhouse, 20-Year Extension of 
Existing Copyrights Is Upheld, N.Y.  TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A24 (quoting 
Lawrence Lessig). 
 416. Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art’s Expense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A17. 
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work was published.417  If the copyright owner failed to pay the 
tax within an appropriate grace period, the work would enter 
the public domain.418  Since then, Representatives Zoe Lofgren 
(D-Cal.) and John Doolittle (R-Cal.) have proposed the similar 
Public Domain Enhancement Act (PDEA),419 which would 
require, beginning 50 years into a copyright’s term, that the 
copyright owner pay a fee of $1 every ten years in order to keep 
the copyright in force.420  Under the PDEA, the Copyright 
Office would be expected to make the fee’s payment as 
convenient as possible, and would be required to make 
information concerning copyrighted works’ status and 
ownership readily accessible to the public.421 
The PDEA would be a step in the right direction, although 
it could signify a compromise with those who would have 
copyright last forever.  For as Professor Lessig noted in his op-
ed, even though 98% of works would likely be freed to the 
public domain after those first 50 years, the Mickey Mouse 
copyright would remain intact.422  So would it be with many 
more works—the Gershwin pieces, the “Happy Birthday” song, 
and others—that have served as rallying points for the CTEA’s 
opposition.423  There is thus some danger that the PDEA, by 
easing the public burden of copyright while leaving open an 
avenue for copyrights to remain intact for very long periods of 
time, could give a backhanded push to an effectively perpetual 
copyright. 
So long as the predicted 2% renewal rate does not rise 
dramatically, though, this danger should appear insignificant 
to those, ourselves included, who would support the PDEA.  Of 
course, further term extensions are less likely to meet strong 
opposition if the copyright regime is less oppressive.  But a 
decision to forego the PDEA’s significant promise on the basis 
of that principle would be nearly as insensible as a decision to 
 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id.  Professor Lessig suggested that the tax be “very small, maybe $50 
a work.”  He regarded his proposal as one that would cause a sizable number 
of  works—those as to which the tax had not been paid, probably because the 
works were no longer earning a commercial return—to enter the public 
domain.  Id. 
 419. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 420. See id. 
 421. See id. 
 422. Lessig, supra note 416, at A17. 
 423. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 44, at E2; Heald & Sherry, supra note 
276, at 1169. 
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advocate something rash—say, an abandonment of the “fair 
use” doctrine—as a means of galvanizing the opposition to the 
next proposed term extension. (We have no intention, of course, 
of proposing anything of that nature.)  And at any rate, the 
CTEA’s history shows that Congress did not take the ills of 
term extension very seriously when it was considering a term 
extension of huge length and sweeping applicability.  It would 
be foolish to presume that Congress would not consider 
enacting yet another blanket extension.  In the post-CTEA era, 
the PDEA would be a viable means of lessening the damage 
caused, and to be caused, by the CTEA and its possible 
progeny. 
Of course, there is a remote worst-case scenario for the 
PDEA.  We refer to the possibility that the predicted renewal-
rate of 2% would prove, in reality, to be much larger.  Recall 
that the 2% figure is based on the percentage of works 
published more than 50 years ago that remain in print.424  
Given the CTEA’s ease of passage in Congress and the statute’s 
having survived constitutional attack, copyright owners have 
better reason than ever before to believe that the working term 
of copyright will be extended additional times, in the direction 
of perpetuity.  A rights-holder, facing the option to renew, 
might therefore renew in 2010 even though he, she, or it might 
not have bothered to do so if, say, a 1970-like environment still 
existed.  It is thus a decent bet that under a PDEA regime, the 
renewal rate will be somewhat larger than 2%.  The difference’s 
magnitude is unforeseeable, but the possibility that the 
renewal rate could grow enormous—the very worst-case 
scenario, which we discuss below—shows that even if the 
PDEA does become law, preventing further term extensions 
should still be at the top of copyright activists’ long-term 
agenda. 
B. WILL PRIVATE PUBLIC DOMAIN SUBSTITUTES BE 
DEVELOPED? 
It has been said that the Disney corporation pushed for the 
CTEA in the hope that “nobody could do to Walt Disney what 
Walt Disney did to the Brothers Grimm.”425  For at least the 
next 20 years, that hope will be a reality.  The obvious problem 
 
 424. See Lessig, supra note 416, at A17; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 425. Lessig, Keynote Address, supra note 398. 
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for Disney, though, is that the CTEA has fenced off a wide 
range of works that were not under Disney’s copyright, thus 
delaying Walt Disney from being able to do to Wanda Gag’s 
Millions of Cats (a 1928 children’s book) what Walt Disney did 
to the Brothers Grimm.  Disney was no doubt aware of this 
effect but, seeing that private legislation a la Oliver Evans426 
would be a tougher sell, decided to promote the blanket 
extension because for Disney, the CTEA’s benefits outweighed 
its costs. 
Disney’s cost-benefit analysis was sensible, for the 
intellectual property that the CTEA has allowed Disney to 
retain remains profitable.  Although the CTEA has stunted the 
growth of the stock of public domain works from which Disney 
may draw, that stock, as it now stands, is already large.  As for 
those copyrighted works from which Disney may wish to 
borrow in the future, Disney should, in most cases, have little 
trouble summoning up the resources needed to negotiate a 
licensing deal. 
Moreover, Disney, as a major rights-holder, now has a 
sizable library of its own copyrighted material.  In a sense, this 
library may become a private substitute for the public domain, 
which, thanks to the CTEA, will receive no new entries until 
the ageless Dick Clark announces the arrival of the year 2019.  
If the going gets tough, say, if the CTEA-frozen public domain 
does not furnish attractive options for Disney to re-work or 
other parties refuse en masse to allow Disney access to their 
copyrighted works, Disney may always draw on its own as a 
basis for new creative efforts.  Disney frequently revisits works 
that are readily identified with the company—the film Fantasia 
2000, the TV series Goof Troop, and the straight-to-video Lion 
King II: Simba’s Pride come quickly to mind—but the company, 
owning more and more copyrights on well-aged works, has the 
increasingly attractive option of creating works that, though 
derived from Disney’s own storehouse, will not appear so 
conspicuously to be rehashes.  Consider the film Aladdin, 
which Disney borrowed from the public domain.  The film was a 
derivative work, but because the source material was so old, 
Aladdin did not suffer from the same sequel-stigma that some 
of Disney’s straight-to-video fare might.  Now suppose that the 
source material had been under Disney’s copyright.  Disney 
would have been able to prevent the release of any cheaper, 
 
 426. See supra note 175. 
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straight-to-video Aladdin “knock-offs,” and it would have been 
able to collect all the royalties from any resurgence of interest 
in the original along with a freshly repackaged 1001 Nights to 
boot.  To Disney, this kind of scenario would have been optimal, 
and as the term of copyright grows ever longer, such a scenario 
grows more and more plausible. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the working 
term of copyright were extended long enough to approach 
perpetuity.  An entity as wealthy as Disney, we have shown, 
would be able to negotiate access to most works.  Yet so long as 
the relevant copyright owners were various, those rights-
holders’ demands would likewise vary, and Disney’s creative 
and marketing freedom would be hindered somewhat.  
Furthermore, even if Disney were borrowing from older public 
domain works, Disney would not be able to keep others from 
borrowing from those same public domain works.  It would thus 
be in Disney’s best interest to hold the copyrights on as many 
works as possible, whether immediately marketable or not, or 
at least to ensure that the rights over them are in the hands of 
friendly entities.  The result would be another type of “private 
public domain” of works to which Disney has unlimited rights.  
Through agreements among friendly rights-holders, private 
public domains could be networked into a larger enclosure 
accessible at low cost only by participants in the agreement. 
To be sure, this is the very worst-case scenario.  But it is 
possible, and it shows that the PDEA, though a commendable 
proposal, leaves open certain disturbing possibilities that a 
solid term ceiling or extension prohibition would not. 
C. THE GOLAN CASE: IS THE CTEA STILL VULNERABLE TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK? 
In 2001, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred, a 
Denver conductor named Lawrence Golan filed suit against the 
government.427  He alleged that the CTEA, by extending the 
protections on works expected to enter the public domain, had 
made the costs of renting certain orchestral scores 
prohibitive.428  In its initial form, Golan’s complaint regarding 
the CTEA contained contentions similar to those raised in 
 
 427. See Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001) (No. 
01-B-1854). 
 428. See id. at 22-26. 
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Eldred.429  Since Eldred, Golan has amended his complaint so 
that it challenges not merely the CTEA’s retroactivity, but 
rather the CTEA-regime term itself.430 
We believe that a challenge to current copyright terms as 
such could have great promise but that Golan’s particular 
argument does not.431  It starts with the economic rationales 
presented in Justice Breyer’s Eldred dissent and stresses the 
current average-length copyright’s incentive-value, which is 
99.8% that of a perpetual copyright.432  Golan takes a work’s 
total value to be equal to the incentive-value of a perpetual 
copyright.433  Under the terms of the current regime, then, 
copyright holders receive at least 99.8% of a work’s total value, 
and the public therefore is left, at best, with a paltry 0.2%.434  
The “limited [t]imes” requirement of the Copyright Clause, says 
 
 429. See id. at 39-45. 
 430. See First Amended Complaint at 3-4, 13, 18-19, 40-41, Golan v. 
Ashcroft, (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001) (No. 01-B-1854). 
 431. A claim brought by Golan regarding another aspect of copyright law 
may have far more merit, however.  In § 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. (108 Stat. 
4809) 3773 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1996)), Congress restored copyright 
protection to certain foreign works that remained under copyright protection 
in their source countries but had fallen into the public domain in the United 
States because of certain designated reasons, including a failure to file for a 
necessary renewal of copyright and a pre-1989 failure to use the then-required 
copyright notice on copies distributed in the United States.  Id.; see also 
Copyright Act of 1909 supra note 1; Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2. 
Prior to 1989, U.S. law provided that copyright protection on a work was lost if 
the copyright owner failed to employ a proper copyright notice on publicly 
distributed copies of the work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405 (as amended 1988).  Since 
a change that took effect in 1989, such a failure to use a copyright notice does 
not jeopardize the validity of the copyright.  17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405 (2000).  
Golan contends that Congress acted unconstitutionally in removing certain 
works from the public domain and in restoring them to copyright protection.  
First Amended Complaint at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40, Golan (No. 01-B-1854).  
The fact that the works affected by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act were 
in the public domain—as opposed to being near the public domain entry point, 
as in the CTEA scenario—may give Golan’s claim in that regard a strong 
chance of success.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See also Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (once formerly 
copyrighted work enters public domain, any party may make unrestricted use 
of work).  Further discussion of the claim regarding the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act is beyond the scope of this article. 
 432. See First Amended Complaint at 2, 6-7, 8-13, Golan (No. 01-B-1854). 
 433. See First Amended Complaint at 12, Golan (No. 01-B-1854) (noting 
that only a small fraction of all copyright work received the maximum term of 
protection, which also indicates that most work lose their commercial value 
within the maximum copyright term). 
 434. See id. at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40. 
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Golan, means that a work’s total value is to be divided between 
the author and the public.435  If authors are receiving 500 times 
the public’s share, then it is hardly a division at all.  This 
unevenness results, Golan contends, from the term’s length; 
therefore, the “time” is not “limited.”436 
Golan mistakenly assumes that authors and public are 
interested in, and entitled to, the same thing: the incentive-
value of all the royalties collectible under a work’s hypothetical 
perpetual copyright.  This assumption leads to absurd 
consequences.  It suggests, for example, that a 28-year 
copyright term on a work that lost its commercial viability 
before the copyright’s expiration would also be effectively 
perpetual.  In such a case, the author would have collected all 
of the work’s value, and the public none of it.  The merit of a 
renewal requirement, which is meant to allow commercially 
depleted works to fall into public domain, would also be called 
into question.437  Interestingly, however, some of the strongest 
supporters of a renewal requirement have involvement with 
Golan’s case.438 
Another hypothetical reveals the flaws in Golan’s 
argument.  Suppose that the interest rate were 2%.  In that 
case, the average term of copyright under the current regime 
would be dividing works’ value about as “fairly” as the old 28-
year terms would under a 7% interest rate.439  Should we really 
take the deal between author and public to rise and fall with 
the interest rate in such a way?  One suspects that we should 
 
 435. See id. at 40. 
 436. See id. at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40. 
 437. Golan would surely respond—correctly—that even commercially dead 
works can retain significant non-pecuniary value.  But in that case, the 0.2% 
estimate of the public’s share in a work’s value loses a great deal of its 
meaning, as the economic estimation of who gets what is smothered in 
unquantifiables. 
 438. The Cyberlaw Clinic at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet 
and Society (CIS) filed the case on behalf of Golan and the other plaintiffs in 
the case.  See Golan v. Ashcroft Case Page, at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/golan_v_ashcroft.shtml (CIS website) 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004).  Professor Lawrence Lessig is the director of the 
CIS.  See id. at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).  
As noted earlier, Professor Lessig suggested shortly after the Eldred decision 
that Congress should lessen the Eldred’s long-term damage by requiring 
copyright owners to pay a nominal tax 50 years after their works were 
published, if they wished to have copyright protection continue. See supra text 
accompanying notes 416-421. 
 439. On Golan’s terms, the division would be roughly 85% to the author 
and 15% to the public. 
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not, and for a number of reasons.  For one thing, the public 
benefits from, and has some ability to use, works even before 
they enter the public domain.  And once the works have 
entered the public domain, the public is indifferent as to the 
much smaller past value of whatever resources it is able to 
retain due to the works’ being competitively priced.  Granted, 
the public does suffer when a work’s competitively priced (i.e., 
post-public-domain-entry) accessibility is delayed, but common 
intuition tells us that the suffering, which worsens with the 
wait, is a function of the passage of time rather than of the 
interest rate. 
Moreover, it is questionable at best that the public is even 
entitled to any part of the creation-time-value of a work’s 
hypothetical royalties.  The great majority of works have 
commercial life spans so short that even a founding-era 
copyright would outlive them.440  So far as these works are 
concerned, the public, under a 1790 regime, would collect not 
0.2%, but 0%, of the works’ creation-time value.  Yet even with 
respect to those short-lived works, the 1998 regime presents a 
rougher deal to the public than the 1790 regime would, for the 
public is concerned with things other than the works’ creation-
time values.  If the public were entitled to any part of them, 
then only an exceedingly short copyright term would be 
permissible, for only that kind of term would expire soon 
enough for exceedingly short-lived works to spend any 
commercially viable time in the public domain. 
The Copyright Clause presumably seeks to allow authors a 
chance to be reimbursed for the costs involved with authorship 
and to earn other sums if their works carry value in the 
marketplace.  The “limited [t]imes” provision ensures that the 
monetary rewards will end at some point.  What entices the 
author to write, it should be remembered, is not money itself, 
but rather (among other motivating factors) the possibility of 
monetary gains.  So far as it is useful to the “progress of 
Science,” this possibility is considered only before the time of 
publication, and in assessing the value of the sum total of all 
royalties, that sum total must be “gathered up” and assessed 
before publication.  Interest rates and the concept of present-
value enable this gathering-up and thus are critical to a 
determination of the incentive-value of a term of copyright.  
But while an author’s inducement to write can be realized at 
 
 440. See supra text accompanying notes 214-216, 337. 
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only one point in time—namely, the time when the author 
decides whether to write—the public’s interest in having the 
period of possible monetary rewards ended is the same at all 
points in time.  So far as the prospective author is concerned, 
then, the interest rate is quite relevant to the consideration of 
term length.  To the public, however, only the term’s length 
itself matters.  The economic analysis of perpetual copyright’s 
incentive-value, we fear, speaks nothing of a term’s limited or 
unlimited nature.441 
We find Golan’s argument inadequate.  This is not to say, 
however, that the CTEA-regime term of copyright is beyond 
critique.  One commentator has suggested an appealing, 
intuitive sort of limit: that a “limited [t]ime” be defined in 
reference to life span.442  In his Eldred dissent, Justice Breyer 
suggested that the common-law rule against perpetuities might 
be used as a reference point for limitedness.443  And of course, 
one should consider that the original duration of copyright was 
limited to 28 years, and to only 14 if the author did not live 
long enough to qualify for the renewal term.  Perhaps some 
simple perspective would be instructive.  Would the Framers 
ever have regarded a life-plus-70-years duration as a “limited” 
time?444 
In our view, whether the copyright term is a “limited” time 
should be determined in the context of a renewed emphasis on 
the Copyright Clause’s “to Authors” provision.445  We would 
take the “to Authors” language to mean that the benefits of 
copyright are meant to target only prospective authors, and 
that any copyright-related benefit bestowed upon any party 
must work, at least in part, to better prospective authors’ view 
of the benefits of producing a work.  Our interpretation of “to 
Authors,” then, would not rule out reasonable post-death 
 
 441. It says a great deal, however, about the CTEA’s prospective 
fruitlessness. 
 442. See Solum, supra note 298, at 31-38. 
 443. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 251-52 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that “ [w]hether 
such referents mark the outer boundary of “‘limited Times’ is not before us 
today.”  Id. at 210 n.17. 
 444. We address this question in more depth elsewhere in the article.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 410-415; infra text accompanying notes 457-
458. 
 445. The Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
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protection, for those extra years of future rights may be seen as 
by the prospective author as a benefit when he or she is 
considering authorship.  Neither would our interpretation go so 
far as to make copyright nontransferable, for without the right 
of transfer, the prospective author would see scarce potential 
benefit in authorship. 
Our “to Authors” doctrine would, however, demand that 
the grant to the prospective author be reasonably efficient.  For 
example, suppose that one is a prospective author, that the 
interest rate is 7%, and that if he publishes, he can expect to 
pull in a $100 royalty payment one year from now.  Application 
of the present value concept tells us that those royalties are, at 
this time, worth $93.46.446  This is the value of the grant to the 
author, for a year from now, when the grant would be worth 
more, the prospective author would be past considering 
authorship of the work in question.  Let us say, then, that the 
grant “to [the] Author[]” is approximately 93.5% efficient, with 
the difference between that figure and 100% being considered, 
for Copyright Clause purposes, a deadweight loss to society. 
It can be seen from this example that even an optimal term 
of copyright can only be so efficient.  For purposes of 
illustration, the 28th year of copyright could only be about 15% 
efficient,447 given a 7% interest rate, and over the entire term, 
the copyright could only be 46% efficient.448  But now consider 
the extra 20 years added to the term by the CTEA—in a typical 
case, the last 20 years of a 95-year copyright.  Assuming 
constant revenues, the royalties given over that 20-year span 
could be only 0.33% efficient.449  This means that only one-third 
of a cent from every CTEA dollar would go to an author of a 
perfectly enduring work.  In fairness, though, we should point 
out that the later years of extension bring down the overall 
 
 446. If invested at an annual interest rate of 7%, $93.46 would yield a 
fraction of a cent more than $100 after a year. 
 447. We reach this figure through the following formula, in which e 
represents the efficiency rating, r the interest rate, and n the year: en = [1 / (1 
+ r)n].  The formula is identical to that for the present value of a future dollar. 
 448. We reach this figure by adding the efficiency ratings for each year in 
an interval and then dividing by the number of years.  The idea is to divide the 
sum of the present values, which decline, by the sum of the future values, 
which remain constant.  But the figure is also a mean efficiency rating.  The 
variables retain their prior meanings, see supra note 447, but we introduce m, 
which represents the first year of the interval.  If we were to gauge the 
efficiency of the renewal term under the 1790 regime, m would be 14, and n 
28.  Thus: e(m, n) = { [1 / (1 + r)m] + [1 / (1 + r)m+1] . . . [1 / (1 + r)n] } / (n - m). 
 449. See supra note 448. 
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efficiency rating significantly, and that copyright owners who 
see 75 years of commercial viability for their works will collect 
the bulk of the royalties in the more profitable earlier years.  If 
the copyright owner were to cease collecting royalties entirely 
after the 75th year, for example, the efficiency of his or her 
CTEA grant could be as high as 0.63%.450 
To be sure, these are ugly numbers, but even so, any 
additional year of copyright gives some benefit to authors.  The 
authors provision itself, moreover, does not demand 
efficiency.451  The limited times provision, however, does 
require that the exclusive rights come to an end.  It thus 
requires that exclusivity’s costs, so far as they are affected by 
the length of the interval of exclusivity, be minimized.  When a 
term’s length causes the public to be charged $300 in the form 
of monopoly pricing for every $1 that goes to the prospective 
author, there is reason to question seriously the term’s 
compliance with the “limited [t]imes” provision. 
Shifting emphasis from the progress of Science provision to 
the authors provision strengthens the case against the CTEA’s 
constitutionality in a number of ways.  For one, it rules out any 
possible revisitation theory of copyright-related benefit.452  For 
another, it allows critics of the CTEA’s constitutionality to get 
by on much less than they could if they were emphasizing the 
progress provision.  The standard progress of Science argument 
involves a discussion of the public domain and its progress-
related centrality as a repository of material for derivative 
works.453  We, of course, do not intend to dispute that progress 
may necessitate a healthy public domain, and we in no way 
wish to understate its importance.  We do, nonetheless, believe 
term extension opponents face an uphill battle if they seek to 
establish to a wary judiciary that progress is dependent on the 
 
 450. Id.  In that case, of course, the term of the right, reaching past the 
profitable years, would have other problems. 
 451. This seems so unless one appeals to intuition.  To draw an analogy, 
consider a hypothetical salad dressing company—say, “Alfred Neumann’s”—
that advertises its policy of passing on a portion of its profits to charity and 
encourages consumers to “do their part” by stocking up.  Neumann’s, however, 
does not disclose that under this policy, it passes on only 0.3% of its profits.  
Most people, upon learning out how little of the profits went to charity, would 
seem likely to regard the Neumann’s marketing strategy as misleading. 
 452. To be more precise, the emphasis on the “to Authors” language does 
not rule out the upkeep theory entirely.  But where an incentive-theoretic 
justification is absent, an upkeep-theoretic one alone will not do. 
 453. See supra text accompanying notes 299, 324. 
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public domain to such a degree that no term extension 
impoverishing the public domain while creating no new 
incentive could ever be progressive, or that the progress of 
Science language refers specifically and exclusively to the 
public domain’s enrichment.  Term extension opponents could 
ask much less of a judge by arguing, closer to the text of the 
Copyright Clause, that: (1) as long as an exclusive right in a 
work endures, its continuation must be meaningful to the 
author; and (2) the longer the period of exclusivity, the wider 
the gap between the right’s benefit to the author and its costs 
to the public in the form of monopoly pricing—costs that may 
be imposed only for the purpose of rewarding the author, and 
that at some point must be lifted.454 
D. NO MORE TERM EXTENSIONS, PLEASE 
The above subheading’s recommendation, which might 
more accurately be termed a plea, follows logically from the 
earlier discussion and analysis in the article.  It remains logical 
even if one rejects our view that the CTEA violated the 
Copyright Clause and, instead, prefers the Eldred majority’s 
 
 454. What might seem at first glance a weakness in our efficiency 
argument is actually not a problem.  Because efficiency deteriorates so 
quickly, the duration extension included in the Copyright Act of 1976 looks 
nearly as constitutionally questionable as the CTEA.  Recall that the 1976 Act 
extended the copyright duration for pre-1978 works from 56 years to 75 years.  
On average, then, the 1976 extension was a mere 0.81% efficient, see supra 
notes 447-448, meaning that over the extension period, the average dollar 
delivered to the prospective author cost the public $123.46.  Because the CTEA 
and the 1976 extension are inefficient on the same order of magnitude, a 
challenge to the CTEA based on its inefficiency might risk, for some, proving 
too much: that the 1976 Act, only twice as efficient as the CTEA, is itself 
invalid.  The authors doctrine points meaningfully to a downward slope, but 
the slope is smooth, and lacks any sort of spike or downward pitch that would 
single out a point when the copyright no longer belonged to the author.  As 
noted earlier, however, other considerations may indicate that the 1976 Act’s 
term extension was constitutional even if the CTEA is not, and that even if the 
1976 extension was also unconstitutional, given the minor economic incentive, 
a court would be able to fashion a decree in such a way that any  longstanding 
reliance interests of potentially affected parties would be protected.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 262, 381; supra note 194.  It should also be noted 
that Eldred may pose minor difficulties for our theory.  In Eldred, the Court 
cited “upkeep” arguments as part of Congress’ “rational basis” for enacting the 
CTEA.  See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207.  These arguments, which have little to do 
with incentive, may be hard to reconcile with our emphasis on the Authors 
provision.  Nevertheless, they were not primary points of emphasis in Eldred 
and, in any event, are further removed from the Copyright Clause’s text than 
is our approach. 
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position that the CTEA was unwise but not unconstitutional.455  
Notwithstanding our many criticisms of the Court’s handling of 
the constitutional issues, Eldred will have done some good if it 
helps expose the lack of wisdom demonstrated by Congress 
when it enacted the CTEA. 
When the expected push for another copyright duration 
extension begins a few years before 2018, Congress will need 
some institutional memory in regard to the CTEA debacle.  It 
must remember that the public interest is a key component of 
the copyright balance.  If it does so, Congress will decide that 
enough is enough, and that yet another term extension would 
be beyond the pale.  Being realistic, however, we cannot predict 
with confidence that Congress will reject the extension 
overtures that are sure to come.  We therefore offer, in the next 
subsection, suggestions for courts faced with deciding a 
constitutional challenge to a future extension of copyright 
duration. 
E. WHAT IF CONGRESS AGAIN EXTENDS COPYRIGHT DURATION? 
If Congress again takes the unfortunate step of 
lengthening copyright duration, the enactment should be 
attacked on constitutional grounds.  In deciding the 
constitutional challenge, the lower courts and ultimately the 
Supreme Court must take proper account of the Copyright 
Clause as a whole and must give effect to all of the language 
therein.  Doing so will involve heeding our earlier criticisms of 
Eldred’s treatment of incentive-related issues and of that 
decision’s adoption of a lenient, overly deferential standard of 
review.456 
It will also be important to interpret the Copyright 
Clause’s limited times language in light of the meaning the 
Framers reasonably would have contemplated.  As explained 
earlier, the almost-contemporaneous-construction principle 
should be applied.  Under that principle, the Copyright Act of 
1790 and its establishment of a maximum duration of 28 years 
would be seen as a reliable indication of the general length the 
Framers probably had in mind when they used the limited 
times phrase in the Copyright Clause.457  If the drastically 
 
 455. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22. 
 456. See supra text accompanying notes 325-372, 386-415. 
 457. See supra text accompanying notes 410-415.  See also Karjala, supra 
note 44 at 244-45 (discussing importance of considering 28-year duration 
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lengthened durations called for by the CTEA are supplemented 
by yet another extension, that extension would place the 
copyright term at a point exceedingly far removed from what 
the Framers presumably envisioned when they spoke of limited 
times.  Such a state of affairs should not be ignored by a court 
(or the Court) in the quest to give meaning to constitutional 
language. 
Judicial examination of the next copyright duration 
extension, if there is one, should involve another feature we 
suggested earlier: a more careful consideration of  the “to 
Authors” language in the Copyright Clause.  As indicated in 
our earlier explanation, a focus on the “to Authors” phrasing 
would complement the analysis of the “limited [t]imes” 
language, would inform the analysis of incentive issues arising 
under the Copyright Clause, and would help give effect to the 
Clause’s overall language and objectives.458 
Worth noting, also, is Justice Ginsburg’s narrow handling 
of the concern in Eldred that retroactive term extensions could 
be strung together to create an effectively perpetual term.  She 
wrote that “ [n]othing before this Court warrants construction 
of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension as a congressional 
attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’ constraint,”459 
but offered no elaboration on the point.  She did not attempt to 
dismiss the stringing-together argument altogether.  It could be 
simply that demonstrating the argument to be inapplicable to 
this case was more economical than demonstrating it to be 
impermissible in any case regardless of its context, and Justice 
Ginsburg acted accordingly.  But it could also be that Justice 
Ginsburg and the Court wished to leave open the possibility of 
a determination that Congress, in passing some future term 
extension, was consciously providing the next “installment”460 
on a perpetual term, and was thereby acting 
 
established by 1790 Act in determining what limited times means). 
 458. See supra text accompanying notes 445-454. 
 459. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. 
 460. Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law, 
American University) (voicing the suspicion that the CTEA “represents a 
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan”).  In Eldred, 
Justice Ginsburg observed that whether referents such as the rule against 
perpetuities “mark the outer boundary of ‘limited Times’ is not before us 
today.”  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 n.17.  This statement may be a further 
indication that another copyright duration extension by Congress could 
present such an “outer boundary” issue.  See id. at 208-10. 
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unconstitutionally. 
Such a determination would be difficult to make.  If 
nothing else, the length of the intervals that may pass between 
term extensions may complicate an attempt to identify 
legislative misbehavior.  By the time Disney and the Gershwin 
estate begin working on the next term extension,461 enough 
new faces will occupy Congress that it will be difficult to single 
out a continuous group of legislators to whom the conspiracy 
can be attributed.462  But even if there is no conscious 
congressional intent to subvert the limited times provision, 
Congress may do so inadvertently, and likely will unless 
checked by the judiciary.463 
In our view, courts revisiting the issues of the sort 
considered in Eldred should take note of one point frequently 
overlooked: namely, that even as the theoretical reasons to 
extend the term of copyright diminish with each successive 
extension, the practical reasons not to extend the term of 
copyright diminish likewise.  That is, as the baseline term of 
copyright grows longer and longer, two things occur.  First, the 
public domain becomes more and more literally a thing of the 
past.  Recall one of the article-opening hypotheticals, 
concerning which we wrote that a work authored in 1923 
would, under the CTEA’s terms, enjoy a 95-year term of 
copyright and would not enter the public domain until the year 
2018 ends.  By that time, the work of course would be 
significantly older than it would have been at the end of 1998, 
when it would have become public domain-property if not for 
the CTEA, and far older than it would have been in 1979, the 
public domain entry year originally scheduled under the 
 
 461. Let us say 2015, 20 years after the CTEA’s initial prototype was 
proposed.  See supra note 50. 
 462. Of course, there is the institutional memory that Congress should be 
expected to have regardless of the identities of the individuals who make up 
that body at any given point.  Some courts, however, might be reluctant to 
regard mere institutional carryover as furnishing a sufficient basis for 
congressional accountability on an attempt-to-evade basis. 
 463. As suggested by the textual statement to which this footnote is 
appended, whether Congress intended to act unconstitutionally may not be 
nearly as important, in the end, as Justice Ginsburg’s statement in Eldred 
seemed to indicate.  Whether a government action is unconstitutional should 
depend primarily on the action’s effect rather than on what the underlying 
intent was or was not.  Cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(questioning “why the Court considers it relevant” that Congress supposedly 
was not involved in an attempt to evade the limited times constraint). 
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Copyright Act of 1909.464  When the public domain becomes 
occupied only by the ancients, the relevance of the public 
domain to the citizenry appears so slight that retroactive term 
extensions receive little notice.  This surely accounts in large 
part for the relative silence surrounding the CTEA’s passage.  
By way of contrast, imagine the noise that a 20-year retroactive 
extension could generate now if, for instance, the maximum 
term of copyright were still 28 years, and the movie Star Wars 
were slated to enter the public domain in 2005. 
A longer and longer baseline duration may have a second 
effect: that the baseline term becomes so long as to drain all 
practical significance from objections to further extensions. 
Suppose, for instance, that in 2018, Congress extends copyright 
duration another 100 years.  By 2115, if Walt Disney himself, 
roused from cryogenic slumber, petitions for another extension, 
legislators would likely be unconcerned about slowing future 
works’ entry into the public domain.  For after all, the average 
term of copyright would then already be 195 years,465 an 
interval in which anything could happen, and projections so 
basic as the survival of the intellectual property system, of the 
U.S. Constitution, and even of the human race itself, become 
speculative to varying degrees.  If the date of entry into the 
public domain were already so far off, a further postponement 
would seem only to have theoretical importance.  Additionally, 
although the baseline term of copyright is not yet 195 years, 
one could reasonably characterize the 95-year term as already 
so long that the additional century of protection would make 
only a theoretical difference to the prospective application. 
These factors add up to make term extension a less 
consequential decision each time.  There is no sign, however, 
that the copyright owners’ lobby will ease its pressure.  
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court requires that a finding of 
intent to create a perpetual term must be found in order for a 
term extension to be invalidated,466 then legislators will see 
little reason not to support new term extensions every time the 
matter comes up. 
One possible remedy for this domino effect would be to 
disallow any argument in supposed justification of a particular 
extension if that argument would seem to apply to term 
 
 464. For the earlier explanation, see supra text accompanying note 59. 
 465. This assumes no changes in life expectancy. 
 466. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16. 
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extensions generally.  In order to determine whether an 
argument for term extension was permissible, a court would 
abstract from the particulars and suppose a baseline term of 
length x, an extension of length y, and only the contextual 
factors that can reasonably be expected never to change.  If an 
asserted basis for term extension appears to apply just as well 
to any term extension as to the one at hand, then that basis 
would not be given credence.  For example, if it were argued 
before a court that Congress had chosen to extend the term of 
copyright from 95 years to 100 years in order simply to afford 
authors a greater incentive to publish, the court should ignore 
that justification, for any extension of any finite term would 
increase the incentive somewhat.  If it were argued, on the 
other hand, that the above-mentioned extension was meant to 
increase the incentive to authors by 0.046%,467 the court should 
examine the argument on its negligible merits. 
This test would have to be at least indirectly based on 
these acknowledgments by courts: that the pressure on 
Congress to stop extending copyright durations will not 
increase as a function of the term length, but may indeed 
decrease; that, so long as the word “limited” in the Copyright 
Clause is taken to mean merely finite, then any one term will 
be just as limited as the last; and that, if a certain line of 
reasoning justifying an extension this time around could 
reasonably be expected to work equally well next time, and the 
next, and so on, then it would be likely to carry the working 
terms of currently copyrighted works into perpetuity.  If courts 
are unwilling to specify how far Congress can go and still have 
a copyright duration that is a limited time, the courts must be 
careful not to approve of any particular term extension on 
grounds that could be generalized to any future extension.  To 
allow use of such generalized grounds would be to give tacit 
approval to a hypothetical indefinite series of term extensions, 
and thus a perpetual working copyright. 
A difficulty in implementing such a scheme would be to 
decide when a term extension is really justified by special 
circumstances.  Some examples may be helpful.  The 1831 and 
1909 extensions would both be justifiable on the specific ground 
that they provided significant marginal incentive.468  The 1976 
 
 467. See supra notes 447-448. 
 468. Significant marginal incentive is non-generalized because it focuses on 
the meaningfulness of the incentive provided by the extension at issue, as 
opposed to the largely theoretical added incentive that any extension might be 
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extension could be justified on the ground that the 
requirements of the Berne Convention, a unique event, made it 
imperative.469  Notwithstanding Eldred’s unconvincing reliance 
on the minimal harmonization with European Union copyright 
duration as a supposed justification for the CTEA,470 we believe 
that courts are generally up to the task of distinguishing 
between meaningful special circumstances and those of the 
makeweight variety. 
F. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
Elsewhere in the article, we have predicted that as the 
year 2018 approaches, there will be efforts to persuade 
Congress to enact yet another copyright duration extension.471  
We would be pleased if that prediction does not prove accurate.  
If such efforts occur, however, the public will have to be vigilant 
in order to make certain that Congress does not enact Bono II.  
By the public, we mean not only ordinary citizens but also a 
broad range of associations, organizations (for-profit and not-
for-profit), and educational institutions.  All of these parties 
share the interest in a proper copyright balance and in a 
vibrant public domain from which to draw.  This broadly 
defined public will have to watch for signs of extension-related 
lobbying efforts and for other early rumblings that might signal 
future legislative developments in that regard.  It must weigh 
in with senators and representatives regarding the lack of need 
or justification for another term extension, in case Congress 
forgets in the intervening years about the shortchanging of the 
public interest that the CTEA accomplished. 
Perhaps it is idealistic to think that the public will assume 
this monitoring role, but perhaps not.  Even if Eldred was 
wrongly decided, the Court’s lukewarm approval of the CTEA 
and the media coverage generated by the decision472 probably 
 
asserted to have. 
 469. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257-61, 263-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 470. See id. at 256-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For further discussion of 
this point, see supra text accompanying notes 319-320. 
 471. See supra text accompanying notes 422-424, 455-456. 
 472. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22 (crediting the petitioners for having 
“forcefully urge[d] that Congress pursued very bad policy,” but holding that a 
supposed lack of “wisdom” on the part of Congress did not render the CTEA 
unconstitutional).  For examples of post-Eldred media coverage that gave 
attention to the objections raised against the CTEA, see Greenhouse, supra 
note 415, at A22; Amy Harmon, A Corporate Victory, But One That Raises 
Public Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A24.  See also Lessig, 
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have made the public more aware of copyright issues and of the 
reality that term extensions are not cost-free.  One assumes, 
moreover, that media attention to a future move to extend 
copyright duration would be greater than the minimal press 
coverage given to the CTEA prior to its enactment. 
Creators, would-be creators, and copyright owners could 
also be part of the broadly defined public that would send a no-
more-extensions message to Congress.  These parties, however, 
will not decide to join in that message unless they develop a 
more expansive vision of what is good public policy regarding 
copyrights.473  Those who create and those who own copyrights 
should recognize that what goes around comes around.  One’s 
CTEA-lengthened copyright may operate in a certain instance 
to prevent another party from using the work or to require that 
the user pay a licensing fee.  In another instance, however, the 
creator or copyright owner who “benefited” from the CTEA will 
be disadvantaged by it when that party wishes to use, for 
creative purposes, another’s work that would have been in the 
public domain for free use if not for the CTEA.  The good 
public—and constitutional—policy of maintaining a rich and 
accessible public domain thus may be seen as consistent with, 
not contrary to, the interests of creators.474  Perhaps as we get 
closer to 2018, the venerable quartet of Quincy Jones, Bob 
Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana will come to that 
realization and decline to provide congressional testimony in 
support of a possible Bono II.475 
Regarding Congress, we have already made plain our 
primary recommendation: Congress should get out of the 
copyright term extension business.476  In addition, we 
recommend the previously discussed PDEA, or an enactment 
similar thereto, as a sensible way of lessening the harm done 
by the CTEA.477  We now close this section with a proposal for a 
 
supra note 416, at A17. 
 473. Though they may not think of it in that sense, the more expansive 
vision would also be closer to the constitutional policy established by the 
Copyright Clause, which contemplates rights not only for creators but also for 
the public.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (creators’ exclusive rights must 
expire after limited time). 
 474. See generally supra parts III.B, III.C, IV.A, IV.B. 
 475. As noted earlier, Jones, Dylan, Henley, and Santana testified before 
Congress on the pro-CTEA side.  See supra text accompanying notes 108, 279-
281; supra note 50. 
 476. See supra text accompanying notes 455-456. 
 477. See supra text accompanying notes 416-424. 
LANGVARDT 05/12/2004  12:52 PM 
2004] UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 289 
 
narrow statute that speaks to a specific situation touched upon 
by the Supreme Court in Eldred. 
When works such as films or audio recordings are 
“restored” in one way or another, copyright protection often 
extends to some new element of expression present in the 
restored edition.478  Protection does not extend, however, to the 
grunt work—the cleaning of the print, the remastering of the 
soundtrack— that is likely the most arduous and costly, and in 
the case of older films with deteriorating prints, the most 
urgent, part of the restoration project.479 
We suggest here that a new, narrow right be recognized for 
restorers of public-domain works.  This exclusive right, which 
would exist for a definite period of time such as 20 years, would 
extend only to the restored edition of the work; the right-holder 
would have no rights over the underlying public domain work 
itself.  Nor would the holder of the restorer’s right be able to 
prevent others from making their own restored editions.480  
Digital watermarking technologies481 could serve to safeguard 
against free-riders who would simply copy the protected 
restoration and market it as their own. 
One of the principal justifications advanced in favor of the 
CTEA was that 20 more years of exclusivity in the oldest works 
would give those works’ copyright owners an incentive to 
 
 478. For instance, the restorer might produce a DVD that includes not only 
a restored version of the underlying film but also commentary on the film by 
an expert. 
 479. See 17 U.S. C. § 102(b) (2000).  Earlier, we referred to the film 
Metropolis as an example of a restored public-domain film.  See supra text 
accompanying note 317.  The film’s restorers would have copyright protection 
regarding a number of their additions and changes—for instance, some 
“intertitles” that explain what is happening between scenes—but they have no 
copyright rights regarding the physical restoration labor and process.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b).  For more information regarding the restored edition of 
Metropolis, see Michael Janusonis, Fritz Lang’s Classic Metropolis is 
Captivating, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Nov. 1, 2002, at E2. 
 480. By “making their own restored editions,” we mean employing film-
restoration technology and equipment to the public domain film in a manner 
that reflects time, effort, and expense comparable to what the previous 
restorer would have had to devote to the project, as opposed to simply making 
copies of the earlier restorer’s version. 
 481. See, e.g., Sarnoff Lab Says Studios are Interested in Copy-Tracing 
Watermark, AUDIO WEEK, February 17, 2003.  Typically, digital watermarking 
is discussed in the anti-piracy context as a means of tracing a file back to a 
particular user.  In the context of our proposal, the invisible watermark would 
be used to trace a file back to its true restorer. 
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restore them.482  With its narrower scope, the restorer’s right 
would provide the same incentive to prospective restorers while 
leaving valuable material available to the public. Through 
allowing diverse parties the opportunity to restore a work, the 
restorer’s right would allow for a degree of competition among 
restorers that copyright term extension cannot, while also 
doing a better job of seeing that a greater and more diverse 
number of works would likely be restored.  Finally, by coming 
into play whenever the restorer decides to restore the work, the 
incentive of the restorer’s right would outpace the temporary, 
ever deteriorating, and largely theoretical incentive of a term 
extension. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the CTEA, it set two dubious 
records: first, the shortest length of time since a previous 
extension of copyright duration (22 years) and second, the 
longest single duration extension (20 years).  Applying both 
prospectively and retrospectively and coming so closely, in a 
relative sense, on the heels of the 19-year extension granted in 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the CTEA has produced striking 
effects.  Copyright duration is now set at 95 years for pre-1978 
copyrighted works that qualified for the CTEA’s duration, even 
though the law in existence at the time those works came 
under copyright called for a maximum duration of 56 years.  
For works created in 1978 or thereafter, the average post-
CTEA duration is presumably 95 years, with many works 
receiving a far longer period of protection.  Ninety-five or more 
years of copyright protection stands in marked contrast with 
the maximum of 28 years of protection established in the 
Copyright Act of 1790.  That statute, of course, was enacted 
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, whose 
Copyright Clause sets the ground rules with which 
congressional enactments regarding copyright must comply. 
In enacting the CTEA, Congress demonstrated a 
disturbing willingness to do the bidding of Disney et al., the 
outspoken CTEA proponents whose concern was that some of 
their copyrights on important properties would soon expire if 
 
 482. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07.  As Justice Stevens suggested, 
however, the need to furnish incentives to restore old works could have been 
accomplished by a measure that stopped far short of a blanket extension of the 
duration of all copyrights.  See id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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no duration extension were granted.  Preoccupied with the 
interests and wishes of copyright owners, Congress seemingly 
gave little or no thought to preservation of the proper 
Copyright Clause-mandated balance in this area of intellectual 
property.  That balance calls for a rich public domain from 
which all may freely draw.  The CTEA, however, has frozen the 
public domain at its 1998 composition until January 1, 2019, 
and has established a massive giveaway to copyright owners at 
considerable costs—economic and non-economic—to the public. 
Congress acted both unwisely and unconstitutionally, in 
our view, when it established the CTEA jackpot for copyright 
owners.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the 
CTEA against constitutional attack but suggested strongly that 
the CTEA was not an example of good policymaking.  As we 
have shown here, the Court erred in holding that the CTEA 
passed constitutional muster.  The Court’s overly deferential 
approach paid insufficient attention to the flimsiness of the 
justifications offered for the CTEA.  Sacrificing analytical 
soundness for expediency, the Court did not properly address 
the controlling components of the Copyright Clause, including 
its incentive requirement, its “limited [t]imes” requirement and 
other relevant language placing checks on congressional power, 
and its contemplation of a vibrant and accessible public 
domain. 
Despite its extremely deferential thrust and its seemingly 
broad sweep, Eldred may not have resolved all questions 
regarding the CTEA’s constitutionality.  Moreover, Eldred 
appears to have allowed an opening for possible constitutional 
challenges of later copyright extensions (should they be enacted 
by Congress).  Perhaps the embarrassment factor produced by 
media coverage of Eldred’s commentary on an apparent lack of 
congressional wisdom will cause Congress not to enact further 
extensions of copyright duration; perhaps Congress will 
otherwise recognize the error of its duration-extending ways.  
But this may be wishful thinking.  If Congress fails to learn 
from the CTEA debacle and again succumbs to the term-
extension lobbying machine that seems likely to be cranked up 
as 2018 draws nearer, courts—and possibly the Supreme 
Court—will become involved in determining the 
constitutionality of yet another term extension.  We have 
therefore offered recommendations for proper judicial handling 
of the constitutional analysis.  If Congress sensibly decides to 
reject any future duration-extension overtures, it should also 
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consider the recommendations we have offered for legislation 
that may lessen the damage done by the CTEA and 
simultaneously further the creative process. 
Because of the CTEA, the copyright on this article will last 
for the duration of the co-authors’ lives plus 70 years.  Would 
we still have had ample incentive to write if the controlling 
legal rule had continued to call for a copyright duration of life 
plus “only” 50 years?  Of course, though the article would have 
dealt with some other topic. We would not have written this 
article, for if the rules were still life-plus-50, there would have 
been no CTEA, no Eldred, and, accordingly, no related article.  
So, in that sense, the CTEA did provide us an “incentive” to 
write.  Perhaps we owe Congress a thank-you note after all. 
 
